Strategy & Policy

Regional Fears of Western Primacy and the Future of U.S. Middle Eastern Basing Policy Dr W Andrew Terrill Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The United States has a core national interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East as well as containing or eliminating threats emanating from that region. Yet, if most American strategic analysts can agree on this assumption and these goals, there is often disagreement on the ways to best achieve them. In this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill presents his analysis of how the United States and other Western states might best address their military cooperation and basing needs within the Middle East, while still respecting and working with an understanding of regional and especially Arab history and concerns. He also provides the reader with policy recommendations based upon his analysis."

Value Projection and American Foreign Policy Dr Douglas J Macdonald Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The controversies over the Bush administration’s “doctrine” of promoting democracy as a long-term goal of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) have raised once again that hardy perennial in the debate over American foreign policy: value projection. The debate juxtaposes two basic positions: the Jeffersonian idea that the United States should, when possible, serve as an active agent for the spread of democratic values in the world, and the Washingtonian idea that we should serve as a model for the rest of the world by developing democracy at home, not by taking actions to foster it abroad."

Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats Mr Henry D Sokolski Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Long discounted by arms control critics, traditional nonproliferation efforts now are undergoing urgent review and reconsideration even by their supporters. Why? In large part, because the current crop of nonproliferation understandings are ill-suited to check the spread of emerging long-range missile, biological, and nuclear technologies."

Planning For and Applying Military Force: An Examination of Terms Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This Letort Paper briefly examines current and, in some cases, still evolving definitions in joint doctrine—especially with regard to strategy, center of gravity, decisive point, and commander’s intent. It discusses the heritage of those concepts and terms, most of which derived from the writings of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. In so doing, the author finds that current joint planning definitions and concepts tend to confuse more than they inform. In short, they are not ready to be incorporated into formal doctrine, and certainly not into the actual planning process. Hence, concept developers need to go back to the drawing table, and make a concerted effort to separate the proverbial wheat from the chaff. Change is good, but so is tradition. The definitions advanced by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz have stood the test of time for good reasons. If we decide to change them, we should have equally good reasons for doing so."

Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray considers irregular warfare in the light of the general theory of strategy and finds that that theory is fully adequate to explain the phenomenon. Rather less adequate, Dr. Gray suggests, is the traditional American way of war. The monograph offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of “the American way.” It concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that “way” and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes."

Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy Dr Harry R Yarger Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The word “strategy” pervades American conversation and our news media. We tend to use strategy as a general term for a plan, a concept, a course of action, or a “vision” of the direction in which to proceed at the personal, organizational, and governmental—local, state, or federal—levels. Such casual use of the term to describe nothing more than “what we would like to do next” is inappropriate and belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking. It reduces strategy to just a good idea without the necessary underlying thought or development. It also leads to confusion between strategy and planning, confining strategic possibilities to near-time planning assumptions and details, while limiting the flexibility of strategic thought and setting inappropriately specific expectations of outcomes. "

The Danger of Seeking Permanent U.S. Military Bases in Iraq Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In a June 25, 2005, address to the nation, President George W. Bush stated, “We will stay in Iraq as long as we are needed—and not a day longer.” This statement may initially appear unremarkable, but it is nevertheless an important and valuable assertion of policy that can be usefully applied to the concept of long-term basing rights in Iraq."

Going to War With the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism Dr Daniel Byman Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Daniel Byman reviews the problems common to the security forces of local allies that have fought or may soon fight insurgencies linked to al-Qa’ida. He argues that these problems stem from deep structural weaknesses, such as the regime’s perceived illegitimacy, poor civil-military relations, an undeveloped economy, and discriminatory societies. Together, they greatly inhibit the allied armed forces’ effectiveness in fighting the insurgents. Various U.S. programs designed to work with allied security forces, at best, can reduce some of these issues. To be effective, any program to assist allied counterinsurgency forces should factor in the allies’ weaknesses."

The High Cost of Primacy Mr Nathan P Freier Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "It is critical that the elected representatives, policymakers, opinion leaders, and population of the United States recognize that the maintenance of our global position comes at a price. We must now acknowledge an historic certainty; a truism ignored in the decade that preceded the War on Terror and the pacification of Iraq. Dominant global power engenders persistent resistance and exposes the United States to enormous costs and burdens. This observation is value neutral. That some actively oppose us and we incur costs as a result should come as no surprise. We must realistically account for both in the formation of grand strategy."