•  Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #3

    Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #3

    Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #3 Prof John F Troxell Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita the military mounted a massive response that saved many lives and greatly assisted recovery efforts. The military took proactive steps and responded with about 50,000 National Guard and 20,000 active federal personnel. Based on its June 2005 civil support strategy, the Department of Defense (DOD) relied heavily on the Guard during the initial response. In addition, active duty forces were alerted prior to landfall and key capabilities such as aviation, medical, and engineering forces were initially deployed. Growing concerns about the magnitude of the disaster prompted DOD to deploy large, active ground units to supplement the Guard beginning about 5 days after landfall..."
    • Published On: 8/15/2007
  •  Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #4

    Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #4

    Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #4 Mr John Elliot, Prof James O Kievit Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The frequently strained interaction between the active component and the National Guard during the military’s response to Hurricane’s Katrina and Rita in the summer of 2005 has led some to argue for a cultural migration away from strict “command and control” concepts toward a broader concept of “command, control, cooperation and coordination.” Meanwhile, many experts believe that pandemic influenza or terrorist attacks employing nuclear or biological devices likely will result in death and economic or physical disruption that would vastly exceed the destruction wreaked along the Gulf Coast, that the destructive potential of hurricanes like Katrina and Rita actually represent the “lower end” of catastrophic events. "
    • Published On: 8/15/2007
  •  Beyond Iraq: The Lessons of a Hard Place

    Beyond Iraq: The Lessons of a Hard Place

    Beyond Iraq: The Lessons of a Hard Place Mr Anton K Smith Student issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Our “adventure” in Iraq is doing little to enhance the post 9/11 security of the American public. The idea that a Middle East-altering democracy could be militarily introduced into a country as riven and as historically different from the U.S. as Iraq is now understood to have been naïve. As a series of early failures drove wedge after wedge into the fragile Iraqi society, the policy objective of a 'united, stable and democratic Iraq' at peace with its neighbors fell victim to shortsighted decisions and poor preparation. The prolonged engagement in Iraq is distracting us from an even greater threat of a stateless insurgency arrayed against the current world order. A mechanism for constraining U.S. prerogatives has been established, and a formula for our defeat is under development."
    • Published On: 7/15/2007
  •  Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare

    Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare

    Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare LTC James D Campbell Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In the summer of 1899, Lieutenant Matthew Batson was commanding L Troop, 4th U.S. Cavalry, during operations in the Philippines. Already recognized as an energetic and courageous officer during the war in Cuba, Batson gained further notoriety after being awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for actions in combat with his troop in July. At the request of his superiors, in late summer Batson submitted a formal proposal for raising a scout company for the First Division’s Provisional Cavalry Brigade. The plan called for this company to be recruited from the Macabebes, an ethnic tribal group in Southern Luzon who had long opposed domination by the majority Tagalogs. The Tagalogs formed the backbone and provided most of the leadership for the Army of the Philippine Republic, fighting against U.S. rule in the archipelago..."
    • Published On: 7/15/2007
  •  Collins Center Update Volume 9, Issue 3 (Summer 2007)

    Collins Center Update Volume 9, Issue 3 (Summer 2007)

    Collins Center Update Volume 9, Issue 3 (Summer 2007) Professor B.F. Griffard, Professor Dennis M. Murphy, Mr. John Auger, Professor Jim Kievit, Colonel Michael Gould, MAJ Kyle Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership
    • Published On: 6/15/2007
  •  Collins Center Update Vol 9, Issue 2

    Collins Center Update Vol 9, Issue 2

    Collins Center Update Vol 9, Issue 2 Colonel Phil Evans, Mr. Ritchie Dion, Mr. Bill Waddell, Mr. Bob Barnes, Mr. John Auge, Mr. Kevin Cogan, Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership
    • Published On: 4/15/2007
  •  A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare

    A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare

    A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare Mr Kevin J Cogan Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In March 2004, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Office of Force Transformation (OFT) initiated a study focusing on the U.S. Army V Corps’ and 3rd Infantry Division’s major combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This study, entitled “Network Centric Warfare Case Study: U.S. V Corps and 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operation Iraqi Freedom Combat Operations (March-April 2003)” is one of several case studies commissioned by OFT to determine the military’s ability to conduct operations in accordance with network centric warfare (NCW) concepts."
    • Published On: 3/15/2007
  •  Proteus Futures Workshop 2006: Analyzing Future Complex National Security Challenges within the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environment

    Proteus Futures Workshop 2006: Analyzing Future Complex National Security Challenges within the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environment

    Proteus Futures Workshop 2006: Analyzing Future Complex National Security Challenges within the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environment Study by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "From 22 to 24 August 2006 the Proteus Management Group USA hosted an Academic Workshop to bring together specialists from academia, the defense community, and civilian organizations to share information and insights on analyzing future complex national security challenges. "
    • Published On: 1/30/2007
  •  Information as Power

    Information as Power

    Information as Power Ms Cindy E Ayers, Dr Jeffrey L Groh, Dennis M Murphy, Prof David John Smith Anthology by the US Army War College, The Information in Warfare Working Group, Center for Strategic Leadership "The Information in Warfare Working Group (I2WG) of the United States Army War College is pleased to present this anthology of selected student work from Academic Year 2006 representing examples of well-written and in-depth analyses on the vital subject of Information in Warfare. The charter of the working group calls for it to coordinate and recommend the design, development and integration of content and courses related to the information element of power into the curriculum to prepare students for senior leadership positions. This publication is an important component of that effort."
    • Published On: 1/26/2007
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