John A. Bonin, ©2025 John A. Bonin; Monograph from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; Although 1775 is indisputably the birth year of the US Army, two events occurred on June 14 of that year to which the Army can credit its birthday. One is the adoption by the Continental Congress of the collective militia forces from several colonies outside Boston to form a Continental Army, of which Congress appointed George Washington the commander in chief on June 15, 1775. In addition, the US Regular Army officially dates its beginning to June 14, 1775, when the Second Continental Congress directed 10 companies of expert riflemen to be raised immediately in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. William Thompson’s commission as the colonel of the Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion was dated June 25, 1775, and made him the first colonel of what would eventually become, through George Washington’s Continental Army, the US Regular Army. But William Thompson has not found a prominent place in the American pantheon of revolutionary heroes for a variety of reasons. In addition, Thompson’s Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion later became the 1st Continental Regiment and ended the American Revolution as the 1st Pennsylvania Regiment, but its lineage has not continued in the modern US Army.

R. Evan Ellis, ©2025 R. Evan Ellis; Monograph from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; Innovative new thinking on the security dimension of the challenges posed by the PRC’s engagement in Latin America and the DoD’s role in the whole-of-government US response is needed. This monograph highlights risks from PRC influence networks, digital architectures, and dual-use commercial facilities in the region, particularly at ports and in the space sector; shows how PRC economic engagement and other support sustains illiberal regimes, indirectly contributing to the risks these regimes pose by hosting criminal and terrorist groups and other US adversaries, such as Russia and Iran; and illustrates how commercial, people-to-people, and security engagements create options for the PRC to exploit against the United States in times of war. It advocates for new effects-based strategic concepts for how the DoD can strengthen cooperation with the region and limit PRC access through enhanced security cooperation and leveraging partners’ valuation of their relationships with the United States to influence their choices regarding cooperation with the PRC and gain better situational awareness for responding to China. Finally, it discusses how the United States should work with regional partners to plan for likely PRC actions in the region in times of war, leveraging the presence, relationships, and knowledge created through engagement.

Ron Gurantz, ©2024 Ron Gurantz; Monograph from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; The US strategy in the run-up to the invasion of Ukraine appeared to undermine Russian efforts to justify the war. While studies of international crises typically focus on the goals of deterrence and escalation management, recent events in Ukraine show that counterjustification is another important objective. Russia used covert activities and deception to try and create a pretext for its invasion, and the United States aggressively countered these efforts. This monograph presents an exhaustive study of the US military, diplomatic, and informational strategy in the run-up to the invasion of Ukraine and derives lessons about counterjustification that can be applied in future crises. The study should help military officers and government officials develop effective counterjustification tactics.

Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-first Century Dr C. A. Pfaff Monograph by the US Army War College, US Army War College Press, Strategic Studies Institute "To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that examine the strategic decision-making process in interactions with adversaries and partners. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game-theory and similar approaches to understand how coercion works better. This analysis considers competitive interactions between actors that have discrete and qualifiable, if not quantifiable, preferences and who behave rationally, though this analysis acknowledges the behavior that is considered rational is frequently informed by nonrational social, cultural, and psychological factors. Considering these competitive interactions allows one to identify “rules of thumb” that can orient and guide actors as they compete."

A Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key US Allies and Security Partners—Second Edition Mr Gary J Schmitt Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "In a world where the United States faces two major revisionist powers—Russia and China—and additional security threats from Iran, North Korea, and jihadist terrorists, a critical edge for the United States is its global network of allies and strategic partners. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy notes, 'Alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match.' "

Security Threats, American Pressure, and the Role of Key Personnel: How NATO’s Defence Planning Process is Alleviating the Burden-Sharing Dilemma Dr John R Deni Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Many say one of NATO’s greatest strengths is its ability to conduct multinational military planning through its integrated military command. If this statement is true, the quadrennial NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is one of the alliance’s crown jewels. Through this process, the alliance strives to ensure it has the capabilities and capacity necessary to handle numerous threats and challenges across the alliance’s three mission areas: collective defense, crisis response, and cooperative security. For several allies, the NDPP is their only defense planning process. For the alliance, the NDPP represents a major element in the organization’s efforts to distribute fairly the burden of the member states’ common security requirements."

Rise and Fall? The Rise and Fall of ISIS in Libya Dr Azeem Ibrahim Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "This report argues exploiting the military and political defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Libya to eradicate the group completely from the country and weaken its capacity to act elsewhere in North and sub-Saharan Africa is now possible. In addition, the Libyan conflict continues to have consequences for the political stability of Europe via the pressure the migration flows are putting on the political infrastructure of the continent. In turn, this instability has implications for the United States’ European strategy, both insofar as commercial interests are concerned and in US capacity to contain Russian assertiveness on the edges of NATO territory."

Commentary on “The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028” BG Huba Wass de Czege Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Accepting General Mark A. Milley’s invitation to provide critical feedback on the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) discussion, Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, US Army retired, provides an institutionally informed critique of United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028."

Nonstate Actors and Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategies: The Coming Challenge Dr Jean-Loup Samaan Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "This monograph explores the emerging challenge of nonstate actors’ anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategies and their implications for the United States and its allies. This monograph starts from one major development: the historical monopoly of states over precision-guided munitions has eroded, and this evolution eventually challenges the ability of the most advanced militaries to operate in certain environments. Questioning the type of strategy that nonstate actors may implement as they gain greater access to advanced military technology, the research argues some of these groups increasingly lean toward A2/AD strategies. The analysis focuses on two regions, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, where case studies include Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis in Yemen, and separatist groups in Ukraine."