Op-Eds

Working and Playing Well with Others: A Strategy-Policy Mismatch in Export Controls LTC Charles H Wilson Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Reading through the strategic guidance that our Nation has been operating under for a number of years, you can find a basic, common concept that I like to refer to as “work and play well with others.” It is derived from statements like “partnerships continue to be the principle source of our strength”1 and “the reform of NATO structures, capabilities and procedures must be accelerated.”2 Those are just two examples of the many similar references that are imbedded throughout documents from the National Security Strategy to CJCS-approved military strategies. The concept is also routinely reflected in guidance at lower levels of government, such as that developed by our Combatant Commanders."

The Summit: Mirage or Milestone? Dr Sherifa D Zuhur Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Considering Senator George Mitchell’s remarks on the negotiations that ended the conflict in Northern Ireland, I can only wonder if they would have succeeded if matters were left to fester as in the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Or in the national dispute in Lebanon. Or Iraq. Without the energy devoted by a U.S. President, the 2 years devoted to negotiations on Northern Ireland, and the leaders’ refusal to be dissuaded by violence, could Mitchell have succeeded? Had he and others not been deeply committed to the notion that the people of Northern Ireland should choose their own future, would they have prevailed?"

Grunts and Jarheads: Rethinking the Army-Marine Division of Labor Dr Steven Metz Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Debate rages today about the future of America’s ground forces. Gone are the days when serious strategists could suggest that that utility of landpower was receding. Now no one questions its importance. But there is disagreement on the type and number of ground forces that the nation needs. "

Can Tony Blair Make a Difference in the Middle East? Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "As the entire world now knows, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair has decided not to slip into comfortable retirement. Instead, after 10 years of service as the leader of the United Kingdom, he has sought out one the world’s most thankless jobs at one of the worst possible times to accept it. He has arranged to be appointed special envoy of the Middle East Peace Quartet. The Quartet includes the European Union, Russia, the United Nations, and the United States..."

Treating Allies as Allies in the Arab World Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "OK, so the Total Force is being expanded. What will that expansion look like? Colonel (Ret.) John Bonin of the U.S. Army War College argues that restricting the increase to all “trigger-pullers” is the wrong answer. In the long run, he is clearly correct, but maybe there is another dimension that bears consideration—the Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) limits."

Treating Allies as Allies in the Arab World Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "At this crucial junction in time, there are serious, evolving, and seemingly nonstop challenges involving the potential spread of violent upheaval and terrorism in the Middle East and particularly the Gulf region. To address these difficulties, the United States will need to work with friendly Arab nations that can help us meet those challenges with united strength. Unfortunately, the importance of our alliances with regional Arab powers is not always fully appreciated by our own strategic thinkers. Questions correspondingly emerge as to whether we are doing enough to understand allied concerns and find ways in which we can work together to address the terrorism threat."

From Munich to Munich Dr Stephen J Blank Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In Munich in 1938, the West abandoned Central and Eastern Europe to the dictators. On February 10, 2007, Vladimir Putin demanded that it do so again. In his confrontational speech to the annual Wehrkunde conference in Munich, Putin blasted U.S. policy, blaming American unilateralism for provoking a new arms race, destabilizing the Middle East, undermining international institutions, distorting the purpose of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and supporting democratic revolutions in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)..."

The Missing Debate Prof John R Martin, Dr Gordon Rudd Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "While the surge of 21,500 additional troops to Iraq is consuming national headlines, another important debate is being marginalized. With little public attention, Congress recently authorized an increase of 92,000 uniformed personnel for the Army and Marines. Although significant operationally, the Iraq augmentation is temporary; the larger increase will be permanent, with long-term strategic implications for national security capabilities. Without a thoughtful debate on how to structure the permanent plus-up, the additional 92,000 Soldiers and Marines may have only limited utility."

In Defense of Rational Risk Assessment Mr Nathan P Freier Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Risk in Webster’s is “the possibility of suffering harm or loss.”1 Risk accompanies both action and inaction. To strategists, it is accounted for and mitigated, but not always or even commonly avoided. To the national security strategist, risk—to paraphrase the current defense strategy—is the likelihood of failure or prohibitive cost in pursuit of key objectives. In this view, some goals are beyond reach. Others are within reach, but the cost of achieving them puts more important ambitions in some jeopardy. Unfortunately, those familiar with contemporary strategic-level military decisionmaking know that rational consideration of even the prospect of failure is absent. In high-level policy discussions, success is assumed."