The Proliferation Security Initiative as a New Paradigm for Peace and Security Dr Mark R Shulman Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have menaced mankind for six decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the threat has changed dramatically with the development of new weapons, with the rise of transnational criminal and terrorist organizations, and with a diminishing capacity of some states to control the weapons they have. In the hands of an Al Qaeda, such a weapon threatens to kill tens of thousands and destroy tens of billions of dollars worth of property. It could bring global trade to a standstill and trigger panic, economic depression, and widespread suffering the likes of which have not been seen for many years."

Iron Troikas: The New Threat from the East Dr Richard J Krickus Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "There has been widespread discussion of Russia’s efforts to exploit its energy assets to influence developments in Ukraine; specifically, to put pressure on the leaders of the Orange Revolution who have adopted a Western orientation, rather than one toward the East—Russia. Less attention has been devoted to similar efforts undertaken by Russia to advance Moscow’s security objectives in the East Baltic Sea Region (EBSR). Through what the author of this monograph, Dr. Richard Krickus, calls Iron Troikas, he demonstrates how the Russian leadership has exploited its energy assets to advance its security interests in the vital EBSR—with emphasis on Poland and the Baltic countries."

CU @ The FOB: How the Forward Operating Base is Changing the Life of Combat Soldiers Dr Stephen J Gerras, Dr Leonard Wong Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This inquiry has been conducted in the midst of increasing questioning by policymakers and scholars concerning the importance and role of alliances and other multilateral arrangements and legal norms affecting the use of force by the United States. Provoked in part by the transatlantic altercations surrounding Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the questioning is driven by systemic developments—changes in the structure of world politics and changes in the shape of war—of which the Iraq-focused disputes were a symptom."

Multilateral Constraints on the Use of Force: A Reassessment Dr Seyom Brown Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This inquiry has been conducted in the midst of increasing questioning by policymakers and scholars concerning the importance and role of alliances and other multilateral arrangements and legal norms affecting the use of force by the United States. Provoked in part by the transatlantic altercations surrounding Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the questioning is driven by systemic developments—changes in the structure of world politics and changes in the shape of war—of which the Iraq-focused disputes were a symptom."

Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies Dr James S Corum Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph examines the British experience in building and training indigenous police and military forces during the Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies. The two insurgencies provide a dramatic contrast to the issue of training local security forces. In Malaya, the British developed a very successful strategy for training the Malayan police and army. In Cyprus, the British strategy for building and training local security forces generally was ineffective. The author argues that some important lessons can be drawn from these case studies that apply directly to current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine."

Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray considers irregular warfare in the light of the general theory of strategy and finds that that theory is fully adequate to explain the phenomenon. Rather less adequate, Dr. Gray suggests, is the traditional American way of war. The monograph offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of “the American way.” It concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that “way” and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes."

Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System Dr Andrew Scobell Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In the first decade of the 21st century, few national security challenges facing the United States are as vexing as that posed by North Korea. North Korea is both a paradox and an enigma. It is a paradox because on the one hand, by some measures it appears to be a very powerful state—possessing the world’s fourth largest armed forces, a sizeable arsenal of ballistic missiles, and a worrying nuclear program—but on the other hand, it is an economic basket case in terms of agricultural output, industrial production, and foreign trade exports. North Korea is also an enigma because virtually every aspect of the Pyongyang regime is mysterious and puzzling."

Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The Sovereignty of Context Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph provides an audit, a not-unfriendly critical review, of the concept of revolutionary military change. It offers a review of what those who theorize about, and those who are committed by policy to execute, such a revolution ought to know about their subject. As the subtitle of the analysis announces, the leading edge of the argument is the potency, indeed the sovereign importance, of warfare’s contexts."

Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy Dr Harry R Yarger Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The word “strategy” pervades American conversation and our news media. We tend to use strategy as a general term for a plan, a concept, a course of action, or a “vision” of the direction in which to proceed at the personal, organizational, and governmental—local, state, or federal—levels. Such casual use of the term to describe nothing more than “what we would like to do next” is inappropriate and belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking. It reduces strategy to just a good idea without the necessary underlying thought or development. It also leads to confusion between strategy and planning, confining strategic possibilities to near-time planning assumptions and details, while limiting the flexibility of strategic thought and setting inappropriately specific expectations of outcomes. "