Center for Strategic Leadership

Crack in the Foundation: Defense Transformation and the Underlying Assumption of Dominant Knowledge in Future War COL Herbert R Mcmaster Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "A failure to examine critically the fundamental assumption that underpins much of the defense transformation initiative threatens to undermine the best efforts of senior military and civilian officials and create vulnerabilities in future American forces. While this failure may not affect initiatives connected with homeland security, the ballistic missile defense program, or business practice reforms, it has permitted the development of an unrealistic vision of future conventional war. The intellectual foundation for building tomorrow’s military force rests on the unfounded assumption that technologies emerging from the “information revolution” will lift the fog of war and permit U.S. forces to achieve a very high degree of certainty in future military operations."

Citizen-Soldiers in a 21st Century Army at War Prof James O Kievit, LTC Thomas P Murray Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In the first decade of the 19th Century, Prussian General Karl Von Clausewitz set out to determine why nations with the most professional armies of his day lost war after war to the seemingly less-professional armies of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. In his now famous manuscript, On War, Clausewitz identified as essential to the nature of war the interplay of three key elements: the Government, the General and the army, and the people. From the government derived the fundamental rationale, from the general and the army the necessary skill and courage, and from the people the passions that enabled the creation and sustained exertion of tremendous national power. Successful conduct of war therefore requires both the preparation and the thoughtful orchestration of all three elements to draw forth and appropriately direct the maximum power of the nation."

Reporters on the Ground: The Military and the Media's Experience During Operation Iraqi Freedom Prof Michael J Pasquarett Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "During the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Department of Defense (DoD) developed an embedded media program that planned for large numbers of embedded reporters throughout military units. Unlike Vietnam in the 1970s, this program resulted in television reporting from within Iraq, especially from those reporters embedded with front-line units, almost instantaneously. The speed that these reports made it on the air often outpaced the military’s communication channels. Although it gave the American citizens an immediate close up report of what their armed forces were doing, it handicapped media analysts and stateside reporters in their ability to put the raw reporting from the field into a larger context. Conversely, those TV journalists supplying these spectacular reports and engrossing pictures from the front line were also handicapped in that they were reporting in a vacuum, unable themselves to obtain any kind of perspective or context."

Assisting Professional Militaries in Latin America, National Security Strategy Development Workshop, La Paz, Bolivia Prof Bernard F Griffard, Mr Todd M Wheeler Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Professionalization of their nation’s military establishment is a challenge for some Latin American democracies because of the historical baggage carried by their armed forces. The populations of the countries concerned are often suspicious of providing these former repressive organizations with modern “equipment and techniques”. However, the reality is, that the region’s military organizations existing with less than adequate training and professional standards as well as operating in an under resourced environment are susceptible to corruption and politicization, and in that way pose a threat to further democratic development. "

The U.S. Army's Initial Impressions of Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle Dr Conrad C Crane Study by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "From 26 to 29 August 2002, the Army assembled representatives from its worldwide commands at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania to assess Army operations to date in the global war on terrorism. The initial impressions offered by the participants highlighted rapid and successful responses at home and in distant theaters from Afghanistan to the Philippines. They also revealed some shortcomings in current operations and insights for future operations. "

The Collins Center Update Vol 5, Issue 4: July - September 2003 Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership

Environmental Security Cooperation USARPAC's: Defense Environmental and International Cooperation (DEIC) Conference Dr Kent H Butts, Christopher Jasparro, LTC Curtis W Turner Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The U.S Counterterrorism (CT) program for Southeast Asia received important support in June when attendees at the United States Defense Environmental and International Cooperation (DEIC) Conference developed a military-based model for identifying and preventing the causes of environmental terrorism, preventing attacks on critical infrastructure, and providing consequence management and mitigation of man-made and natural disasters."

Re-Examining Tomorrow's Battlefield: Taking the Fight into the Cities COL Steven M Jones Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Americans and our allies are not the only ones glued to the television lately! One can be sure that enemies of the United States not directly engaged by the invasion of Iraq have likewise been watching intently—and learning. Now, more than ever, the U.S. military's overwhelming dominance in Iraq has guaranteed that future adversaries will pursue every conceivable asymmetric advantage to offset their conventional and technological inferiority."

Public Safety During Combat: A Positive Lesson from Vietnam COL Frank L Miller Jr Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The incredible success of General Tommy Franks’ push to Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom will be studied for years as the quintessential example of modern warfare. The Combined and Joint Forces of the Allied Coalition executed a strategy designed to be everywhere at once in order to render the Iraqi defender totally unable to establish a coherent defense. Even given the limitation of only one route of ground ingress (from Kuwait), the speed and agility of the ground forces, combined with the deep ISR and targeting assets of the Air Force and Army Aviation, and the economy of force efforts of the Special Operations elements, simply overwhelmed the ability of the Iraqi Army to defend. This was intentional, but at least one unintentional result of this unprecedented speed of maneuver must be addressed in all future planning: as enemy forces or individual combatants are bypassed and allowed to mix with noncombatants, the Decisive Phase of Campaign Operations will overlap with the Post-Conflict Phase. This dynamic must be planned for with a robust public safety capability that itself can overlap in time and space with combat operations. "