Archive

After Fidel, The Deluge? Dr Alex Crowther Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "As Louis XV allegedly said, “Apres moi, le deluge.” Certainly people have thought that Cuba after Fidel would be the same. How would a Cuban state that revolves around him survive his departure? How would a government where no decision is too small for his attention function? How would the generations who have known no one other than the “Maximo Lider” handle the change? Luckily for the Cuban government, the answer is—there will be almost no change in the near future. No deluge, just a drizzle."

Opportunities for Engaging Minorities Dr Dallas D Owens Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, The Department of Criminal Justice, North Carolina Central University "Successful engagement of minority communities by community, state, and national security agencies requires cultural understanding and appreciation for diversity within and among the agencies and willingness by agency leaders to initiate contact, either directly or through mutually-trusted agents."

Deterrence, Missile Defense, and Collateral Damage in the Iranian-Israeli Strategic Relationship Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "One of the central concerns of U.S. strategic analysts examining the Middle East is the danger that Iran may develop a nuclear weapons capability which it could use to threaten the security of other regional states. These fears exist despite the recent declassification of a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) “key judgments” summary suggesting that the Iranian nuclear weapons development program was frozen in 2003."

Intrepidity . . . And Character Development within the Army Profession Dr Don M Snider Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "How many Army soldiers, particularly Leaders, who just read the title of this opinion piece, knew the meaning of the first word; how many brought to their reading an accurate understanding of the term? More importantly, how many Army Leaders could place a true meaning of the word into the context of the Army as a unique profession producing, for the security of the American people, fighting forces for effective land combat? Where does intrepidity fit in what the Army produces and how does the profession develop such a thing?"

Development and Reform of the Iraqi Police Forces COL Tony Pfaff Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This paper will seek to show how social, political, cultural, and environmental factors have combined to impede Iraqi police development in ways that are predictable, understandable, and, with external help, resolvable. The corruption and abuse found in the Iraqi police services cannot simply be explained by poor leadership, the actions of a few corrupt individuals, or even the competing agendas of the various militias that are fighting for influence in post-Saddam Iraq. Rather, one must explain why such practices occur despite the fact they are unacceptable according to Iraqi cultural norms."

COIN of the Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy Dr Steven Metz, Mr Ralph Wipfli Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, with the 21st Century Defense Initiative of The Brookings Institution "Regardless of whether counterinsurgency (COIN) will be the dominant form of military activity in the future or simply one of several, the United States needs an effective national strategy which explains when, why, and how the nation should undertake it"

Is it Time to Mandate Volunteerism? Dr Leonard Wong Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This October, the U.S. Army successfully met its annual recruiting goal by bringing in 80,000 new soldiers for fiscal year 2007. This accomplishment, however, necessitated the offering of a $20,000 bonus to ship out immediately, depleted the delayed-entry pool of next year’s recruits to make this year’s mission, and required the relaxing of standards in the areas of high school graduation, criminal background, and mental aptitude. The next few years will be even more of a challenge as the Army increases its strength by 28,000 soldiers by 2010."

Working and Playing Well with Others: A Strategy-Policy Mismatch in Export Controls LTC Charles H Wilson Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Reading through the strategic guidance that our Nation has been operating under for a number of years, you can find a basic, common concept that I like to refer to as “work and play well with others.” It is derived from statements like “partnerships continue to be the principle source of our strength”1 and “the reform of NATO structures, capabilities and procedures must be accelerated.”2 Those are just two examples of the many similar references that are imbedded throughout documents from the National Security Strategy to CJCS-approved military strategies. The concept is also routinely reflected in guidance at lower levels of government, such as that developed by our Combatant Commanders."

The Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context Dr W Andrew Terrill Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, with The Atlantic Council of the United States "The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and the Atlantic Council of the United States conducted a colloquium entitled “The Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context” on March 25, 2007. Additional support for this conference was provided by the Washington Delegation of the European Commission and the Heinrich-Boell Foundation. The colloquium brought together serving and retired academics, diplomats, and military officers from the United States, Europe, and Turkey."