Op-Eds

Treating Allies as Allies in the Arab World Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "At this crucial junction in time, there are serious, evolving, and seemingly nonstop challenges involving the potential spread of violent upheaval and terrorism in the Middle East and particularly the Gulf region. To address these difficulties, the United States will need to work with friendly Arab nations that can help us meet those challenges with united strength. Unfortunately, the importance of our alliances with regional Arab powers is not always fully appreciated by our own strategic thinkers. Questions correspondingly emerge as to whether we are doing enough to understand allied concerns and find ways in which we can work together to address the terrorism threat."

Knowing when to Salute Prof Douglas C Lovelace Jr, Dr Leonard Wong Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The other morning, about 100 colonels and a handful of civilians assembled for our annual Army War College staff and faculty photo. We were arranged on the outdoor steps of one of the many historic buildings on post and faced the flagpole which dominates the entire campus. Unlike other Army posts, the flag at the Army War College is illuminated day and night and flown continuously—eliminating the need for junior soldiers (who are rare at the Army War College) to raise and lower the flag during daily reveille and retreat ceremonies..."

From Munich to Munich Dr Stephen J Blank Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In Munich in 1938, the West abandoned Central and Eastern Europe to the dictators. On February 10, 2007, Vladimir Putin demanded that it do so again. In his confrontational speech to the annual Wehrkunde conference in Munich, Putin blasted U.S. policy, blaming American unilateralism for provoking a new arms race, destabilizing the Middle East, undermining international institutions, distorting the purpose of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and supporting democratic revolutions in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)..."

The Missing Debate Prof John R Martin, Dr Gordon Rudd Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "While the surge of 21,500 additional troops to Iraq is consuming national headlines, another important debate is being marginalized. With little public attention, Congress recently authorized an increase of 92,000 uniformed personnel for the Army and Marines. Although significant operationally, the Iraq augmentation is temporary; the larger increase will be permanent, with long-term strategic implications for national security capabilities. Without a thoughtful debate on how to structure the permanent plus-up, the additional 92,000 Soldiers and Marines may have only limited utility."

In Defense of Rational Risk Assessment Mr Nathan P Freier Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Risk in Webster’s is “the possibility of suffering harm or loss.”1 Risk accompanies both action and inaction. To strategists, it is accounted for and mitigated, but not always or even commonly avoided. To the national security strategist, risk—to paraphrase the current defense strategy—is the likelihood of failure or prohibitive cost in pursuit of key objectives. In this view, some goals are beyond reach. Others are within reach, but the cost of achieving them puts more important ambitions in some jeopardy. Unfortunately, those familiar with contemporary strategic-level military decisionmaking know that rational consideration of even the prospect of failure is absent. In high-level policy discussions, success is assumed."

Negotiating with Iran and Syria over Iraq Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The United States has been struggling for decades to establish effective ways to deal with Iran and Syria, with no easy answer coming to the fore. In recent years, the question sometimes was framed as to whether we should seek regime change for these nations or accept the existence of the current regimes and attempt to change their behavior through political pressure and negotiations. Recently, the possibility of coercive regime change seems to have been ruled out under all but the most exceptional circumstances by a key administration official."

Iraqi Security Forces and Lessons from Korea Dr Sheila Miyoshi Jager Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The creation of a viable Iraqi security force has been the sine qua non of our success in Iraq (and the withdrawal of our military). The key question is, is this still feasible? This is not the first time we have undertaken such a task. Some succeeded (the Balkans and El Salvador), some failed (Vietnam), and some are ongoing (Afghanistan). But it was in South Korea, after its liberation at the end of World War II, where we first attempted to build a national security force from the ground up..."

Transformation's Uncontested Truths Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Much of the literature concerning military transformation in the United States employs a number of popular, but hitherto unchallenged clichés. Unfortunately, when phrases are repeated frequently enough, they begin to sound true. In policy circles, where haste is often by necessity the order of the day, that poor basis can suffice to justify any number of decisions. Clichés and catchwords are merely handy ways of capturing and conveying truths; they may reveal a lack of imagination on the part of the user, but they are hardly dangerous. Unsubstantiated clichés, however, are another matter."

Fashion Tips for the Field Grade Dr Leonard Wong Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "From my perch here in the ivory fortress of the U.S. Army War College, I am tasked to look across the Army, take notice of strategic trends in the human dimension of war, and then ponder their implications for the military. Recently, I have felt compelled to address a strategic trend noticed by most everyone in the Army, yet seldom discussed in open company. Although I have yet to get my hands on the actual statistics to prove it, I believe that right about the time an officer attains the rank of major, his choice of clothing begins to narrow down to two or three items. As a result, he begins to stand out in a crowd because his civilian wardrobe is about 7 or 8 years out of date. (I focus on males because they (we) have greater need for correction.)"