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Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War Dr David C Hendrickson, Dr Robert W Tucker Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker examine the contentious debate over the Iraq war and occupation, focusing on the critique that the Bush administration squandered an historic opportunity to reconstruct the Iraqi state because of various critical blunders in planning. Though they conclude that critics have made a number of telling points against the Bush administration’s conduct of the Iraq war, they argue that the most serious problems facing Iraq and its American occupiers—criminal anarchy and lawlessness, a raging insurgency, and a society divided into rival and antagonistic groups—were virtually inevitable consequences that flowed from the act of war itself."

The Danger of Seeking Permanent U.S. Military Bases in Iraq Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In a June 25, 2005, address to the nation, President George W. Bush stated, “We will stay in Iraq as long as we are needed—and not a day longer.” This statement may initially appear unremarkable, but it is nevertheless an important and valuable assertion of policy that can be usefully applied to the concept of long-term basing rights in Iraq."

Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran Mr Patrick Clawson, Mr Henry D Sokolski Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Little more than a year ago, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) completed its initial analysis of Iran’s nuclear program, Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. Since then, Tehran’s nuclear activities and public diplomacy have only affirmed what this analysis first suggested: Iran is not about to give up its effort to make nuclear fuel and, thereby, come within days of acquiring a nuclear bomb. Iran’s continued pursuit of uranium enrichment and plutonium recycling puts a premium on asking what a more confident nuclear-ready Iran might confront us with and what we might do now to hedge against these threats."

Going to War With the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism Dr Daniel Byman Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Daniel Byman reviews the problems common to the security forces of local allies that have fought or may soon fight insurgencies linked to al-Qa’ida. He argues that these problems stem from deep structural weaknesses, such as the regime’s perceived illegitimacy, poor civil-military relations, an undeveloped economy, and discriminatory societies. Together, they greatly inhibit the allied armed forces’ effectiveness in fighting the insurgents. Various U.S. programs designed to work with allied security forces, at best, can reduce some of these issues. To be effective, any program to assist allied counterinsurgency forces should factor in the allies’ weaknesses."

Coup D'Oeil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning Dr William Duggan Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In our military professions, formal analytical methods co-exist with intuitive decisionmaking by leaders in action. For the most part, there is no harm done. But many officers can recount times when they knew they should have “gone with their gut,” but followed instead the results of their analytical methods. The gap between these two forms of decisionmaking perhaps has grown wider in recent times, especially in Iraq, where adaptive leadership seems to have overshadowed formal methods of planning. Departing from formal methods increasingly seems to be the mark of an effective commander, as we learn from Dr. Leonard Wong’s recent Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) report, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom (July 2004)."

Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In an era of broad and perhaps profound change, new theories and concepts are to be welcomed rather than shunned. However, before they are fully embraced, they need to be tested rigorously, for the cost of implementing a false theory and developing operational and strategic concepts around it can be greater than remaining wedded to an older, but sounder one. The theory of Fourth Generation War (4GW) is a perfect example. Were we to embrace this theory, a loose collection of ideas that does not hold up to close scrutiny, the price we might pay in a future conflict could be high indeed."

The PLA Shapes the Future Security Environment Mr Andy Gudgel Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, with The Heritage Foundation "Over 50 experts on China and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gathered at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, from September 23-25, to attend the 2005 PLA Conference, “The PLA Shapes the Future Security Environment,” cosponsored by the Heritage Foundation and the U.S. Army War College. The colloquium considered how the PLA shapes the global security environment."

The High Cost of Primacy Mr Nathan P Freier Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "It is critical that the elected representatives, policymakers, opinion leaders, and population of the United States recognize that the maintenance of our global position comes at a price. We must now acknowledge an historic certainty; a truism ignored in the decade that preceded the War on Terror and the pacification of Iraq. Dominant global power engenders persistent resistance and exposes the United States to enormous costs and burdens. This observation is value neutral. That some actively oppose us and we incur costs as a result should come as no surprise. We must realistically account for both in the formation of grand strategy."

Chinese National Security: Decisionmaking Under Stress Dr Andrew Scobell, Dr Larry M Wortzel Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "If there is one constant in expert analyses of the history of modern China, it is the characterization of a country perpetually in the throes of crises. And in nearly all crises, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has played an instrumental role. While China at the mid-point of the 21st century’s first decade is arguably the most secure and stable it has been in more than a century, crises continue to emerge with apparent frequency. Consequently, the study of China’s behavior in conditions of tension and stress, and particularly how the PLA is a factor in that behavior, is of considerable importance to policymakers and analysts around the world."