•  Maritime Threats Workshop

    Maritime Threats Workshop

    Maritime Threats Workshop Dr Kent H Butts, LTC Curtis W Turner, Cmdr Robert L Wohlschlegel Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The United States-Republic of the Philippines strengthened their strategic partnership when representatives of the two countries co-hosted the Maritime Threats Workshop held in Cebu, Republic of the Philippines on 26-30 July 2004, focused on promoting multilateral interoperability and cooperation on maritime and environmental issues that foster terrorism; identifying maritime and transnational threats; discussing solutions to these issues; developing maritime protection capabilities; encouraging military support to civil authority; facilitating international and interagency cooperation (to include NGO/IOs); and strengthening the bonds between the military and civilian organizations. The multilateral workshop is the fourth of a series of U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) Defense Environmental Cooperation Conference."
    • Published On: 10/15/2004
  •  The Reserve Components' Role in Recovering from a Biological Incident

    The Reserve Components' Role in Recovering from a Biological Incident

    The Reserve Components' Role in Recovering from a Biological Incident LTC John C Traylor, Prof Bert B Tussing Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "With the potential proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) capabilities throughout the world an already challenging security environment grows even more daunting every day. Whether occurring naturally, released unintentionally, or dispersed with a deliberately diabolic intent, the effects of a release of these mechanisms can transcend even the immediate devastation they may portend. Beyond massive death and injury, these agents could attack the very core of the Nation’s security, economic strength, and physical and mental well-being. As such, the military component of this Nation’s defense must begin pondering the “unthinkable,” postulating the role it may have to play in mitigating, responding to, and recovering from this kind of catastrophe."
    • Published On: 10/15/2004
  •  Trilateral Strategic Defense Capability Planning Symposium

    Trilateral Strategic Defense Capability Planning Symposium

    Trilateral Strategic Defense Capability Planning Symposium Dr Kent H Butts, LTC Curtis W Turner Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The Republic of the Philippines (RP) has undertaken a bold initiative to reform its national security architecture in order to more effectively address regional terrorist and other transnational threats. This strategic planning initiative has developed the Emerging Security Environment to 2022 document, a National Military Strategy, a National Internal Security Plan, and a Multi-Year Defense Capability Planning System (MYDCaPS). The initiative has its roots in a two-year long series of trilateral, Republic of the Philippines, Australia and United States (U.S.) Senior Leader Strategic Planning Symposia. The Australian Embassy-Manila hosted the latest event, the Trilateral Strategic Defense Capability Planning Symposium, on 13-15 July 2004."
    • Published On: 9/15/2004
  •  Southeast Asia Subject Matter Expert Exchange

    Southeast Asia Subject Matter Expert Exchange

    Southeast Asia Subject Matter Expert Exchange LTC Curtis W Turner, Prof Bert B Tussing, Dr Richard L Winslow Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "From 6-19 June 2004, a team composed of staff members from the United States Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) and the National Defense University traveled to Indonesia and Malaysia in support of the Pacific Command’s Subject Matter Exchange Program. This team consisted of Dr. Richard Winslow, Professor Bert Tussing and Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Turner of CSL; and Dr. Greg Foster of the National Defense University’s Industrial College of the Armed Forces."
    • Published On: 8/31/2004
  •  Iraq 2003-4 and Mesopotamia 1914-18: A Comparative Analysis in Ends and Means

    Iraq 2003-4 and Mesopotamia 1914-18: A Comparative Analysis in Ends and Means

    Iraq 2003-4 and Mesopotamia 1914-18: A Comparative Analysis in Ends and Means Dr James D. Scudieri Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "This paper is a comparative analysis of the linkage between strategic ends with operational ways and means of the current operation in Iraq in 2003-4 and the British campaign in Mesopotamia in 1914-18. The two campaigns took place literally over the same ground. The United States now and Great Britain then both faced significant challenges to project and maintain military power in this part of the world. Moreover, the two great powers inherited daunting civil-military requirements in country. This study has restricted research to unclassified sources on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Open-source research for an ongoing campaign greatly complicated attainment of a comprehensive understanding of the linkage between ends, ways, and means, but such an option facilitated frank debate with wider dissemination."
    • Published On: 8/15/2004
  •  Effectiveness of Stability Operations During the Initial Implementation of the Transition Phase for Operation Iraqi Freedom

