Why Saddam will not Choose Exile Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "During his rise to power, Saddam Hussein is reported to have taken his two young sons to Iraqi torture chambers to view acts of torment committed against the luckless individuals imprisoned there. One of these sons, Uday, grew up to be a psychopath, while the other, Qusay, became a cold disciplined killer like his father. Both learned from Saddam’s torturers to avoid the most horrible of all fates—helplessness before your enemies. It is a fate that Saddam himself will never accept."

Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr W Andrew Terrill Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "During the latter half of the 20th century, U.S. military leaders and planners focused heavily on winning wars, and not so much on the peacekeeping or nation-building that comes afterwards. But national objectives can often be accomplished only after the fighting has ceased. With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to begin planning for the post-conflict reconstruction of that state. This monograph presents some historical insights from past occupations and peace operations, provides some additional analysis of the unique requirements involved in remaking Iraq, and, most importantly, develops a detailed list of potential tasks to help contemporary military commanders plan for post-conflict operations there."

Waging Ancient War: Limits on Preemptive Force Dr D Robert Worley Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this study, conducted under the U.S. Army War College’s External Research Associates Program, Dr. D. Robert Worley addresses the ways that the age of terrorism is affecting American grand strategy. He contends that terrorism has made many of the basic concepts of international relations and national security obsolete. Declaring war on a tactic—terrorism—erodes the clarity necessary for coherent strategy. Dr. Worley then develops what he calls a “guerra strategy” more appropriate for dealing with terrorism and other nonstate threats."

Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr W Andrew Terrill Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to plan for its post-conflict reconstruction. To assist such planning, this study proposes a construct for identifying the postwar missions to be accomplished following a victory over the Hussein regime and suggests the time phasing for the accomplishment of specific tasks."

Defeating Saddam Hussein's Strategy LTC Raymond A Millen Colloquium Report by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Should war break out between Iraq and the United States, Saddam Hussein will likely adopt a strategy designed to undermine the prestige of the United States and turn the Arab World against the West. A war culminating in a titanic battle for Baghdad would provide Saddam Hussein with the prestige and respect he seeks from the Arab World. His military advisers have likely informed him that urban combat will deprive U.S.-led coalition forces of their technological advantage and result in considerable attrition."

Plan Colombia: Reality of the Colombian Crisis and Implications for Hemispheric Security Dr Luz E Nagle Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Professor Luz E. Nagle has never been a believer in Plan Colombia as the solution to her native country’s array of problems. Now she has again published on the subject, in an article which is eloquently critical about the plan’s results during the administration of President Andrés Pastrana, yet which holds out hope for a better turn of events in the new administration of President Alvaro Uribe. It is a study written with passion and commitment. But also, as befits a law professor, it is scholarly in its degree of documentation and factual content."

Saddam's Strategy: No To Nuclear Weapons; Yes To Biologicals Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Advocates of war with Iraq currently contend that Saddam Hussein is actively and aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability much as he did prior to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Very little evidence is presented to support this argument, but the logic associated with it generally maintains that Saddam has a capacity for developing illicit weapons in secret. The world was surprised by the post-DESERT STORM revelations of a massive hidden nuclear weapons program by Iraq. If Iraq fooled us once, could they not do so again?"

South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances Dr Michael R Chambers Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Whither South Asia? This is not a question that has troubled many Americans, although the number has been growing over the last few years. The nuclear weapons tests of 1998 and the Kargil crisis of 1999 helped to increase that number. But as this is written in June 2002, perhaps more Americans than ever are concerned about the future of South Asia. This, of course, is a result of the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11 as it is often referred to) and the resulting war on terrorism that has been conducted in part through Pakistan. It is also a result of the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian Parliament by Islamic militants out of Kashmir, and the escalation of tensions that followed between India and Pakistan. By June 2002, these two nuclear-armed neighbors seemed on the threshold of war."

Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy Dr Stephen D Biddle Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the “Afghan Model” of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim."