Letort Papers

 
  •  A "Hollow Army" Reappraised: President Carter, Defense Budgets, and the Politics of Military Readiness

    A "Hollow Army" Reappraised: President Carter, Defense Budgets, and the Politics of Military Readiness

    A "Hollow Army" Reappraised: President Carter, Defense Budgets, and the Politics of Military Readiness Prof Frank L Jones Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The term “hollow army” became a part of the American political vocabulary more than 30 years ago, in another election year, 1980. Highlighted by a reporter in an article about the U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s congressional testimony concerning the fiscal year 1981 defense budget, the term became a metaphor for the Jimmy Carter administration’s alleged neglect of U.S. national security by political opponents as well as disapproving members of his own party in Congress, who believed him to be a liability..."
    • Published On: 10/1/2012
  •  Real Leadership and the U.S. Army: Overcoming a Failure of Imagination to Conduct Adaptive Work

    Real Leadership and the U.S. Army: Overcoming a Failure of Imagination to Conduct Adaptive Work

    Real Leadership and the U.S. Army: Overcoming a Failure of Imagination to Conduct Adaptive Work COL John B Richardson IV Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Former Army Chief of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey has highlighted “failure of imagination” as a major obstacle in an organization’s ability to learn, adapt, and find solutions to complex problems. As a former Commanding General of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Dempsey led the redesign of the Army’s conceptual foundation. He and other Army officials, reflecting on the previous decade’s conflicts, aggressively instituted a campaign of learning, which TRADOC describes as “a broad set of initiatives designed to produce an Army capable of rapidly adapting to defeat unforeseen threats.”"
    • Published On: 12/1/2011
  •  The Afghanistan Question and the Reset in U.S.-Russian Relations

    The Afghanistan Question and the Reset in U.S.-Russian Relations

    The Afghanistan Question and the Reset in U.S.-Russian Relations Dr Richard J Krickus Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has said that the ability of the United States and Russia to cooperate in Afghanistan will be a solid test of their reset in relations. That proposition is the thesis of this monograph. Many analysts in both countries would agree with this assessment, but a significant number of them believe a fruitful reset is implausible."
    • Published On: 10/1/2011
  •  Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power

    Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power

    Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power Mr Alexander Ghaleb Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The slow re-emergence of Russia as a world power despite its weak military force is of critical significance for the strategic interests of the United States in Europe. Since the Cold War, Russia has been perceived as a broken nation that no longer represents a threat to the North Atlantic Alliance. This monograph emphasizes that Russia overcame this major vulnerability by developing the capacity to use unilateral economic sanctions in the form of gas pricing and gas disruptions against many European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states."
    • Published On: 10/1/2011
  •  Adapting, Transforming, and Modernizing Under Fire: The Mexican Military 2006-11

    Adapting, Transforming, and Modernizing Under Fire: The Mexican Military 2006-11

    Adapting, Transforming, and Modernizing Under Fire: The Mexican Military 2006-11 Mr Inigo Guevara Moyano Letort Paper by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Since President Felipe Calderon took office in December 2006, Mexico has embarked upon the implementation of a culture of law and security that has triggered a war with organized crime. This war has involved all sectors of society and has activated a series of renovations in its armed forces, which to date remain the most trusted institutions in Mexican society. This groundbreaking Letort Paper is an important contribution to an understanding of the structure, culture, motivators, and challenges of the Mexican military in the 21st century..."
    • Published On: 9/1/2011
  •  Understanding the North Korea Problem: Why It Has Become the "Land of Lousy Options"

    Understanding the North Korea Problem: Why It Has Become the "Land of Lousy Options"

    Understanding the North Korea Problem: Why It Has Become the "Land of Lousy Options" COL William A Boik Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph is intended to draw attention to the challenges faced by the United States in developing a coordinated strategy for dealing with North Korea. Despite the many decades of direct U.S. involvement on the Korean Peninsula, we continue to have little understanding of the North Korean culture or of events inside North Korea. We also do not have a long-term coordinated strategy for North Korea. Over the past decade, the United States has focused much of its attention on the Middle East and the War on Terror, and seems to only focus on North Korea in response to crises when they arise on the peninsula. "
    • Published On: 7/1/2011
  •  The Military's Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies

    The Military's Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies

    The Military's Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies Dr Geraint Hughes Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the U.S. Government was criticized for adopting a militaristic response to the threat posed by al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. As the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that in Northern Ireland demonstrate, any liberal democracy that uses its armed forces to combat terrorism will incur controversy both domestically and internationally."
    • Published On: 5/1/2011
  •  Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response

    Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response

    Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response Brigadier Andrew Smith Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that has emerged in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 is a contemporary example of conventional militaries being confronted with a tactical surprise with operational—if not strategic—implications. Those implications can necessitate “institutional” responses to avoid strategic defeat in what, for many countries, are “wars of discretion.” Operational surprise, as defined in this examination, differs from strategic shocks as described by Nathan Freier, and the necessary responses are distinct from the military adaptations considered by John Nagl. The paper contends that the 6-year evolution of the IED experience from 2003 until 2009 constitutes a complete cycle of surprise and response, of which the most significant part is the institutional response."
    • Published On: 4/1/2011
  •  Reforming Military Command Arrangements: The Case of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

