Strategy & Policy

 
  •  Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict

    Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict

    Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Because strategic performance must involve the ability to decide, to command, and to lead, as well as the capacity to understand, there are practical limits to what is feasible and useful by way of formal education in strategy. The soldier who best comprehends what Sun-tzu, Clausewitz, and Thucydides intended to say, is not necessarily the soldier best fitted to strategic high command. It is important to distinguish between intellect and character/personality. The superior strategist is ever uniquely a product of nature/biology, personality/psychology, and experience/opportunity. Nonetheless, formal education has its place."
    • Published On: 11/1/2009
  •  Strategic Vision Workshop: Land Power in the 21st Century

    Strategic Vision Workshop: Land Power in the 21st Century

    Strategic Vision Workshop: Land Power in the 21st Century LTC Artur M Loureiro Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, with Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), National Security Faculty and Researchers at Texas A&M University, Bush School of Government, Scowcroft Institute "This iteration of the Strategic Vision Workshop was a continuation of previous workshops conducted in the greater Boston area that involved the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The results of these previous workshops were reported in a May 2008 CSL Issue Paper, Volume 5-08. This issue paper provided an overview of the discussions that took place in each of the academic institutions listed previously. The chief architect of the “Strategic Choices” Brief was Major General David Fastabend, now recently retired, who at the time was the G-3/5/7"
    • Published On: 7/15/2009
  •  Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies

    Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies

    Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The USAWC’s Strategic Studies Institute held its 20th Annual Strategy Conference on April 14-16, 2009, at Carlisle Barracks. This year’s focus, “Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies,” was intended to look beyond the noted importance of advances in the field of cyber and information technologies to raise awareness of other technology areas which thus far have received less visibility. The conference explored biogenetics, biometrics, nanotechnologies, robotics, artificial intelligence, alternative energies, electromagnetic weaponry, nuclear power, and global warming. Approximately 135 attendees along with 19 panelists and speakers participated. As anticipated, the conference brought together a diverse group of scholars and individuals from the defense community and academia."
    • Published On: 6/1/2009
  •  American Grand Strategy after War

    American Grand Strategy after War

    American Grand Strategy after War Dr Dallas D Owens, Mr Ionut C Popescu Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and Duke University " • Since World War II, each American war has been followed by a period of grand strategy reassessment. • The degree to which the Nation’s leaders have felt the need to revise grand strategy has depended in part upon the degree to which the preceding conflict led to adverse consequences and in part upon the level of perceived danger in the new strategic environment."
    • Published On: 5/1/2009
  •  Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: A Proposed Human Capital Model Focused upon Talent

    Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: A Proposed Human Capital Model Focused upon Talent

    Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: A Proposed Human Capital Model Focused upon Talent LTC Michael J Colarusso, COL David S Lyle, COL Casey Wardynski Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Creating and maintaining a highly competent U.S. Army Officer Corps has always been the cornerstone of the nation’s defense. Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle, and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso consider America’s continuing commitment to an all-volunteer military, its global engagement in an era of persistent conflict, and evolving changes in its domestic labor market. They argue that the intersection of these factors demands a comprehensive Officer Corps strategy recognizing the interdependency of accessing, developing, retaining and employing talent. In their view, building a talent-focused strategy around this four-activity human capital model will best posture the Army to match individual officer competencies to specific competency requirements."
    • Published On: 4/1/2009
  •  HAMAS and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics

    HAMAS and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics

    HAMAS and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics Dr Sherifa D Zuhur Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph considers the changing fortunes of the Palestinian movement, HAMAS, and the recent outcomes of Israeli strategies aimed against this group and Palestinian nationalism external to the Fatah faction of the Palestinian Authority. The example of HAMAS challenges much of the current wisdom on “insurgencies” and their containment. As the author, Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, demonstrates, efforts have been made to separate HAMAS from its popular support and network of social and charitable organizations. These have not been effective in destroying the organization, nor in eradicating the will to resist among a fairly large segment of the Palestinian population."
    • Published On: 12/1/2008
  •  Known Unknowns: Unconventional "Strategic Shocks" in Defense Strategy Development

    Known Unknowns: Unconventional "Strategic Shocks" in Defense Strategy Development

    Known Unknowns: Unconventional "Strategic Shocks" in Defense Strategy Development Mr Nathan P Freier Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The current defense team confronted a gamechanging “strategic shock” in its first 8 months in office. The next team would be well-advised to expect the same. Defense-relevant strategic shocks jolt convention to such an extent that they force sudden, unanticipated change in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) perceptions about threat, vulnerability, and strategic response. Their unanticipated onset forces the entire defense enterprise to reorient and restructure institutions, employ capabilities in unexpected ways, and confront challenges that are fundamentally different than those routinely considered in defense calculations."
    • Published On: 11/1/2008
  •  The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy

    The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy

    The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy Dr Stephen D Biddle, Mr Jeffrey A Friedman Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The future of nonstate military actors is a central issue for U.S. strategy and defense planning. It is widely believed that such combatants will be increasingly common opponents for the U.S. military, and many now advocate sweeping change in U.S. military posture to prepare for this—the debate over the associated agenda for “low-tech” or irregular warfare transformation is quickly becoming one of the central issues for U.S. defense policy and strategy. As a prominent recent example of a nonstate actor fighting a Westernized state, Hezbollah’s 2006 campaign thus offers a window into a kind of warfare that is increasingly central to the defense debate in the United States. And the case’s implications for U.S. policy have already become highly controversial. "
    • Published On: 9/1/2008
  •  Work Group 2 - Assessing the Evolving Relationship of the National Guard to Other Components of Domestic Crisis Response

    Work Group 2 - Assessing the Evolving Relationship of the National Guard to Other Components of Domestic Crisis Response

    Work Group 2 - Assessing the Evolving Relationship of the National Guard to Other Components of Domestic Crisis Response Dennis M Murphy Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The new National Strategy for Homeland Security, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1, and a host of other initiatives have signaled what could result in significant changes in the roles played by the Reserve Component in domestic preparedness, response and recovery operations. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) in particular may be postured to take on expanded responsibilities in these areas as its Chief assumes a new status as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense."
    • Published On: 7/15/2008
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