Strategy & Policy

 
  •  Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq

    Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq

    Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq Mr David M Tressler Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "U.S. soldiers in Iraq—from junior to senior leaders—conduct thousands of negotiations with Iraqi leaders while pursuing tactical and operational objectives that affect the strategic import of the U.S. mission in that country. As long as U.S. troops operate under conditions like the ones they currently face while at the same time conducting a counterinsurgency and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operation in Iraq, negotiation will be a common activity and an important part of achieving mission objectives. Lessons from experience negotiating in Iraq can be helpful in future operations."
    • Published On: 8/1/2007
  •  The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration

    The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration

    The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray draws a sharp distinction between preemption and prevention, and explains that the political, military, moral, and strategic arguments have really all been about the latter, not the former. Dr. Gray provides definitions, reviews the history of the preventive war option, and considers the merit, or lack thereof, in the principal charges laid against the concept when it is proclaimed to be policy."
    • Published On: 7/1/2007
  •  In Defense of Rational Risk Assessment

    In Defense of Rational Risk Assessment

    In Defense of Rational Risk Assessment Mr Nathan P Freier Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Risk in Webster’s is “the possibility of suffering harm or loss.”1 Risk accompanies both action and inaction. To strategists, it is accounted for and mitigated, but not always or even commonly avoided. To the national security strategist, risk—to paraphrase the current defense strategy—is the likelihood of failure or prohibitive cost in pursuit of key objectives. In this view, some goals are beyond reach. Others are within reach, but the cost of achieving them puts more important ambitions in some jeopardy. Unfortunately, those familiar with contemporary strategic-level military decisionmaking know that rational consideration of even the prospect of failure is absent. In high-level policy discussions, success is assumed."
    • Published On: 2/1/2007
  •  Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy

    Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy

    Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy Dr Steven Metz Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "During the past 5 years, American strategy has undergone a sea change, shifting from a focus on the conventional military forces of rogue or rising states to irregular challenges associated with the “long war” against transnational jihadism. Much of the new thinking has resulted from the conflict in Iraq. One result of this has been an attempt to relearn counterinsurgency by the U.S. military. While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?"
    • Published On: 1/1/2007
  •  Belize 2021 National Security Framework: Strengthening the Links between Policy, Resource Allocation and Execution

    Belize 2021 National Security Framework: Strengthening the Links between Policy, Resource Allocation and Execution

    Belize 2021 National Security Framework: Strengthening the Links between Policy, Resource Allocation and Execution COL Dale C Eikmeier, Prof Bernard F Griffard Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The absence of an institutionalized process for long-range national security planning is a strategic disadvantage. To reduce risk and achieve Vision 2021, Belize requires an integrated national security architecture that develops policy, coordinates action plans, monitors execution, reviews progress and maintains a long-term perspective. Currently, the government does not possess an adequate national security planning structure with the requisit capability. Redesigning the current national security architecture so that it provides long-range planning, coordination between cabinet ministers and their agencies, and monitoring of security programs can be the difference between success and failure of a national security strategy. "
    • Published On: 12/15/2006
  •  Regional Fears of Western Primacy and the Future of U.S. Middle Eastern Basing Policy

    Regional Fears of Western Primacy and the Future of U.S. Middle Eastern Basing Policy

    Regional Fears of Western Primacy and the Future of U.S. Middle Eastern Basing Policy Dr W Andrew Terrill Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The United States has a core national interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East as well as containing or eliminating threats emanating from that region. Yet, if most American strategic analysts can agree on this assumption and these goals, there is often disagreement on the ways to best achieve them. In this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill presents his analysis of how the United States and other Western states might best address their military cooperation and basing needs within the Middle East, while still respecting and working with an understanding of regional and especially Arab history and concerns. He also provides the reader with policy recommendations based upon his analysis."
    • Published On: 12/1/2006
  •  Value Projection and American Foreign Policy

    Value Projection and American Foreign Policy

    Value Projection and American Foreign Policy Dr Douglas J Macdonald Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The controversies over the Bush administration’s “doctrine” of promoting democracy as a long-term goal of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) have raised once again that hardy perennial in the debate over American foreign policy: value projection. The debate juxtaposes two basic positions: the Jeffersonian idea that the United States should, when possible, serve as an active agent for the spread of democratic values in the world, and the Washingtonian idea that we should serve as a model for the rest of the world by developing democracy at home, not by taking actions to foster it abroad."
    • Published On: 6/1/2006
  •  Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats

    Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats

    Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats Mr Henry D Sokolski Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Long discounted by arms control critics, traditional nonproliferation efforts now are undergoing urgent review and reconsideration even by their supporters. Why? In large part, because the current crop of nonproliferation understandings are ill-suited to check the spread of emerging long-range missile, biological, and nuclear technologies."
    • Published On: 6/1/2006
  •  Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?

    Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?

    Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray considers irregular warfare in the light of the general theory of strategy and finds that that theory is fully adequate to explain the phenomenon. Rather less adequate, Dr. Gray suggests, is the traditional American way of war. The monograph offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of “the American way.” It concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that “way” and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes."
    • Published On: 3/1/2006
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