Antulio J. Echevarria II, Larry P. Goodson, and Brennan Deveraux – Project Directors; Integrated Research Project from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; The US government and the US Army are unprepared for a great-power war. This integrated research project (IRP), sponsored by Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General James J. Mingus, is a critical first step in helping senior US Army leaders increase their knowledge of, and preparations for, deterring or fighting a great-power war in the twenty-first century. No one knows how long the US government and the US Army have to prepare for a future conflict. Consequently, the US Department of Defense faces difficult decisions as it balances preparing for a future war with maintaining readiness to address current challenges. The student research in this IRP only scratches the surface of what the US Department of Defense and the US Army should do to understand, deter, and prepare more effectively for the possibility of a great-power war in the twenty-first century. While the steps outlined here are preliminary, they are not tentative. Readers will find that each chapter offers concrete, actionable recommendations based on duly considered analysis. But more work lies ahead.

Antulio J. Echevarria II; Monograph from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; This monograph discusses how NATO might better leverage risk to strengthen the alliance’s extended deterrence. Such leverage would prove especially useful because Kyiv is unlikely to be permitted to join NATO and the United States may reduce its presence in Europe. Western analysts have not given Russian deterrence enough credit for the alliance’s deterrence failure on February 24, 2022. The alliance did not act fecklessly, nor did it self-deter. Rather, NATO’s deterrence measures were calibrated more for hybrid/gray-zone attacks of the sort it saw in 2014, not for the large-scale combat operations the alliance witnessed in 2022, which involved a nuclear-armed adversary with stronger interests in Ukraine than NATO had. To be sure, the alliance’s leaders acted responsibly in managing the risk of escalation. But in so doing, they also facilitated Russian deterrence efforts, which succeeded in keeping Washington and Brussels from intervening in the war. The alliance thus demonstrated its need for a strategy that would increase the risks and costs of war for Russia without unduly raising NATO’s. In short, the alliance needs a proxy strategy of “waging war without going to war,” whereby NATO can provide its full political, economic, and military support to Ukraine without running the risk of putting alliance troops in harm’s way.

Brennan Deveraux and Joshua Arostegui; Monograph from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; This monograph establishes a contextual baseline that serves as the framework for future comparisons of the US Army and the People’s Liberation Army Army. It examines differences in five key components of land warfare: the two nations’ landpower definitions, uses of land forces to build relationships, underlying warfare concepts, associated modernization efforts, and varying approaches to simulating land warfare in the region. In examining these components, the authors identify warfare intangibles that highlight analytical findings in a way that promotes future research. The existing scholarship comparing the two forces is often limited in scope, focusing on funding or comparing capabilities such as the number of specific weapons systems. This monograph differs from existing scholarship by providing a broad, in-depth comparison of critical landpower components. The analysis challenges long-held assumptions about US Army superiority and sets a foundation for future research. The authors rely heavily on primary sources and ample secondary documents translated directly from Chinese vernacular sources. This study’s conclusions challenge conventional thinking surrounding the People’s Liberation Army and will assist US military and policy practitioners in assessing the relative strengths and advantages the US military can grow or exploit.

C. Anthony Pfaff and Christopher John Hickey, Principal Investigators; ©2025 C. Anthony Pfaff. All rights reserved. Integrated Research Project from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; "Integrating Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Technologies into Common Operating Picture and Course of Action Development" explores the potential of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning to revolutionize military planning processes by enhancing situational awareness and expediting course of action development within the Joint planning process. The study delves into technical, organizational, and resource considerations that are critical for AI integration. In addition, the study highlights the importance of clean, structured data in training AI systems, addresses challenges in data collection across varying formats and classifications, and emphasizes the need for AI-friendly infrastructure. By automating processes like common operational picture generation and leveraging AI for course of action analysis, military planners can achieve greater efficiency and decision-making speed. Furthermore, this publication underscores the challenges of ethical implementation, resource sustainability, and organizational adaptation, including upskilling personnel and integrating commercial vendors. Case studies, such as the Maven Smart System and STORMBREAKER, demonstrate AI’s ability to enhance data fusion, improve battlefield awareness, and streamline operational planning. This research provides a robust framework for overcoming barriers to AI adoption, enabling the US military to harness AI technologies for enhanced planning, decision making, and operational success.

