Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War Dr David C Hendrickson, Dr Robert W Tucker Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker examine the contentious debate over the Iraq war and occupation, focusing on the critique that the Bush administration squandered an historic opportunity to reconstruct the Iraqi state because of various critical blunders in planning. Though they conclude that critics have made a number of telling points against the Bush administration’s conduct of the Iraq war, they argue that the most serious problems facing Iraq and its American occupiers—criminal anarchy and lawlessness, a raging insurgency, and a society divided into rival and antagonistic groups—were virtually inevitable consequences that flowed from the act of war itself."

Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran Mr Patrick Clawson, Mr Henry D Sokolski Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Little more than a year ago, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) completed its initial analysis of Iran’s nuclear program, Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. Since then, Tehran’s nuclear activities and public diplomacy have only affirmed what this analysis first suggested: Iran is not about to give up its effort to make nuclear fuel and, thereby, come within days of acquiring a nuclear bomb. Iran’s continued pursuit of uranium enrichment and plutonium recycling puts a premium on asking what a more confident nuclear-ready Iran might confront us with and what we might do now to hedge against these threats."

Going to War With the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism Dr Daniel Byman Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Daniel Byman reviews the problems common to the security forces of local allies that have fought or may soon fight insurgencies linked to al-Qa’ida. He argues that these problems stem from deep structural weaknesses, such as the regime’s perceived illegitimacy, poor civil-military relations, an undeveloped economy, and discriminatory societies. Together, they greatly inhibit the allied armed forces’ effectiveness in fighting the insurgents. Various U.S. programs designed to work with allied security forces, at best, can reduce some of these issues. To be effective, any program to assist allied counterinsurgency forces should factor in the allies’ weaknesses."

Coup D'Oeil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning Dr William Duggan Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In our military professions, formal analytical methods co-exist with intuitive decisionmaking by leaders in action. For the most part, there is no harm done. But many officers can recount times when they knew they should have “gone with their gut,” but followed instead the results of their analytical methods. The gap between these two forms of decisionmaking perhaps has grown wider in recent times, especially in Iraq, where adaptive leadership seems to have overshadowed formal methods of planning. Departing from formal methods increasingly seems to be the mark of an effective commander, as we learn from Dr. Leonard Wong’s recent Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) report, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom (July 2004)."

Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In an era of broad and perhaps profound change, new theories and concepts are to be welcomed rather than shunned. However, before they are fully embraced, they need to be tested rigorously, for the cost of implementing a false theory and developing operational and strategic concepts around it can be greater than remaining wedded to an older, but sounder one. The theory of Fourth Generation War (4GW) is a perfect example. Were we to embrace this theory, a loose collection of ideas that does not hold up to close scrutiny, the price we might pay in a future conflict could be high indeed."

Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation Dr Stephen J Blank Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This book-length monograph seeks to illuminate India’s rising power and capabilities with regard to the key regions on its periphery: the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and South East Asia. The author also considers the major issues pertaining to India’s bilateral defense agenda with the United States. By revealing the dimensions of India’s growing capabilities and interests, he provides a strategic rationale developing the U.S.-India partnership further."

Precedents, Variables, and Options in Planning a U.S. Military Disengagement Strategy from Iraq Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr W Andrew Terrill Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The United States is engaged in a massive effort to rehabilitate the government and political culture of Iraq, following the destruction of the Saddam Hussein regime in spring 2003. The U.S. goal and ideal for Iraq is the establishment and maintenance of a strong, self-sufficient, and forward-looking government. Currently, Iraq is in transition, as that country’s political leaders seek to establish a new, more representative form of government, while at the same time attempting to cope with a vicious ongoing insurgency. To accomplish these tasks, the government needs significant U.S. military support which will be reduced and then eliminated over time as the Iraqis hopefully become more self-sufficient."

Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare Dr Max G Manwaring Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph comes at a time when the U.S. and Venezuelan governments are intensifying an ongoing series of acrimonious charges and countercharges. Each country has argued repeatedly that the other is engaged in a political-economic-military struggle for Western Hemisphere hegemony. On a more personal level, the United States maintains that President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela is playing a destabilizing role in the region, and is compromising the quality of democracy and the exercise of power in Venezuela and other parts of the Americas. Chávez rebuts that the only destabilizing factor in the hemisphere is President George W. Bush, and that democracy and power long since have been perverted by American capitalists and local elites for their own purposes. And the U.S.-Venezuelan verbal sparing match continues unabated."

Contractors on Deployed Military Operations: United Kingdom Policy and Doctrine Prof Matthew Uttley Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Department of Defense (DoD) initiatives to use contractors on deployed military operations remains a contentious issue in U.S. military transformation. Despite the intense debates surrounding the benefits and costs of DoD outsourcing, little attention has focussed on similar Ministry of Defence (MoD) initiatives underway in the United Kingdom (UK). Since the UK and United States are likely to remain close allies in future expeditionary deployments, the MoD’s approach to contractor support is a salient case study for the DoD and U.S. armed services. This monograph, by Professor Matthew Uttley, examines the controversies surrounding deployed contractor support, the ways that the MoD has harnessed private sector capacity, and the lessons this provides for U.S. policymakers and military planners. In doing so, the author provides important insights into a significant theme in contemporary defense and security policy,"