Past Publications

Other People's Wars: PLA Lessons from Foreign Conflicts Mr Daniel Alderman, Mr Joe Narus, The National Bureau of Asian Research Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, The National Bureau of Asian Research "The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has not fought in a major war since 1979, but has studied the lessons of modern foreign conflicts from throughout the world. In some cases, those lessons have resulted in observable changes to the PLA’s strategic, tactical, or operational posture."

Junior Leader Professional Development — Who Has the Time? Dr Steven Metz Op-ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "While researching General Matthew Ridgway’s oral history at the Military History Institute, author Tom Ricks came across this astute quote: “My advice to any young officer is read—read—read. And learn from the successes of the great ones and their failures.” Few Americans speak with greater authority on the requirements of military leadership than Ridgway. He commanded the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II; the 8th Army in the Korean War; replaced Douglas MacArthur as the overall commander in Korea; served as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe; and then as Army Chief of Staff. He was both an exceptional leader and a strategist. We should heed what Ridgway had to say."

Central Asian Security Trends: Views from Europe and Russia Dr Stephen J Blank Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The papers collected in this volume pertain to Central Asia. Indeed, they offer us two foreign views of the strategic situation evolving there—a Russian and a French analysis. For obvious reasons: the war in Afghanistan, proximity to major global actors, large energy holdings, and for less obvious reason, i.e., the possibility that domestic instability in one or more of these states could spread to other Muslim states as we now see in the Arab revolutions of 2011, Central Asia is an increasingly important and interesting strategic region. As such, it merits sustained critical attention and analysis of the sort we are presenting here and that we have presented in the past."

Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The concept of soft power, that is the influence attained through the co-option of foreigners by the attractiveness of our values, ideas, and practices, understandably has great appeal. Soft power is much cheaper than the hard power of military force, and it is more compatible with the culture of a principally liberal American society. All too often, military force seems to fail as an instrument of policy and, as a consequence, it invites the view that it is becoming obsolescent and even anachronistic. Dr. Colin Gray subjects hard and soft power to close critical scrutiny and finds that the latter is significantly misunderstood and, as a consequence, misassessed as a substitute for the threat or use of military force. Each kind of power has its limitations, but the obvious and familiar challenges characteristic of military force do not mean that therefore soft power should be our policy instrument of choice. The author warns against expecting too much of soft power."

Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response Brigadier Andrew Smith Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that has emerged in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 is a contemporary example of conventional militaries being confronted with a tactical surprise with operational—if not strategic—implications. Those implications can necessitate “institutional” responses to avoid strategic defeat in what, for many countries, are “wars of discretion.” Operational surprise, as defined in this examination, differs from strategic shocks as described by Nathan Freier, and the necessary responses are distinct from the military adaptations considered by John Nagl. The paper contends that the 6-year evolution of the IED experience from 2003 until 2009 constitutes a complete cycle of surprise and response, of which the most significant part is the institutional response."

A Colloquium on U.S. National Security Policy, Military Strategy: Understanding the Environment for Contemporary Warfare Mr Dave Lewis, Dr Steve Maxner, Dr Dennis Patterson Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Texas Tech University "No problem facing the United States is more important than national security, particularly in the context of our contemporary wars. In addition, no institution is more involved and more affected by this problem of protecting national security in the context of contemporary wars than the U.S. Army (and the U.S. military overall). The problem of contemporary wars has created numerous challenges for the U.S. Army."

Security and Governance: Foundations for International Stability Mr Dru Lauzon, Mr Andrew Vine Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Queen’s Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University Defence Management Studies, Land Force Doctrine and Training System of the Canadian Forces "Stability operations in fragile states are likely to remain an important focus of the foreign policy of Western countries for the foreseeable future. The central question to consider when launching these operations is whether a particular type of intervention is more effective than others, and to determine what insights can be drawn from previous deployments in failed and fragile states."

Brazil's Security Strategy and Defense Doctrine Mr Andrew Fishman, Dr Max G Manwaring Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, with The Center for Latin American Issues, The George Washington University "In September 2007, Brazil’s President Lula mandated the establishment of a national defense strategy. In December 2008, the Minister of Defense, Nelson Jobim, sent that strategy to the President. In 2010, President Lula signed executive orders to implement the new strategy (the Projecto Nacional) ..."

Reforming Military Command Arrangements: The Case of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Mr Henrik Bliddal Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "After the Shah of Iran was deposed and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the United States began to craft a new Persian Gulf Security Framework (PGSF). Consisting of military, diplomatic, economic, and covert steps, it signified a historic strategic reorientation towards the Persian Gulf. This paper examines an integral part of the PGSF: the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). As the first real tool for U.S. power projection in the area, and the immediate precursor to today’s Central Command (CENTCOM), the RDJTF has indeed left an important mark on the U.S. approach to the Persian Gulf. This paper is the fullest account of its creation thus far."