Strategy & Policy

Transforming to Effects-Based Operations: Lessons from the United Kingdom Experience Dr Andrew M Dorman Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The United Kingdom has remained one of the oldest and closest U.S. allies. It has continued to engage in a variety of operations across the globe in countries ranging from Afghanistan and Iraq to the Balkans and Sierra Leone and has undertaken these tasks within a defense budget that has continued to decline as a percentage of gross domestic product. This has meant a series of changes to the traditional approach to defense that has gone much further than that of the United States and many of its European counterparts. As part of this process, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces have officially sought to adopt an effects-based approach to operations within the context of an overall “comprehensive approach” that supposedly brings together the various organs of government. The author of this monograph, Dr. Andrew M. Dorman, evaluates the relative success the United Kingdom has had in adapting to this change, identifying a number of successes and pitfalls from which other countries could well learn."

Working and Playing Well with Others: A Strategy-Policy Mismatch in Export Controls LTC Charles H Wilson Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Reading through the strategic guidance that our Nation has been operating under for a number of years, you can find a basic, common concept that I like to refer to as “work and play well with others.” It is derived from statements like “partnerships continue to be the principle source of our strength”1 and “the reform of NATO structures, capabilities and procedures must be accelerated.”2 Those are just two examples of the many similar references that are imbedded throughout documents from the National Security Strategy to CJCS-approved military strategies. The concept is also routinely reflected in guidance at lower levels of government, such as that developed by our Combatant Commanders."

On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge Dr Sheila Miyoshi Jager Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph, by Dr. Sheila Miyoshi Jager, explores the role that cultural knowledge must play in thinking about a new strategy for counterinsurgency. Although the importance of cultural awareness and understanding of adversary societies has been widely recognized as essential to operations and tactics on the battlefield, Dr. Jager argues its significance has been largely ignored in formulating the broader strategic goals of counterinsurgency. This monograph highlights the importance of culture, and cultural awareness, in formulating a broad strategy for counterinsurgency which also has wide-ranging implications for U.S. foreign policy."

The 2nd Annual Proteus Academic Workshop and the Way Ahead Mister William O Waddell, COL William L Wimbish III Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The Proteus Management Group (PMG) hosted the second annual Proteus Futures Academic Workshop 14-16 August 07 at the Center for Strategic Leadership, United States Army War College (USAWC) at Carlisle Barracks, PA. This year’s workshop provided international scholars from various organizations and institutions across government, academia and the private sector the opportunity to present papers on topics that explore complex issues within the future global security environment, as well as to examine Proteus related new and innovative concepts, strategies and processes to meet 21st century security challenges. Over 70 workshop participants from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds participated in this year’s event. "

American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment Dr Gabriel Marcella Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The fear that extra-hemispheric powers would strategically deny Latin America as a friend of the United States has animated American statesmen since the 19th century. Such fear certainly pervaded the Cold war competition. Today the challenge to the security and well-being of Latin America is neither ideological, nor military, nor external. Strategic denial is more likely to come about from a highly combustible blend of poverty, crime, despair, corruption, resentment, and antidemocratic sentiments that promise a vague 21st century socialism under new authoritarian clothing. The sentiments are sinking deep roots in the socio-political landscape, and they are profoundly anti-American. "

Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq Mr David M Tressler Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "U.S. soldiers in Iraq—from junior to senior leaders—conduct thousands of negotiations with Iraqi leaders while pursuing tactical and operational objectives that affect the strategic import of the U.S. mission in that country. As long as U.S. troops operate under conditions like the ones they currently face while at the same time conducting a counterinsurgency and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operation in Iraq, negotiation will be a common activity and an important part of achieving mission objectives. Lessons from experience negotiating in Iraq can be helpful in future operations."

The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray draws a sharp distinction between preemption and prevention, and explains that the political, military, moral, and strategic arguments have really all been about the latter, not the former. Dr. Gray provides definitions, reviews the history of the preventive war option, and considers the merit, or lack thereof, in the principal charges laid against the concept when it is proclaimed to be policy."

2007 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) Antulio J. Echevarria II Document by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Today our nation faces several major challenges, ranging in type from the conflict in Iraq to changes in force size and structure. These challenges may be more significant than any the United States has faced in more than a decade. With the publication of the 2007 KSIL, the Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College invite all researchers to contribute their efforts to resolving these challenges. Researchers are encouraged to contact any of the SSI points of contact, or those found in the Expanded KSIL, for further information regarding their desired topics. These points of contact are not necessarily subject experts, but can recommend such experts or additional sponsors."

In Defense of Rational Risk Assessment Mr Nathan P Freier Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Risk in Webster’s is “the possibility of suffering harm or loss.”1 Risk accompanies both action and inaction. To strategists, it is accounted for and mitigated, but not always or even commonly avoided. To the national security strategist, risk—to paraphrase the current defense strategy—is the likelihood of failure or prohibitive cost in pursuit of key objectives. In this view, some goals are beyond reach. Others are within reach, but the cost of achieving them puts more important ambitions in some jeopardy. Unfortunately, those familiar with contemporary strategic-level military decisionmaking know that rational consideration of even the prospect of failure is absent. In high-level policy discussions, success is assumed."