    Effectiveness of Stability Operations During the Initial Implementation of the Transition Phase for Operation Iraqi Freedom

    Effectiveness of Stability Operations During the Initial Implementation of the Transition Phase for Operation Iraqi Freedom COL Paul F Dicker Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The United States’ strategic goal at the onset of the armed conflict in Iraq was to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime and to create a free, unified, and democratic Iraq. The necessity of having a unified Iraq derives from its strategic location in the Middle East and from U.S. commitments to other Middle East countries supporting the war effort, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In order to achieve this strategic goal, the coalition, led by the U.S. military, would need to first insure a secure and stable environment."
    • Published On: 7/15/2004
  •  Incorporation of Indigenous Forces in Major Theater War: Advantages, Risks and Considerations

    Incorporation of Indigenous Forces in Major Theater War: Advantages, Risks and Considerations

    Incorporation of Indigenous Forces in Major Theater War: Advantages, Risks and Considerations Ms Priscilla Sellers Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The planning of nearly all military campaigns has included, at least in part, the consideration of the participation of friendly indigenous forces or assets. From the North African Campaign (Operation Torch) to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the number and specific tactical responsibilities of the indigenous assets in theater have varied but generally have continued to increase. Just as the responsibilities of the indigenous force have continued to change over time, so have the responsibilities incumbent upon the U.S. military establishment in determining the appropriate integration and handling of this local asset, based upon respective inherent factors. "
    • Published On: 7/15/2004
  •  Leveraging the Media: The Embedded Media Program in Operation Iraqi Freedom

    Leveraging the Media: The Embedded Media Program in Operation Iraqi Freedom

    Leveraging the Media: The Embedded Media Program in Operation Iraqi Freedom Col Glenn Starnes Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Margaret Belknap writing in Parameters in 2002 commented, “The fourth estate [the media] offers a superb mechanism for strategic leaders and warfighters to transmit operational objectives and goals, as well as to reinforce policy objectives.” Ms Belknap stated that strategic leaders must be proactive in leveraging the media in order to inform audiences concerning objectives and end-states. She warned that if the military failed to leverage the media, they risked having the graphic images of war shown to the world and the American people in a distorted manner. Inaccurate or deceitful reporting of military actions could drastically affect the will and support of the American people, which is the strategic center of gravity for the United States (US). Loss of public support for a war could also affect the decision-making process at the strategic level. Essentially, Ms Belknap echoed the sentiment of many others who recommend the military cease holding the press at arm’s length. Instead, the military should embrace the press and leverage the media’s technology and worldwide reach to further strategic goals."
    • Published On: 7/15/2004
  •  Observing al Qaeda Through the Lens of Complexity Theory: Recommendations for the National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism

    Observing al Qaeda Through the Lens of Complexity Theory: Recommendations for the National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism

    Observing al Qaeda Through the Lens of Complexity Theory: Recommendations for the National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism LTC Michael F Beech Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The defeat of al Qaeda and the global network of Islamic terrorist organizations often appear no more certain today than it did two years ago. Since 9/11 the world has witnessed terrorist attacks against US interests and its allies in seven different countries. Al Qaeda may have lost Afghanistan as a safe haven, but it has gained a new front by conducting operations against US and coalition forces in Iraq. Despite US military successes, al Qaeda retains a demonstrated ability to recruit and conduct operations globally as Osama bin Laden and many of his most experienced inner circle and associates are still at large. Although there has yet to be another devastating attack on the US homeland, it is important to remember that the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon took over three years of planning and preparation. The lack of a subsequent catastrophic attack in the US since 9/11 is not in itself proof of a successful strategy against terrorism. Despite the efforts of two years of military operations against al Qaeda, the CIA pronounced that al Qaeda still represents the single greatest risk to US national security. This paradox calls into question the very frameworks, models and tools that US strategic leaders use to develop counter terrorism policy and strategy."
    • Published On: 7/15/2004
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