Strategy & Policy

Accessing Talent: The Foundation of a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy LTC Michael J Colarusso, COL David S Lyle, COL Casey Wardynski Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Once the Army accesses a cohort of officers, it must live with them throughout a 30-year career span. This is because, unlike most enterprises, the Army cannot buy talent from elsewhere to fill shortfalls at its mid and upper-level ranks. The Officer Corps embodies a unique profession whose culture and core warfighting abilities take years to develop. This means that each new officer cohort represents far more than the Army’s latest crop of junior leaders; they are the feedstock for its future field grade and general officers. As a group, they must therefore possess the depth and breadth of talent needed not just to lead platoon-sized formations, but to meet future operational and strategic leadership demands as well."

Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Retaining Talent LTC Michael J Colarusso, COL David S Lyle, COL Casey Wardynski Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The U.S. Army has made significant investments in its future, especially in its leadership. In particular, the Army has devoted billions of dollars to officer undergraduate-level education, world class training, and developmental experiences. Since the late 1980s, however, prospects for the Officer Corps’ future have been darkened by an ever-diminishing return on this investment, as evidenced by plummeting company-grade officer retention rates. Significantly, this leakage includes a large share of high-performing officers, many of them developed via a fully-funded undergraduate education."

Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Because strategic performance must involve the ability to decide, to command, and to lead, as well as the capacity to understand, there are practical limits to what is feasible and useful by way of formal education in strategy. The soldier who best comprehends what Sun-tzu, Clausewitz, and Thucydides intended to say, is not necessarily the soldier best fitted to strategic high command. It is important to distinguish between intellect and character/personality. The superior strategist is ever uniquely a product of nature/biology, personality/psychology, and experience/opportunity. Nonetheless, formal education has its place."

A Case Study in Security Sector Reform: Learning from Security Sector Reform/Building in Afghanistan (October 2002-September 2003) Capt Jason C Howk Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Security sector reform (SSR) is that set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. This is a complex and involved task against which Captain Howk evaluates the early international effort to rebuild effective governance in Afghanistan. The purpose of this case study is to document the lessons learned through the development and execution of the SSR program in Afghanistan, with special emphasis from 2002 through 2003. The author has a unique and enviable position from which to observe the inner workings of the highest level commands in Afghanistan—first as an Aide de Camp to then Major General Karl Eikenberry during his first tour in Afghanistan and as the current Aide de Camp to General Stanley McChrystal. "

Strategic Vision Workshop: Land Power in the 21st Century LTC Artur M Loureiro Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, with Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), National Security Faculty and Researchers at Texas A&M University, Bush School of Government, Scowcroft Institute "This iteration of the Strategic Vision Workshop was a continuation of previous workshops conducted in the greater Boston area that involved the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The results of these previous workshops were reported in a May 2008 CSL Issue Paper, Volume 5-08. This issue paper provided an overview of the discussions that took place in each of the academic institutions listed previously. The chief architect of the “Strategic Choices” Brief was Major General David Fastabend, now recently retired, who at the time was the G-3/5/7"

2009 Key Strategic Issues List Antulio J. Echevarria II Document by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Unlike other lists that generally reflect issues which are operational or tactical in nature, the focus of the Key Strategic Issues List is strategic. The spotlight is, in other words, on those items that senior Army and Department of Defense leaders should consider in providing military advice and formulating military strategy. At present, the U.S. military is engaged in a changing situation in Iraq and an increasing presence in Afghanistan, as well as efforts to restore balance in force sizing and structure."

Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The USAWC’s Strategic Studies Institute held its 20th Annual Strategy Conference on April 14-16, 2009, at Carlisle Barracks. This year’s focus, “Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies,” was intended to look beyond the noted importance of advances in the field of cyber and information technologies to raise awareness of other technology areas which thus far have received less visibility. The conference explored biogenetics, biometrics, nanotechnologies, robotics, artificial intelligence, alternative energies, electromagnetic weaponry, nuclear power, and global warming. Approximately 135 attendees along with 19 panelists and speakers participated. As anticipated, the conference brought together a diverse group of scholars and individuals from the defense community and academia."

Cultural Dimensions of Strategy and Policy COL Jiyul Kim Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "There has been a growing recognition in the post-Cold War era that culture has increasingly become a factor in determining the course of today’s complex and interconnected world. The U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq extended this trend to national security and military operations. One might call this the Department of Defense’s “cultural turn.” The focus thus far has been on the importance of culture at the tactical and operational levels."

American Grand Strategy after War Dr Dallas D Owens, Mr Ionut C Popescu Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and Duke University " • Since World War II, each American war has been followed by a period of grand strategy reassessment. • The degree to which the Nation’s leaders have felt the need to revise grand strategy has depended in part upon the degree to which the preceding conflict led to adverse consequences and in part upon the level of perceived danger in the new strategic environment."