Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran Mr Patrick Clawson, Mr Henry D Sokolski Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Little more than a year ago, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) completed its initial analysis of Iran’s nuclear program, Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. Since then, Tehran’s nuclear activities and public diplomacy have only affirmed what this analysis first suggested: Iran is not about to give up its effort to make nuclear fuel and, thereby, come within days of acquiring a nuclear bomb. Iran’s continued pursuit of uranium enrichment and plutonium recycling puts a premium on asking what a more confident nuclear-ready Iran might confront us with and what we might do now to hedge against these threats."

Going to War With the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism Dr Daniel Byman Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Daniel Byman reviews the problems common to the security forces of local allies that have fought or may soon fight insurgencies linked to al-Qa’ida. He argues that these problems stem from deep structural weaknesses, such as the regime’s perceived illegitimacy, poor civil-military relations, an undeveloped economy, and discriminatory societies. Together, they greatly inhibit the allied armed forces’ effectiveness in fighting the insurgents. Various U.S. programs designed to work with allied security forces, at best, can reduce some of these issues. To be effective, any program to assist allied counterinsurgency forces should factor in the allies’ weaknesses."

Coup D'Oeil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning Dr William Duggan Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In our military professions, formal analytical methods co-exist with intuitive decisionmaking by leaders in action. For the most part, there is no harm done. But many officers can recount times when they knew they should have “gone with their gut,” but followed instead the results of their analytical methods. The gap between these two forms of decisionmaking perhaps has grown wider in recent times, especially in Iraq, where adaptive leadership seems to have overshadowed formal methods of planning. Departing from formal methods increasingly seems to be the mark of an effective commander, as we learn from Dr. Leonard Wong’s recent Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) report, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom (July 2004)."

Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In an era of broad and perhaps profound change, new theories and concepts are to be welcomed rather than shunned. However, before they are fully embraced, they need to be tested rigorously, for the cost of implementing a false theory and developing operational and strategic concepts around it can be greater than remaining wedded to an older, but sounder one. The theory of Fourth Generation War (4GW) is a perfect example. Were we to embrace this theory, a loose collection of ideas that does not hold up to close scrutiny, the price we might pay in a future conflict could be high indeed."

Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation Dr Stephen J Blank Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This book-length monograph seeks to illuminate India’s rising power and capabilities with regard to the key regions on its periphery: the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and South East Asia. The author also considers the major issues pertaining to India’s bilateral defense agenda with the United States. By revealing the dimensions of India’s growing capabilities and interests, he provides a strategic rationale developing the U.S.-India partnership further."

Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare Dr Max G Manwaring Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph comes at a time when the U.S. and Venezuelan governments are intensifying an ongoing series of acrimonious charges and countercharges. Each country has argued repeatedly that the other is engaged in a political-economic-military struggle for Western Hemisphere hegemony. On a more personal level, the United States maintains that President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela is playing a destabilizing role in the region, and is compromising the quality of democracy and the exercise of power in Venezuela and other parts of the Americas. Chávez rebuts that the only destabilizing factor in the hemisphere is President George W. Bush, and that democracy and power long since have been perverted by American capitalists and local elites for their own purposes. And the U.S.-Venezuelan verbal sparing match continues unabated."

Contractors on Deployed Military Operations: United Kingdom Policy and Doctrine Prof Matthew Uttley Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Department of Defense (DoD) initiatives to use contractors on deployed military operations remains a contentious issue in U.S. military transformation. Despite the intense debates surrounding the benefits and costs of DoD outsourcing, little attention has focussed on similar Ministry of Defence (MoD) initiatives underway in the United Kingdom (UK). Since the UK and United States are likely to remain close allies in future expeditionary deployments, the MoD’s approach to contractor support is a salient case study for the DoD and U.S. armed services. This monograph, by Professor Matthew Uttley, examines the controversies surrounding deployed contractor support, the ways that the MoD has harnessed private sector capacity, and the lessons this provides for U.S. policymakers and military planners. In doing so, the author provides important insights into a significant theme in contemporary defense and security policy,"

Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf Dr Zachary Abuza Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has re-emerged as one of the more important terrorist groups confronting the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), the United States, and our allies in Southeast Asia. Founded in 1991 by Abdurrajak Janjalani, a veteran of the Afghan Mujiheddin and colleague of Osama bin Laden, the group quickly rose to prominence as a lethal terrorist organization committed to the establishment of an independent Islamic state. With funds from Saudi charities administered by bin Laden’s brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, the ASG grew quickly. The group focused its terrorist, assassination, and kidnapping efforts on sectarian targets. Yet, following the plot led by Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to blow up 11 U.S. jetliners and assassinate the Pope, Khalifa’s and the ASG’s roles were uncovered. "

Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s Dr Jeffrey Record Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The appeasement of Nazi Germany by the western democracies during the 1930s and the subsequent outbreak of World War II have been a major referent experience for U.S. foreign policymakers since 1945. From Harry Truman’s response to the outbreak of the Korean War to George W. Bush’s decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein, American presidents have repeatedly affirmed the “lesson” of Munich and invoked it to justify actual or threatened uses of force. However, the conclusion that the democracies could easily have stopped Hitler before he plunged the world into war and holocaust, but lacked the will to do so, does not survive serious scrutiny. Appeasement proved to be a horribly misguided policy against Hitler, but this conclusion is clear only in hindsight—i.e., through the lens of subsequent events."