•  The Collins Center Update Volume 6, Issue 4

    The Collins Center Update Volume 6, Issue 4

    The Collins Center Update Volume 6, Issue 4 Dr Kent H Butts, Prof James O Kievit, LTC Thomas P Kratman, Mr Eugene L Thompson, LTC Curtis W Turner, Cdr Robert L Wohlschlegel Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership
    • Published On: 9/1/2004
  •  Southeast Asia Subject Matter Expert Exchange

    Southeast Asia Subject Matter Expert Exchange

    Southeast Asia Subject Matter Expert Exchange LTC Curtis W Turner, Prof Bert B Tussing, Dr Richard L Winslow Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "From 6-19 June 2004, a team composed of staff members from the United States Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) and the National Defense University traveled to Indonesia and Malaysia in support of the Pacific Command’s Subject Matter Exchange Program. This team consisted of Dr. Richard Winslow, Professor Bert Tussing and Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Turner of CSL; and Dr. Greg Foster of the National Defense University’s Industrial College of the Armed Forces."
    • Published On: 8/31/2004
  •  Iraq 2003-4 and Mesopotamia 1914-18: A Comparative Analysis in Ends and Means

    Iraq 2003-4 and Mesopotamia 1914-18: A Comparative Analysis in Ends and Means

    Iraq 2003-4 and Mesopotamia 1914-18: A Comparative Analysis in Ends and Means Dr James D. Scudieri Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "This paper is a comparative analysis of the linkage between strategic ends with operational ways and means of the current operation in Iraq in 2003-4 and the British campaign in Mesopotamia in 1914-18. The two campaigns took place literally over the same ground. The United States now and Great Britain then both faced significant challenges to project and maintain military power in this part of the world. Moreover, the two great powers inherited daunting civil-military requirements in country. This study has restricted research to unclassified sources on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Open-source research for an ongoing campaign greatly complicated attainment of a comprehensive understanding of the linkage between ends, ways, and means, but such an option facilitated frank debate with wider dissemination."
    • Published On: 8/15/2004
  •  Civil-Security Forces Environmental Cooperation in Central America and the Caribbean

    Civil-Security Forces Environmental Cooperation in Central America and the Caribbean

    Civil-Security Forces Environmental Cooperation in Central America and the Caribbean Arthur L Bradshaw, Doctor Kent H Butts, Earl Green, John B Wheatley Study by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "This conference is the fourth in a series of conferences sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command in Central America. As such, it built upon the relationships and programs initiated in earlier conferences. The purpose of these conferences is to support three growing realizations: that the protection of the environment is critical to the sustainable development of the entire region, which is, in turn, critical to regional stability; that environmental issues are best dealt with on a regional basis; and that military and security forces have a vital role in the process of resolving environmental issues."
    • Published On: 7/28/2004
  •  Effectiveness of Stability Operations During the Initial Implementation of the Transition Phase for Operation Iraqi Freedom

    Effectiveness of Stability Operations During the Initial Implementation of the Transition Phase for Operation Iraqi Freedom

    Effectiveness of Stability Operations During the Initial Implementation of the Transition Phase for Operation Iraqi Freedom COL Paul F Dicker Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The United States’ strategic goal at the onset of the armed conflict in Iraq was to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime and to create a free, unified, and democratic Iraq. The necessity of having a unified Iraq derives from its strategic location in the Middle East and from U.S. commitments to other Middle East countries supporting the war effort, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In order to achieve this strategic goal, the coalition, led by the U.S. military, would need to first insure a secure and stable environment."
    • Published On: 7/15/2004
  •  Transformational Leadership in Wartime

    Transformational Leadership in Wartime

    Transformational Leadership in Wartime LTC Steven J Eden Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Few men are vouchsafed the command of armies; fewer still face the task of rebuilding defeated armies in wartime, and of these only a handful have been successful. Three who assumed command in the midst of defeat were George McClellan, arriving in Washington, D.C., to take over the Army of the Potomac as it licked its wounds after Bull Run; William Slim, coming to Burma as the Japanese drove the British out of Rangoon; and Matthew Ridgway, appointed to lead an Eighth Army reeling back before the Chinese pouring over the Yalu River. "
    • Published On: 7/15/2004
  •  Incorporation of Indigenous Forces in Major Theater War: Advantages, Risks and Considerations

    Incorporation of Indigenous Forces in Major Theater War: Advantages, Risks and Considerations

    Incorporation of Indigenous Forces in Major Theater War: Advantages, Risks and Considerations Ms Priscilla Sellers Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The planning of nearly all military campaigns has included, at least in part, the consideration of the participation of friendly indigenous forces or assets. From the North African Campaign (Operation Torch) to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the number and specific tactical responsibilities of the indigenous assets in theater have varied but generally have continued to increase. Just as the responsibilities of the indigenous force have continued to change over time, so have the responsibilities incumbent upon the U.S. military establishment in determining the appropriate integration and handling of this local asset, based upon respective inherent factors. "
    • Published On: 7/15/2004
  •  Observing al Qaeda Through the Lens of Complexity Theory: Recommendations for the National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism

    Observing al Qaeda Through the Lens of Complexity Theory: Recommendations for the National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism

    Observing al Qaeda Through the Lens of Complexity Theory: Recommendations for the National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism LTC Michael F Beech Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The defeat of al Qaeda and the global network of Islamic terrorist organizations often appear no more certain today than it did two years ago. Since 9/11 the world has witnessed terrorist attacks against US interests and its allies in seven different countries. Al Qaeda may have lost Afghanistan as a safe haven, but it has gained a new front by conducting operations against US and coalition forces in Iraq. Despite US military successes, al Qaeda retains a demonstrated ability to recruit and conduct operations globally as Osama bin Laden and many of his most experienced inner circle and associates are still at large. Although there has yet to be another devastating attack on the US homeland, it is important to remember that the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon took over three years of planning and preparation. The lack of a subsequent catastrophic attack in the US since 9/11 is not in itself proof of a successful strategy against terrorism. Despite the efforts of two years of military operations against al Qaeda, the CIA pronounced that al Qaeda still represents the single greatest risk to US national security. This paradox calls into question the very frameworks, models and tools that US strategic leaders use to develop counter terrorism policy and strategy."
    • Published On: 7/15/2004
  •  Swiftly Defeat The Efforts: Then What? The "New American Way Of War" And Transitioning Decisive Combat To Post Conflict Stabilization

    Swiftly Defeat The Efforts: Then What? The "New American Way Of War" And Transitioning Decisive Combat To Post Conflict Stabilization

    Swiftly Defeat The Efforts: Then What? The "New American Way Of War" And Transitioning Decisive Combat To Post Conflict Stabilization LTC John D Nelson Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Since the end of the first Gulf War in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm the United States has fought in three decisive operations: Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. The principles of Rapid Decisive Operations influenced the pattern and conduct of operations in all three conflicts. The success in the major combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom, led Max Boot, to call this a New American Way of War."
    • Published On: 7/15/2004
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