Books

Paradigm Lost?: Transitions and the Search for a New World Order Dr David Jablonsky Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "After every momentous event, there is usually a transition period, in which participants in the events, whether individuals or nation-states, attempt to chart their way into an unfamiliar future. In the United States in this century, there are three such transitions, each focused on America's role in the international arena. After World War I, the American people specifically rejected the global role for the United States implicit in Woodrow Wilson's strategic vision of collective security. In contrast to this "return to normalcy," after World War II the United States moved inexorably toward international leadership in response to the Soviet threat. The result was an acceptance of George Kennan's strategic vision of containing the Soviet Union on the Eurasian landmass and the subsequent bipolar confrontation of the two superpowers in a twilight war that lasted for over 40 years."

Afghanistan and Beyond: Reflections on the Future of Warfare Dr Stephen J Blank Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This report provides an historical analysis of lessons from one of the most important wars of the 1980s, the war in Afghanistan. After reading this study, you will better understand the nature of operations "other than war" in multiethnic states. Many fear that these wars will set the paradigm for wars in the 1990s and will exert pressure on U.S. forces to conduct peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and humanitarian assistance operations in especially dangerous areas. Yugoslavia and Somalia, each in their own way, bear out the ubiquity of these wars and the pressures on the United States to act."

The Nature of the Post-Cold War World Mr William G Hyland, Mr Charles William Maynes Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Are we in a new era in world affairs? It has become commonplace to assert this. But the best way to peer into the future--perhaps the only way--is to examine the past and to look for trends that appear to be shaping the present. If we understand clearly the contours of the international system after 1945, it will probably be easier for us to determine the extent to which we are now truly in a revolutionary era, one which will give us, whether we wish it or not, a New World Order."

Strategy, Forces and Budgets: Dominant Influences in Executive Decision Making, Post-Cold War, 1989-91 Dr Don M Snider Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This study will present, using the process-tracking methodology of George and McKeown, the executive decision making of the Bush administration during the 1989-90 period. During this period the administration decided "that by 1995 our security needs can be met by an active force 25 percent smaller than today's." This early public statement was an indication of a set of major decisions made by the administration to effect a defense draw-down for the post-cold war era, decisions on both military strategy and the forces needed to execute it."

Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order Dr Donald M Snow Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The search for the appropriate uses of military force in the post-cold war international system has commenced. During the cold war, the use of force by the major powers was tied clearly to their political and ideological competition; deterrence of major conflicts between them served the most fundamental national interest, survival. Vital interests revolved around preventing the other side from gaining undue influences in important places such as the Persian Gulf."

General George C. Marshall: Strategic Leadership and the Challenges of Reconstituting the Army, 1939-41 COL John T Nelson II Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this connection, the study of General George C. Marshall, covering his pre-World War II service as Army Chief of Staff, 1939-41, is as inspirational as it is illustrative. Marshall began his tour of duty at a time when the Army was isolated politically and institutionally, when it was profoundly undermanned and poorly equipped, and when the prospects for improving this dismal situation were far from encouraging. In the ensuing 2 1/2 years, the Army's posture changed dramatically for the better, largely through Marshall's Herculean efforts to prepare for the kind of war he saw threatening on the horizon. In effect, he "reconstituted" the Army. It is no exaggeration to say that Marshall enabled America to enter the war with a distinct "running start" in terms of military preparedness-- something this country had never before succeeded in doing."

Eisenhower as Strategist: The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace Dr Steven Metz Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The facts of Dwight D. Eisenhower's military career are well-known. This does not mean, however, that there is nothing to be gained from a careful examination of his experience. Few if any American officers performed a wider array of strategic functions--he was a staff planner in the War Department, wartime commander of a massive coalition force, peacetime Chief of Staff, and Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Eisenhower was directly involved in a number of major transitions including the building of the wartime American Army, its demobilization following the war, and the resuscitation of American military strength during the initial years of the cold war."

Alternative World Scenarios for a New Order of Nations Dr Charles W Taylor Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This futures study has four objectives. The first is to establish a standard method for Department of the Army (DA) agencies to plan for the midrange to the long-range future through the use of an alternative scenario approach. The second is to describe four future alternative world scenarios (environments) that are plausible, realistic, and appropriate for Army and organizational planning into the 21st century. The third is to revise and update the scenarios to bring them into alignment both with world changes that have occurred since they were published and with the author's recent forecasts. The fourth objective is to adjust the forecasts inherent in the scenarios to accommodate plausible future environments."