Publication from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; Maintaining strategic advantage demands professional discourse from across the force. The Academic Year 2025–26 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment provides a framework for those aspiring to tackle the Department of Defense’s most pressing challenges. This year’s authors highlight trending challenges and identify potential tension points across 15 sections organized into four enduring themes. This survey of regional, domestic, and institutional challenges represents the collective expertise of the US Army War College. The narrative is supplemented by a tailored list of 100 command-sponsored questions from 43 different Army and Joint organizations from across the Department of Defense. Combined, the distinct yet complementary narrative and question list offer unique insights into the vital matters impacting defense organizations and provide aspiring researchers with a necessary starting point.

George M. Schwartz, Editor; Conference papers from the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College Press; Using disinformation and social media means, cognitive warfare seeks to shape the attitudes and behaviors of a civilian populace by negatively influencing and disrupting their cognitive processes, thus weakening a society’s political will and degrading national resilience. The authors of these papers provide insights and offer solutions for cognitive defense. Copyright: Chapter 1 – ©2025 Mark R. Landahl; Chapter 3 – ©2025 George M. Schwartz

John A. Bonin, ©2025 John A. Bonin; Monograph from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; Although 1775 is indisputably the birth year of the US Army, two events occurred on June 14 of that year to which the Army can credit its birthday. One is the adoption by the Continental Congress of the collective militia forces from several colonies outside Boston to form a Continental Army, of which Congress appointed George Washington the commander in chief on June 15, 1775. In addition, the US Regular Army officially dates its beginning to June 14, 1775, when the Second Continental Congress directed 10 companies of expert riflemen to be raised immediately in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. William Thompson’s commission as the colonel of the Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion was dated June 25, 1775, and made him the first colonel of what would eventually become, through George Washington’s Continental Army, the US Regular Army. But William Thompson has not found a prominent place in the American pantheon of revolutionary heroes for a variety of reasons. In addition, Thompson’s Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion later became the 1st Continental Regiment and ended the American Revolution as the 1st Pennsylvania Regiment, but its lineage has not continued in the modern US Army.

John R. Deni and Jeffrey D. Rathke, Editors; Collaborative study from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, American-German Institute, US Army War College Press; The essays in this volume analyze Germany’s Zeitenwende, a pivotal shift in security policy triggered by Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Key topics include national security strategy, defense policy, energy policy, industrial strategy, and international relations with Russia, China, the United States, NATO, and the EU. Copyright: Chapter 1 - ©2025 John R. Deni. All rights reserved; Chapter 2 - ©2025 Marina E. Henke. All rights reserved; Chapter 3 - ©2025 John R. Deni. All rights reserved; Chapter 4 - ©2025 Aylin Matlé. All rights reserved; Chapter 5 - ©2025 Sophia Besch. All rights reserved; Chapter 6 - ©2025 Tim Bosch. All rights reserved; Chapter 7 - ©2025 Angela E. Stent. All rights reserved; Chapter 8 - ©2025 Jeffrey D. Rathke and Theresa Luetkefend. All rights reserved; Chapter 9 - ©2025 May-Britt U. Stumbaum and Sharon de Cet. All rights reserved;

R. Evan Ellis, ©2025 R. Evan Ellis; Monograph from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; Innovative new thinking on the security dimension of the challenges posed by the PRC’s engagement in Latin America and the DoD’s role in the whole-of-government US response is needed. This monograph highlights risks from PRC influence networks, digital architectures, and dual-use commercial facilities in the region, particularly at ports and in the space sector; shows how PRC economic engagement and other support sustains illiberal regimes, indirectly contributing to the risks these regimes pose by hosting criminal and terrorist groups and other US adversaries, such as Russia and Iran; and illustrates how commercial, people-to-people, and security engagements create options for the PRC to exploit against the United States in times of war. It advocates for new effects-based strategic concepts for how the DoD can strengthen cooperation with the region and limit PRC access through enhanced security cooperation and leveraging partners’ valuation of their relationships with the United States to influence their choices regarding cooperation with the PRC and gain better situational awareness for responding to China. Finally, it discusses how the United States should work with regional partners to plan for likely PRC actions in the region in times of war, leveraging the presence, relationships, and knowledge created through engagement.