Strategy & Policy

 
  •  Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?

    Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?

    Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray considers irregular warfare in the light of the general theory of strategy and finds that that theory is fully adequate to explain the phenomenon. Rather less adequate, Dr. Gray suggests, is the traditional American way of war. The monograph offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of “the American way.” It concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that “way” and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes."
    • Published On: 3/1/2006
  •  Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy

    Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy

    Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy Dr Harry R Yarger Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The word “strategy” pervades American conversation and our news media. We tend to use strategy as a general term for a plan, a concept, a course of action, or a “vision” of the direction in which to proceed at the personal, organizational, and governmental—local, state, or federal—levels. Such casual use of the term to describe nothing more than “what we would like to do next” is inappropriate and belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking. It reduces strategy to just a good idea without the necessary underlying thought or development. It also leads to confusion between strategy and planning, confining strategic possibilities to near-time planning assumptions and details, while limiting the flexibility of strategic thought and setting inappropriately specific expectations of outcomes. "
    • Published On: 2/1/2006
  •  The Danger of Seeking Permanent U.S. Military Bases in Iraq

    The Danger of Seeking Permanent U.S. Military Bases in Iraq

    The Danger of Seeking Permanent U.S. Military Bases in Iraq Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In a June 25, 2005, address to the nation, President George W. Bush stated, “We will stay in Iraq as long as we are needed—and not a day longer.” This statement may initially appear unremarkable, but it is nevertheless an important and valuable assertion of policy that can be usefully applied to the concept of long-term basing rights in Iraq."
    • Published On: 11/1/2005
  •  Going to War With the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism

    Going to War With the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism

    Going to War With the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism Dr Daniel Byman Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Daniel Byman reviews the problems common to the security forces of local allies that have fought or may soon fight insurgencies linked to al-Qa’ida. He argues that these problems stem from deep structural weaknesses, such as the regime’s perceived illegitimacy, poor civil-military relations, an undeveloped economy, and discriminatory societies. Together, they greatly inhibit the allied armed forces’ effectiveness in fighting the insurgents. Various U.S. programs designed to work with allied security forces, at best, can reduce some of these issues. To be effective, any program to assist allied counterinsurgency forces should factor in the allies’ weaknesses."
    • Published On: 11/1/2005
  •  The High Cost of Primacy

    The High Cost of Primacy

    The High Cost of Primacy Mr Nathan P Freier Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "It is critical that the elected representatives, policymakers, opinion leaders, and population of the United States recognize that the maintenance of our global position comes at a price. We must now acknowledge an historic certainty; a truism ignored in the decade that preceded the War on Terror and the pacification of Iraq. Dominant global power engenders persistent resistance and exposes the United States to enormous costs and burdens. This observation is value neutral. That some actively oppose us and we incur costs as a result should come as no surprise. We must realistically account for both in the formation of grand strategy."
    • Published On: 10/1/2005
  •  Contractors on Deployed Military Operations: United Kingdom Policy and Doctrine

    Contractors on Deployed Military Operations: United Kingdom Policy and Doctrine

    Contractors on Deployed Military Operations: United Kingdom Policy and Doctrine Prof Matthew Uttley Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Department of Defense (DoD) initiatives to use contractors on deployed military operations remains a contentious issue in U.S. military transformation. Despite the intense debates surrounding the benefits and costs of DoD outsourcing, little attention has focussed on similar Ministry of Defence (MoD) initiatives underway in the United Kingdom (UK). Since the UK and United States are likely to remain close allies in future expeditionary deployments, the MoD’s approach to contractor support is a salient case study for the DoD and U.S. armed services. This monograph, by Professor Matthew Uttley, examines the controversies surrounding deployed contractor support, the ways that the MoD has harnessed private sector capacity, and the lessons this provides for U.S. policymakers and military planners. In doing so, the author provides important insights into a significant theme in contemporary defense and security policy,"
    • Published On: 9/1/2005
  •  The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and its Interaction with the Department of Defense

    The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and its Interaction with the Department of Defense

    The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and its Interaction with the Department of Defense COL John C Buss Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Over the past 15 years, the United States has been involved in seven major post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations. The ad hoc responses that characterized U.S. stabilization efforts in these missions have often proven inadequate. On each mission, our government has struggled to provide a responsive and enduring solution. The consequences have been the unnecessary loss of life, damage to infrastructure, and higher eventual costs for reconstruction and stabilization. Our unpreparedness to respond to the instability in post-war Iraq has met with sharp criticism. In response to these failings, the Bush administration established the U.S. Department of State (DOS) Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). This paper will analyze the functions of S/CRS, examine the organization’s relationship with the military, and offer Department of Defense (DOD) policy recommendations to improve the interagency cooperation with this new organization."
    • Published On: 7/15/2005
  •  U.S. Pacific Command Combating Terrorism Symposium: Addressing the Underlying Conditions of Terrorism

    U.S. Pacific Command Combating Terrorism Symposium: Addressing the Underlying Conditions of Terrorism

    U.S. Pacific Command Combating Terrorism Symposium: Addressing the Underlying Conditions of Terrorism Dr Kent H Butts, Prof Bert B Tussing Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In sponsorship with the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), the National Intelligence Council (NIC), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United States Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) conducted a symposium-workshop entitled Addressing the Conditions that Foster Terrorism at the Collins Center, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, on June 8-10, 2005. The symposium examined the strategies, coordination efforts, and processes devoted to diminishing the underlying conditions of terrorism and demonstrated the pressing need for greater emphasis on this key element of the United States (U.S.) combating terrorism (CT) policy."
    • Published On: 7/15/2005
  •  Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for "Democratic Security"

    Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for "Democratic Security"

    Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for "Democratic Security" Dr Thomas A Marks Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "A sea-change has occurred in troubled Colombia, as detailed in this monograph. For the first time in 40 years, cautious optimism pervades discussions of Bogota’s seemingly intractable situation. Drugs, terrorism, and insurgency continue in their explosive mix, but the current government of President Alvaro Uribe has fashioned a counterinsurgency approach that holds the strategic initiative and has a chance of negating a long-standing security threat to the state."
    • Published On: 7/1/2005
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