Letort Papers

Joint Strategic Planning System Insights: Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff 1990 to 2012 Dr Richard M Meinhart Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Military leaders at many levels have used strategic planning in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of the current situation, while simultaneously preparing to meet future challenges. This Letort Paper examines how the different Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1990 to 2012 used a strategic planning system to enable them to meet their formal leadership responsibilities as outlined in Title 10 U.S. Code. As such, it provides an historic perspective in assessing the different Chairmen’s leadership legacies in using and modifying their strategic planning system. It also has a contemporary focus as it describes the planning system’s current processes and products."

The Challenge of Drug Trafficking to Democratic Governance and Human Security in West Africa Mr David E Brown Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "...Mr. Brown’s Letort Paper describes how West Africa is under attack from international criminal networks that are using the subregion as a key global hub for the distribution, wholesale, and increasing production of illicit drugs, most prominently cocaine, but also heroin and amphetamines and their precursors. While West African states have made remarkable progress in democratic and economic development over the past decade, the insidious effects of narcotics trafficking have the potential to reverse many of these gains..."

Return of the Balkans: Challenges to European Integration and U.S. Disengagement Mr Janusz Bugajski Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "This Letort Paper assesses the prospects for further turbulence and conflict in the Western Balkans and weighs the implications for U.S. policy and for potential future military engagement. Although the region has slipped off the American radar screen in recent years, several unresolved disputes have the potential of escalating. This Paper systematically describes numerous causes of domestic and regional tensions and outlines a number of conflict scenarios."

Talking Past Each Other? How Views of U.S. Power Vary between U.S. and International Military Personnel COL Richard H M Outzen Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "This Paper addresses the question of whether anecdotally observed friction between U.S. military personnel and their international partners stems from underlying bias or other factors that cannot be practically remedied. After providing a backdrop of the types of friction that have been observed, and that seem to be escalating, the Paper examines alternative theoretical explanations for such friction. The friction mirrors, in a sense, the broader sharpening of anti-U.S. sentiment observed throughout much of the globe over the past decade. There are two broad explanatory approaches: the friction and sentiment stem from who we are and are thus immutable; or they stem from discrete actions and policies, and thus may be ameliorated to some degree."

Beyond the Battlefield: Institutional Army Transformation Following Victory in Iraq LTC G Scott Taylor Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The U.S. Army goes to great lengths to capture lessons learned and preserve these lessons for current practitioners and future generations. Though the Army is one of the most self-critical organizations found in American society, a well-deserved reputation has also been earned for failing to inculcate those lessons by transforming the institutional Army. Change is achieved through a continuous cycle of adaptive innovation, experimentation, and experience. In Iraq, out of necessity while in contact with a dynamic enemy, the Army transformed on the battlefield with radical changes in doctrine, organization, training, and materiel, which significantly enabled battlefield success."

A "Hollow Army" Reappraised: President Carter, Defense Budgets, and the Politics of Military Readiness Prof Frank L Jones Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The term “hollow army” became a part of the American political vocabulary more than 30 years ago, in another election year, 1980. Highlighted by a reporter in an article about the U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s congressional testimony concerning the fiscal year 1981 defense budget, the term became a metaphor for the Jimmy Carter administration’s alleged neglect of U.S. national security by political opponents as well as disapproving members of his own party in Congress, who believed him to be a liability..."

The Afghanistan Question and the Reset in U.S.-Russian Relations Dr Richard J Krickus Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has said that the ability of the United States and Russia to cooperate in Afghanistan will be a solid test of their reset in relations. That proposition is the thesis of this monograph. Many analysts in both countries would agree with this assessment, but a significant number of them believe a fruitful reset is implausible."

The Military's Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies Dr Geraint Hughes Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the U.S. Government was criticized for adopting a militaristic response to the threat posed by al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. As the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that in Northern Ireland demonstrate, any liberal democracy that uses its armed forces to combat terrorism will incur controversy both domestically and internationally."

Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response Brigadier Andrew Smith Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that has emerged in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 is a contemporary example of conventional militaries being confronted with a tactical surprise with operational—if not strategic—implications. Those implications can necessitate “institutional” responses to avoid strategic defeat in what, for many countries, are “wars of discretion.” Operational surprise, as defined in this examination, differs from strategic shocks as described by Nathan Freier, and the necessary responses are distinct from the military adaptations considered by John Nagl. The paper contends that the 6-year evolution of the IED experience from 2003 until 2009 constitutes a complete cycle of surprise and response, of which the most significant part is the institutional response."