Strategic Issues

Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions Dr Don M Snider Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Vice Admiral James Stockdale, Vietnam prisoner of war and Medal of Honor recipient, once said, 'Even in the most detached duty, we warriors must keep foremost in our minds that there are boundaries to the prerogatives of leadership, moral boundaries.' In this monograph, the author delineates a segment of these boundaries as they are understood from the study of military professions and as derived from the roles and responsibilities of those seniors privileged to be the profession’s temporary stewards—the colonels/captains and Flag Officers who comprise the strategic leadership. Such boundaries mean that the decision to dissent can never be a purely personal matter. Rather it will reverberate outward impinging at a minimum the three critical trust relationships of the military profession—those with the American people, those with civilian and military leaders at the highest levels of decisionmaking, and those with the junior corps of officers and noncommissioned officers of our armed forces."

The Trouble With Strategic Communication(s) Dennis M Murphy Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Recently the U.S. Southern Command’s Admiral James Stavridis paraphrased World War II’s great naval commander and strategist Ernest King: 'I don’t know what the hell this [strategic communication] is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it.' This past summer over 200 strategic communication practitioners and academics met at the National War College for the first annual Worldwide Strategic Communication Seminar. Senior government officials urged attendees to get on with the business of strategic communication, noting that 'we will be flying the plane while we’re building it'..."

Creative Strategic Intelligence Analysis and Decision Making Within the Elements of National Power; Proteus Futures Workshop Report 2007 Workshop Report by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "From 14 to 16 August 2007 the Proteus Management Group USA hosted an Academic Workshop to bring together specialists from academia, the defense community, and civilian organizations to share information and insights on analyzing future complex national security challenges. "

Toward a Mathematical Theory of Counterterrorism; Proteus Monograph Series 1, Volume 2 Jonathan David Farley Monograph by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, The Proteus Management Group 'In March 2006, The New York Times Magazine published an article entitled, 'Can Network Theory Thwart Terrorists?' When terrorist cells are depicted schematically, they are often shown as structures called graphs. These are not the graphs readers may have plotted in high school algebra, but collections of dots (called nodes), representing individuals, and lines (called edges) between nodes, representing any sort of relationship between the two corresponding individuals, such as a direct communications link."

Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today's Middle East Mr James A Russell Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph attempts to peel back the layers of complexity surrounding the regional threat environment as a first step in the process of constructing a security strategy that can effectively mitigate the threats to U.S. and global interests. The United States has relied on a remarkably effective Cold War template to protect and preserve its regional interests that includes such elements as access to host nation facilities, prepositioned military equipment, foreign military sales, and joint training and exercises. The question facing strategists is whether this template remains relevant to the regional environment. The author argues that changing internal political dynamics throughout the region will make it increasingly difficult for regional elites to continue to allow the United States to apply its tried and true Cold War template."

Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist's Perspective Dr Roger B Myerson Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph is a short nontechnical introduction to the use of game theory in the study of international relations. The focus is on the problem of deterrence against potential adversaries and aggressors. The author, Professor Roger Myerson, uses game models to provide a simple context where we can see more clearly the essential logic of strategic deterrence. We should look to such theoretical analysis for basic insights that may have practical importance in policymaking. The main conclusion is that a great power’s use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force."

American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment Dr Gabriel Marcella Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The fear that extra-hemispheric powers would strategically deny Latin America as a friend of the United States has animated American statesmen since the 19th century. Such fear certainly pervaded the Cold war competition. Today the challenge to the security and well-being of Latin America is neither ideological, nor military, nor external. Strategic denial is more likely to come about from a highly combustible blend of poverty, crime, despair, corruption, resentment, and antidemocratic sentiments that promise a vague 21st century socialism under new authoritarian clothing. The sentiments are sinking deep roots in the socio-political landscape, and they are profoundly anti-American. "

Beyond Iraq: The Lessons of a Hard Place Mr Anton K Smith Student issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Our “adventure” in Iraq is doing little to enhance the post 9/11 security of the American public. The idea that a Middle East-altering democracy could be militarily introduced into a country as riven and as historically different from the U.S. as Iraq is now understood to have been naïve. As a series of early failures drove wedge after wedge into the fragile Iraqi society, the policy objective of a 'united, stable and democratic Iraq' at peace with its neighbors fell victim to shortsighted decisions and poor preparation. The prolonged engagement in Iraq is distracting us from an even greater threat of a stateless insurgency arrayed against the current world order. A mechanism for constraining U.S. prerogatives has been established, and a formula for our defeat is under development."

The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray draws a sharp distinction between preemption and prevention, and explains that the political, military, moral, and strategic arguments have really all been about the latter, not the former. Dr. Gray provides definitions, reviews the history of the preventive war option, and considers the merit, or lack thereof, in the principal charges laid against the concept when it is proclaimed to be policy."