Strategy & Policy

The 2nd Annual Proteus Academic Workshop and the Way Ahead Mister William O Waddell, COL William L Wimbish III Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The Proteus Management Group (PMG) hosted the second annual Proteus Futures Academic Workshop 14-16 August 07 at the Center for Strategic Leadership, United States Army War College (USAWC) at Carlisle Barracks, PA. This year’s workshop provided international scholars from various organizations and institutions across government, academia and the private sector the opportunity to present papers on topics that explore complex issues within the future global security environment, as well as to examine Proteus related new and innovative concepts, strategies and processes to meet 21st century security challenges. Over 70 workshop participants from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds participated in this year’s event. "

American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment Dr Gabriel Marcella Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The fear that extra-hemispheric powers would strategically deny Latin America as a friend of the United States has animated American statesmen since the 19th century. Such fear certainly pervaded the Cold war competition. Today the challenge to the security and well-being of Latin America is neither ideological, nor military, nor external. Strategic denial is more likely to come about from a highly combustible blend of poverty, crime, despair, corruption, resentment, and antidemocratic sentiments that promise a vague 21st century socialism under new authoritarian clothing. The sentiments are sinking deep roots in the socio-political landscape, and they are profoundly anti-American. "

Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq Mr David M Tressler Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "U.S. soldiers in Iraq—from junior to senior leaders—conduct thousands of negotiations with Iraqi leaders while pursuing tactical and operational objectives that affect the strategic import of the U.S. mission in that country. As long as U.S. troops operate under conditions like the ones they currently face while at the same time conducting a counterinsurgency and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operation in Iraq, negotiation will be a common activity and an important part of achieving mission objectives. Lessons from experience negotiating in Iraq can be helpful in future operations."

2007 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) Antulio J. Echevarria II Document by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Today our nation faces several major challenges, ranging in type from the conflict in Iraq to changes in force size and structure. These challenges may be more significant than any the United States has faced in more than a decade. With the publication of the 2007 KSIL, the Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College invite all researchers to contribute their efforts to resolving these challenges. Researchers are encouraged to contact any of the SSI points of contact, or those found in the Expanded KSIL, for further information regarding their desired topics. These points of contact are not necessarily subject experts, but can recommend such experts or additional sponsors."

The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray draws a sharp distinction between preemption and prevention, and explains that the political, military, moral, and strategic arguments have really all been about the latter, not the former. Dr. Gray provides definitions, reviews the history of the preventive war option, and considers the merit, or lack thereof, in the principal charges laid against the concept when it is proclaimed to be policy."

In Defense of Rational Risk Assessment Mr Nathan P Freier Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Risk in Webster’s is “the possibility of suffering harm or loss.”1 Risk accompanies both action and inaction. To strategists, it is accounted for and mitigated, but not always or even commonly avoided. To the national security strategist, risk—to paraphrase the current defense strategy—is the likelihood of failure or prohibitive cost in pursuit of key objectives. In this view, some goals are beyond reach. Others are within reach, but the cost of achieving them puts more important ambitions in some jeopardy. Unfortunately, those familiar with contemporary strategic-level military decisionmaking know that rational consideration of even the prospect of failure is absent. In high-level policy discussions, success is assumed."

Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy Dr Steven Metz Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "During the past 5 years, American strategy has undergone a sea change, shifting from a focus on the conventional military forces of rogue or rising states to irregular challenges associated with the “long war” against transnational jihadism. Much of the new thinking has resulted from the conflict in Iraq. One result of this has been an attempt to relearn counterinsurgency by the U.S. military. While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?"

Belize 2021 National Security Framework: Strengthening the Links between Policy, Resource Allocation and Execution COL Dale C Eikmeier, Prof Bernard F Griffard Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The absence of an institutionalized process for long-range national security planning is a strategic disadvantage. To reduce risk and achieve Vision 2021, Belize requires an integrated national security architecture that develops policy, coordinates action plans, monitors execution, reviews progress and maintains a long-term perspective. Currently, the government does not possess an adequate national security planning structure with the requisit capability. Redesigning the current national security architecture so that it provides long-range planning, coordination between cabinet ministers and their agencies, and monitoring of security programs can be the difference between success and failure of a national security strategy. "

Regional Fears of Western Primacy and the Future of U.S. Middle Eastern Basing Policy Dr W Andrew Terrill Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The United States has a core national interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East as well as containing or eliminating threats emanating from that region. Yet, if most American strategic analysts can agree on this assumption and these goals, there is often disagreement on the ways to best achieve them. In this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill presents his analysis of how the United States and other Western states might best address their military cooperation and basing needs within the Middle East, while still respecting and working with an understanding of regional and especially Arab history and concerns. He also provides the reader with policy recommendations based upon his analysis."