    Reforming Military Command Arrangements: The Case of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

    Reforming Military Command Arrangements: The Case of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Mr Henrik Bliddal Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "After the Shah of Iran was deposed and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the United States began to craft a new Persian Gulf Security Framework (PGSF). Consisting of military, diplomatic, economic, and covert steps, it signified a historic strategic reorientation towards the Persian Gulf. This paper examines an integral part of the PGSF: the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). As the first real tool for U.S. power projection in the area, and the immediate precursor to today’s Central Command (CENTCOM), the RDJTF has indeed left an important mark on the U.S. approach to the Persian Gulf. This paper is the fullest account of its creation thus far."
    • Published On: 3/1/2011
  •  Deciding to Buy: Civil-Military Relations and Major Weapons Programs

    Deciding to Buy: Civil-Military Relations and Major Weapons Programs

    Deciding to Buy: Civil-Military Relations and Major Weapons Programs Mr Quentin E Hodgson Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this timely monograph, Mr. Quentin Hodgson explores how the civilian and military leadership of the Pentagon have debated and argued decisions on major weapons programs. Drawing on interviews with participants and archival research, he has demonstrated the enduring nature of these debates, despite efforts to improve, transform, and overhaul the defense planning and programming system..."
    • Published On: 11/1/2010
  •  Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot

    Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot

    Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot Retrieving data. Wait a few seconds and try to cut or copy again. Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "If the U.S. Army’s current experience in ongoing overseas operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan are any indication, reconstruction has become an integral part of the American way of war. And judging from the disappointing results of reconstruction efforts in these operations, measured mostly in terms of the effect that such efforts have had on the course of these wars, there is much lacking in the Army’s understanding of reconstruction itself and the role that it will likely play in all future operations, especially in counterinsurgencies (COIN)."
    • Published On: 10/1/2010
  •  An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations

    An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations

    An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations LTC Suzanne C Nielsen Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "It is common to hear the argument that military organizations are incapable of reforming themselves. In this paper, Lieutenant Colonel Suzanne Nielsen takes the opposite position. It is not only possible for senior military leaders to change their organizations, it is also necessary since only these leaders are likely to be able to do it."
    • Published On: 9/1/2010
  •  Is the Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army Congruent with the Professional Development of Its Senior Level Officer Corps?

    Is the Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army Congruent with the Professional Development of Its Senior Level Officer Corps?

    Is the Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army Congruent with the Professional Development of Its Senior Level Officer Corps? Dr James G Pierce Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Organization theory hypothesizes that an organization’s culture enables its members to work through the basic problems of survival in, and adaptation to, the external environment. Organizational culture also guides the organization’s development and maintenance of internal processes and procedures that perpetuate adaptability and promote continued existence. Consequently, organizational culture has considerable impact on an organization’s behavior at any given time, particularly on organizational effectiveness. However, little literature and even less data discuss the impact of organizational culture within military organizations and, more importantly, the impact that organizational culture may have on the development of an organization’s leaders."
    • Published On: 9/1/2010
  •  Somalia: Line in the Sand--Identification of MYM Vulnerabilities

    Somalia: Line in the Sand--Identification of MYM Vulnerabilities

    Somalia: Line in the Sand--Identification of MYM Vulnerabilities LTC Eloy E Cuevas, Ms Madeleine Wells Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Continuing instability in Somalia has increased concern that terrorists who seek to establish a foothold in Africa may use such insecure places as a safe haven and launching pad. Several attempts have been made to establish lawful governments in Somalia; however, warlord and clan interests have managed to take center stage among the population. The Somali-based al-Shabaab (also known as the Mujahidin Youth Movement [MYM]) is a militant organization born out of both successive regional turmoil and international salafi-jihadi ideology, which continues to actively undermine the United Nations (UN)-supported African Union (AU) peacekeeping force, the fledging Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and all UN efforts to support Somalis in creating a stable state. "
    • Published On: 9/1/2010
  •  Chinese Energy Security: The Myth of the PLAN's Frontline Status

    Chinese Energy Security: The Myth of the PLAN's Frontline Status

    Chinese Energy Security: The Myth of the PLAN's Frontline Status Dr Ryan Clarke Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The continued impressive growth and development of China, while always of critical strategic importance, has surged in recent years to the forefront of the consciousness of American policymakers, scholars, and the news media, as well as the general public. This trend has been accelerated by the staying power that China demonstrated following its relatively graceful weathering of the global financial crisis, in the process defying a wide range of doomsday prophecies of massive organized riots by newly unemployed rural factory workers and various other classes of people angry with Beijing over economic slowdown or stagnation. "
    • Published On: 8/1/2010
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