Monographs

Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA and the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy Mr Bjoern H Seibert Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Mr. Bjoern Seibert provides timely and interesting insights into the EU’s new security structure. He examines the largest and most complex EU military operation in Africa, Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, and provides an unprecedented look inside the workings of an EU military operation. Mr. Seibert highlights both successes and failures and then scrutinizes the impact of the operation on the ground. He then addresses an extensive list of lessons that can be drawn from this complex multinational stability operation in Africa. He correctly observes that the operation underscores the EU’s long remaining road toward realizing its ambitious agenda. This will not merely require a more expeditionary mindset, but also substantial shifts in budget priorities and reinvestment. Though the process may take years to complete, it is undoubtedly the right course for Europe to take, and would be in the best interest of the United States. "

Preparing for One War and Getting Another? Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "When Edward Luttwak’s Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace was published in 1987, it drew the attention of the defense intellectual community almost immediately, and became required reading in many strategy courses. The idea that war or strategy was driven by a paradoxical logic was attractive. However, a number of questions remain unanswered. If war has its own logic, rather than its own grammar, where does the logic of policy fit in? If the logic of strategy is, in fact, paradoxical, how can it be taught? What are paradoxes, and can they be useful in guiding our strategic choices? All of these questions and more are touched upon in this monograph by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II. He takes a closer look at the seemingly paradoxical logic that is driving aspects of defense thinking today. While the need for certain capabilities may indeed be genuine, the manner in which the arguments for them are made can actually undermine the overall rationale for change."

David Galula: His Life and Intellectual Context Ms Ann Marlowe Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph attempts to place David Galula’s intellectual achievement in relation to both his life experiences and his time. It is not an assessment of the worth of his ideas, though it may be useful for those who wish to make such an evaluation."

Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy Dr Hal Brands Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph analyzes Brazilian grand strategy under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. During Lula’s nearly 8 years in office, he has pursued a multipronged grand strategy aimed at hastening the transition from unipolarity and Western economic hegemony to a multipolar order in which international rules, norms, and institutions are more favorable to Brazilian interests. Lula has done so by emphasizing three diplomatic strategies: soft balancing against the United States, building coalitions to magnify Brazilian negotiating power, and seeking to position Brazil as the leader of a more united South America."

Got Vision? Unity of Vision in Policy and Strategy: What It Is and Why We Need It Dr Anna Simons Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "What do we need when confronted by adversaries who do not adhere to our rule set or social code? Drawing on India’s extensive counterinsurgency experiences, as well as British and American examples of cross-culturally astute strategists, this monograph makes the case for frontloading selection. Its premise is that with the right individual(s) devising strategy, everything else should fall into place. The author contends that certain intuitive abilities are key—abilities that no amount of doctrine can instill or teach."

Organizing to Compete in the Political Terrain Dr Nadia Schadlow Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The degree to which military forces can and should shape the political landscape during war—that is, who rules contested territory—is at the root of several ongoing debates about how to restructure the U.S. Army. It is an issue that is central to striking the appropriate balance between civilian and military assets in stabilization and reconstruction operations, and it is key to determining how much to shift the Army toward so-called irregular war as opposed to so-called conventional capabilities. Decisions about the military’s appropriate role in shaping political outcomes in war are fundamental to resolving these debates and will determine the degree of organizational and educational changes that the United States Army must make to meet current and future security threats. "

Implications of a Changing NATO COL Phillip R Cuccia Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "NATO officials plan to unveil the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Strategic Concept during the Alliance’s summit in Portugal at the end of 2010. This monograph focuses on the impact that the Strategic Concept will have on the Alliance. This analysis describes recent trends within NATO and their implications, and provides senior military and political leaders with a discussion of the changing composition of the NATO nations and the impact of these changes on the nature of the Alliance. The monograph describes four possible scenarios of what NATO could look like in the future so as to give senior leaders thoughts to consider while instituting NATO policy."

Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Employing Talent LTC Michael J Colarusso, COL David S Lyle, COL Casey Wardynski Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In the Information Age, jobs are becoming more complex, requiring employees who are agile, inventive, and empathetic. Work is increasingly characterized by high levels of task interdependence, skill specificity, and uncertainty. In addition, today’s enormously competitive labor market gives educated professionals the option of seeking new employment whenever a company fails to give them sufficient voice in their work. In short, the industrial era, during which “bosses” unilaterally made employment decisions, is over. Today, the most successful enterprises unleash the talents of their workers by collaborating with them rather than dictating to them. In this more equitable environment, prospective employees and employers seek information about each other. Ideally, they will enter into mutually beneficial relationships characterized by high productivity and the initiative, innovation, and tenure born of true job satisfaction."

Decisionmaking In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: The Strategic Shift of 2007 Dr Steven Metz Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In Volume 1 of the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions Monograph Series, Dr. Steven Metz skillfully studied the 2003 decision to go to war in Iraq. The results of that decision are widely called disastrous. In this second volume of the series, Dr. Metz looks carefully at the 2007 decision to surge forces into Iraq, a choice which is generally considered to have been effective in turning the tide of the war from potential disaster to possible—perhaps probable—strategic success. Although numerous strategic decisions remain to be made as the U.S. military executes its “responsible withdrawal” from Iraq, Dr. Metz has encapsulated much of the entire war in these two monographs, describing both the start and what may eventually be seen as the beginning of the end of the war. In this volume, he provides readers with an explanation of how a decision process that was fundamentally unchanged—with essentially the same people shaping and making the decision—could produce such a different result in 2007. As the current administration tries to replicate the surge in Afghanistan, this monograph is especially timely and shows the perils of attempting to achieve success in one strategic situation by copying actions successfully taken in another where different conditions applied."