Center for Strategic Leadership

Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare LTC James D Campbell Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In the summer of 1899, Lieutenant Matthew Batson was commanding L Troop, 4th U.S. Cavalry, during operations in the Philippines. Already recognized as an energetic and courageous officer during the war in Cuba, Batson gained further notoriety after being awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for actions in combat with his troop in July. At the request of his superiors, in late summer Batson submitted a formal proposal for raising a scout company for the First Division’s Provisional Cavalry Brigade. The plan called for this company to be recruited from the Macabebes, an ethnic tribal group in Southern Luzon who had long opposed domination by the majority Tagalogs. The Tagalogs formed the backbone and provided most of the leadership for the Army of the Philippine Republic, fighting against U.S. rule in the archipelago..."

Collins Center Update Volume 9, Issue 3 (Summer 2007) Professor B.F. Griffard, Professor Dennis M. Murphy, Mr. John Auger, Professor Jim Kievit, Colonel Michael Gould, MAJ Kyle Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership

Collins Center Update Vol 9, Issue 2 Colonel Phil Evans, Mr. Ritchie Dion, Mr. Bill Waddell, Mr. Bob Barnes, Mr. John Auge, Mr. Kevin Cogan, Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership

A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare Mr Kevin J Cogan Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In March 2004, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Office of Force Transformation (OFT) initiated a study focusing on the U.S. Army V Corps’ and 3rd Infantry Division’s major combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This study, entitled “Network Centric Warfare Case Study: U.S. V Corps and 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operation Iraqi Freedom Combat Operations (March-April 2003)” is one of several case studies commissioned by OFT to determine the military’s ability to conduct operations in accordance with network centric warfare (NCW) concepts."

Information as Power Ms Cindy E Ayers, Dr Jeffrey L Groh, Dennis M Murphy, Prof David John Smith Anthology by the US Army War College, The Information in Warfare Working Group, Center for Strategic Leadership "The Information in Warfare Working Group (I2WG) of the United States Army War College is pleased to present this anthology of selected student work from Academic Year 2006 representing examples of well-written and in-depth analyses on the vital subject of Information in Warfare. The charter of the working group calls for it to coordinate and recommend the design, development and integration of content and courses related to the information element of power into the curriculum to prepare students for senior leadership positions. This publication is an important component of that effort."

Belize 2021 National Security Framework: Strengthening the Links between Policy, Resource Allocation and Execution COL Dale C Eikmeier, Prof Bernard F Griffard Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The absence of an institutionalized process for long-range national security planning is a strategic disadvantage. To reduce risk and achieve Vision 2021, Belize requires an integrated national security architecture that develops policy, coordinates action plans, monitors execution, reviews progress and maintains a long-term perspective. Currently, the government does not possess an adequate national security planning structure with the requisit capability. Redesigning the current national security architecture so that it provides long-range planning, coordination between cabinet ministers and their agencies, and monitoring of security programs can be the difference between success and failure of a national security strategy. "

The Collins Center Update Volume 9, Issue 1: October - December 2006 B.F. Griffard, Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier, Captain Raymond G. De Lucio, Mr. Ritchie Dion, COL Scott McConnell, Colonel Robert Hume Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership

Proteus: New Insights for a New Age; Proteus Futures Academic Workshop Report Mister William O Waddell, COL William L Wimbish III Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The Proteus Management Group (PMG) hosted the first annual Proteus Futures Academic Workshop 22-24 August 06 at the Center for Strategic Leadership, United States Army War College at Carlisle Barracks. This workshop was focused on providing scholars from various organizations the opportunity to present papers on topics and issues related to the Proteus Insights that addressed future strategic national security challenges. Workshop participants were from a variety of nations, disciplines, and backgrounds, and included: students and faculty from universities, colleges and military service schools; government civilian and military senior leaders, planners and analysts from joint agencies, the uniformed services and the national intelligence community; former political appointees, and international representatives from Canada and Israel."

Network Centric Warfare Case Study Volume I: Operations U.S. V Corps and 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operation Iraqi Freedom (March-April 2003) Mr David W Cammons, Douglas Lindsay, LTC Alan Seise, John B Tisserand III, Duane E Williams Study by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "This report highlights the results of a study of Network Centric Operations (NCO) as executed by V Corps and the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), (3 ID (M)), during the major offensive combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from March 2003 through April 2003. The U.S. V Corps was the senior U.S. Army tactical headquarters responsible for operations conducted primarily along and to the west of the Euphrates River, to include the seizure of Baghdad. At the onset of the campaign (crossing the Kuwait-Iraq border) 3 ID (M) was the only ground maneuver force available to V Corps and continued as the corps’ main effort through the seizure of Baghdad."