Op-Eds

Fighting Insurgents--No Shortcuts to Success Dr James S Corum Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "For the last 3 decades, the Army, the Defense Department, and the CIA have emphasized the high tech aspects of intelligence, sophisticated electronic collection equipment, and multibillion dollar space surveillance programs. Even at the tactical level, Army intelligence personnel are trained primarily to employ a variety of high tech collection means including UAVs, sensors and ground radars. This approach to intelligence collection was appropriate when the intelligence priorities were geared to counting Soviet missile systems or defending the Fulda Gap against a massive Soviet tank attack."

This is Not Your Father's, or Mother's Army! Dr Douglas V Johnson II Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "It would probably strike the average observer as odd or even irrational for the Army to reorganize just as it engages in war, but that seems to be normal for the American Army. In at least three wars, that is exactly what has happened and it is happening again. Had you been an infantry company commander on April 1, 1917, you would have commanded a company of about 58 soldiers armed with 1903 Springfield rifles. By July of that year the company would be 250 strong and equipped with Springfield or possibly British Enfield rifles, heavy and light machineguns, mortars, hand and rifle grenades, and a host of other devices of war new or previously unknown to the U.S. Army."

Debating Ends, not Just Means, in the War on Terror Dr Stephen D Biddle Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The national security debate tends to focus on means. How much money should we spend? Where should we use force? How should our troops be equipped? Ends, however, ought to shape decisions about means. Yet the ends of American national security usually get less attention than the means. As the nation debates national security in this time of war, what critical questions about the ends of American strategy should we be considering?"

Toward a New U.S. Strategy in Asia Dr Stephen J Blank Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Uzbekistan has announced that it will offer U.S. forces a base for operations in Afghanistan, and that it does not rule out the possibility of a permanent base if needed. The importance of this cannot be overestimated. Both Russia and China hoped America's incursion into Central Asia was temporary and would end when the terrorism threat abated. Instead, it appears the United States will remain a major player there, not only countering terrorism but also maintaining access to large energy deposits, preserving options for democratizing these states, and establishing a global power projection capability."

An American Way of War or a Way of Battle? Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Serious study of the American approach to waging war began in the early 1970s with the publication of Russell Weigley’s The American Way of War: A History of U.S. Military Strategy and Policy. Examining how war was thought about and practiced by key U.S. military and political figures from George Washington to Robert McNamara, Weigley concluded that, except in the early days of the nation’s existence, the American way of war centered on the desire to achieve a “crushing” military victory—either through a strategy of attrition or one of annihilation—over an adversary."

The Trajectory of Security Transformation Dr Steven Metz Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "For a decade now, a historic revolution in military affairs has unfolded, driven largely by technological developments. Within the U. S. military, immense effort has been expended to understand this revolution and harness it into security transformation. A network of organizations, institutions, and individual experts emerged to shape and energize this process. The result has been the most rigorous and sustained security transformation in human history."

Expanding the Use of State Defense Forces in Homeland Defense Missions LTC Brent C Bankus Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Current high operational tempo of the active force and the federalized reserves makes it difficult to find adequate numbers of forces to accomplish the many homeland defense missions. As planners attempt to apply the right forces to the proper mission, they need to consider State Defense Forces (SDFs). Planners may be unaware of these forces’ existence; however, they represent an important source of capable manpower to apply within the borders of the various states in the Global War on Terrorism."

What should be Believed about Progress in Iraq? Prof John R Martin Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Reading the newspaper, watching the news or listening to it on the radio, one is led to believe that little or nothing is going right in Iraq. Headlines tell of the combat deaths of soldiers; Iraqis ungrateful and impatient for costly reconstruction efforts; and the failure to find Saddam, his weapons of mass destruction, or evidence of ties to al Qaeda. It seems that the 'quagmire' of 'another Vietnam' is just around the corner. At the opposite extreme are some of the reports coming from the Department of Defense. In an effort to counter the bad image generated from the news reports, they too often insist that all is going according to plan, and that the trends are in the right direction."

Keep the Reserves in the Fight COL James R Pullen Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This statement, attributed to GEN Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff from October 12, 1972 to September 4, 1974, summarizes what has become known as the Abrams Doctrine. This has also been called the Laird-Abrams Doctrine, because it followed on the heels of the Total Force Policy announced in August 1970 by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. In the three decades since GEN Abrams’ tenure, the Army’s reserve components -- the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard -- transformed from neglected, demoralized and left-behind forces to ready units and soldiers that are acknowledged by Defense Department and Army leaders as essential to the Army’s ability to conduct operations."