Letort Papers

 

  •  An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations

    An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations

    An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations LTC Suzanne C Nielsen Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "It is common to hear the argument that military organizations are incapable of reforming themselves. In this paper, Lieutenant Colonel Suzanne Nielsen takes the opposite position. It is not only possible for senior military leaders to change their organizations, it is also necessary since only these leaders are likely to be able to do it."
    • Published On: 9/1/2010
  •  Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? Explaining the Decline in Support for the War in Afghanistan in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany

    Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? Explaining the Decline in Support for the War in Afghanistan in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany

    Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? Explaining the Decline in Support for the War in Afghanistan in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany Mr Charles A Miller Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Domestic support for the war is often mentioned as one of the key battlegrounds of the Afghan conflict. A variety of explanations have been put forward in the media and in the political realm to explain why this war, which once commanded overwhelming popular support in almost all participating countries, is now opposed by a majority, even in the United States itself. Casualties, lack of equitable multilateral burden sharing, confused and shifting rationales on the part of the political leadership for the war and a “contagion” effect from the unpopularity of the Iraq war have all been cited at one time or another."
    • Published On: 6/1/2010
  •  Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of "Unity of Effort" in American Counterinsurgency

    Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of "Unity of Effort" in American Counterinsurgency

    Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of "Unity of Effort" in American Counterinsurgency Mr Henry Nuzum Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The past 2 years have been the most violent of the Afghan insurgency thus far. Taliban and affiliates seek to undermine the state and sap the will of the occupying force. In response, the United States and the coalition pursue a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign that coordinates military, political, and economic assistance to the Afghan government so that it may provide security and services to its people. If the effort succeeds, the government will win the confidence of the citizens, who will increasingly reject the insurgents."
    • Published On: 4/1/2010
  •  Lashkar-I-Taiba: The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of Islamist Terrorism in India

    Lashkar-I-Taiba: The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of Islamist Terrorism in India

    Lashkar-I-Taiba: The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of Islamist Terrorism in India Dr Ryan Clarke Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This work provides a discussion of the foundation of Lashkar-i-Taiba (LeT) and the development of its modus operandi, and it engages in an investigation of LeT activities in India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir region. Further, LeT fundraising methods are touched upon and LeT relationships with regional state and nonstate actors such as Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company are analyzed. Also, the impact that these developments have on domestic Islamist terrorism in India are addressed."
    • Published On: 3/1/2010
  •  Security and Stability in Africa: A Development Approach

    Security and Stability in Africa: A Development Approach

    Security and Stability in Africa: A Development Approach LTC Clarence J Bouchat (USAF, Ret) Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "For a topic long overlooked by American policymakers and strategists, the security and stability of Africa has recently become an important national issue. This nascent importance is readily seen in the increased time, effort, and resources now devoted to the continent by such new organizations as the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). However, to be effective this growing interest must be rooted in the desire to overcome centuries of ignorance and misunderstanding about the conditions and people of Africa"
    • Published On: 1/1/2010
  •  Security and Stability in Africa: A Development Approach

    Security and Stability in Africa: A Development Approach

    Security and Stability in Africa: A Development Approach LTC Clarence J Bouchat (USAF, Ret) Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "For a topic long overlooked by American policymakers and strategists, the security and stability of Africa has recently become an important national issue. This nascent importance is readily seen in the increased time, effort, and resources now devoted to the continent by such new organizations as the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). However, to be effective this growing interest must be rooted in the desire to overcome centuries of ignorance and misunderstanding about the conditions and people of Africa."
    • Published On: 1/1/2010
  •  India's Strategic Defense Transformation: Expanding Global Relationships

    India's Strategic Defense Transformation: Expanding Global Relationships

    India's Strategic Defense Transformation: Expanding Global Relationships LTC Brian K Hedrick Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "India’s defense establishment is undergoing an unprecedented transformation as it modernizes its military, seeks “strategic partnerships” with the United States and other nations, and expands its influence in the Indian Ocean and beyond. This transformation includes a shift from an emphasis on the former Soviet Union as the primary supplier of defense articles to a western base of supply and an increasing emphasis on bilateral exercises and training with many of the global powers."
    • Published On: 11/1/2009
  •  Mind-Sets and Missiles: a First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis

    Mind-Sets and Missiles: a First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis

    Mind-Sets and Missiles: a First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis Mr Kenneth Michael Absher Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This Letort Paper provides a detailed chronology and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The author, Mr. Kenneth Absher, contends that, when our national security is at stake, the United States should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations, including espionage, to penetrate our adversary’s deceptions. At the same time, the United States must also understand that our adversary may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or may not allow its own agenda to be influenced by U.S. diplomatic pressure."
    • Published On: 9/1/2009
  •  Iraq: Strategic Reconciliation, Targeting, and Key Leader Engagement

    Iraq: Strategic Reconciliation, Targeting, and Key Leader Engagement

    Iraq: Strategic Reconciliation, Targeting, and Key Leader Engagement Capt Jeanne F Hull Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Military commanders and diplomats in Iraq and Afghanistan have been meeting with important local officials since the inception of those conflicts. These Key Leader Engagements (or KLE as they are now termed) have aided commanders and diplomats alike in furthering their objectives by establishing productive relationships with those who know and understand Iraq’s complex human terrain best—the Iraqis. However, these engagements frequently take place on ad-hoc bases and are rarely incorporated into other counterinsurgency operations and strategies. In some cases, unit commanders fail to see the utility of using KLE at all—an oversight that contributes to deteriorating security situations and loss of popular support. "
    • Published On: 9/1/2009
Page 7 of 10