Archive

 

  •  Doctrine that Works

    Doctrine that Works

    Doctrine that Works Dr Douglas V Johnson II Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press " I recently spent a morning talking with a scholar who is researching material for a book on the U.S. Army’s willingness to learn about war above the tactical and operational level. His thesis echoes, to some degree, Dr. Antulio Echevarria’s monograph that concludes that there is an American Way of Battle, but not an “American Way of War,” as Russell F. Weigley’s well-studied book suggests. This scholar was asking for evidence to identify change points in the development of U.S. Army thinking about war during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s."
    • Published On: 8/1/2006
  •  Canadian Defense Policy--A breath of Fresh Air

    Canadian Defense Policy--A breath of Fresh Air

    Canadian Defense Policy--A breath of Fresh Air Dr Alex Crowther Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Canada and the United States closely cooperated in most security issues during the 20th century. In recent years, however, security relations between Canada and the United States have become strained, mainly due to disagreements on the methods used by the United States in prosecuting the Global War on Terror. The first policy issue was the Canadian government’s decision to decrease security resources significantly in the wake of the Cold War. The second issue centers on Canada’s disagreement concerning Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, as well as other U.S. policy decisions such as the use of Guantanamo Bay."
    • Published On: 7/1/2006
  •  Value Projection and American Foreign Policy

    Value Projection and American Foreign Policy

    Value Projection and American Foreign Policy Dr Douglas J Macdonald Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The controversies over the Bush administration’s “doctrine” of promoting democracy as a long-term goal of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) have raised once again that hardy perennial in the debate over American foreign policy: value projection. The debate juxtaposes two basic positions: the Jeffersonian idea that the United States should, when possible, serve as an active agent for the spread of democratic values in the world, and the Washingtonian idea that we should serve as a model for the rest of the world by developing democracy at home, not by taking actions to foster it abroad."
    • Published On: 6/1/2006
  •  Is Eurasia's Security Order at Risk?

    Is Eurasia's Security Order at Risk?

    Is Eurasia's Security Order at Risk? Dr Stephen J Blank Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The foundation stones of European and Eurasian security are the series of treaties beginning with the Helsinki treaty of 1975 and its extension at Moscow in 1991; the 1987 Washington Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear forces in Europe (INF); the 1990 Paris Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), extended in 1999; and the Paris and Rome treaties between NATO and Russia in 1997 and 2002. However, some, if not all, of these treaties are apparently at risk. In 2005 Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivano, told U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that Russia was thinking of withdrawing from the INF Treaty. Although nothing came of this gambit, a lower-ranking Russian general restated this interest in early, 2006, obviously at his superiors’ instigation."
    • Published On: 5/8/2006
  •  Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990 TO 2005

    Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990 TO 2005

    Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990 TO 2005 Dr Richard M Meinhart Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Military leaders at many levels have used strategic planning in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of the current situation, while simultaneously focusing on future challenges. This Letort Paper examines how four Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1990 to 2005 used a strategic planning system to enable them to meet their statutory responsibilities specified in Title 10 US Code and respond to the ever-changing strategic environment. These responsibilities include: assisting the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the armed forces; conducting strategic planning and net assessments to determine military capabilities; preparing contingency planning and assessing preparedness; and providing advice on requirements, programs, and budgets."
    • Published On: 4/1/2006
  •  U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat and Occupation

    U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat and Occupation

    U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat and Occupation Mr Shane Lauth, Ms Kate Phillips, Ms Erin Schenck, Dr W Andrew Terrill Colloquium Report by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies "Even before Operation IRAQI FREEDOM began, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) published a monograph about planning for transition to Phase IV operations. Now that we are 3 years beyond the start of that transition, the debate continues about the adequacy of planning for and proficiency of execution of Phase IV operations in Iraq and elsewhere. The debate most often surrounds three issues concerning this final operational phase: the relationship to preceding operational phases; responsibility for planning; and responsibility for execution. Inevitably, the interagency process becomes central to addressing each of these issues."
    • Published On: 4/1/2006
  •  The Challenge of Governance and Security

    The Challenge of Governance and Security

    The Challenge of Governance and Security Dr Max G Manwaring Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, with the U.S. Southern Command, the Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida International University "A contemporary assessment of Latin American and Caribbean security must address a comprehensive, all-inclusive threat environment and consider the utility of all instruments of state power."
    • Published On: 3/1/2006
  •  Planning For and Applying Military Force: An Examination of Terms

    Planning For and Applying Military Force: An Examination of Terms

    Planning For and Applying Military Force: An Examination of Terms Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This Letort Paper briefly examines current and, in some cases, still evolving definitions in joint doctrine—especially with regard to strategy, center of gravity, decisive point, and commander’s intent. It discusses the heritage of those concepts and terms, most of which derived from the writings of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. In so doing, the author finds that current joint planning definitions and concepts tend to confuse more than they inform. In short, they are not ready to be incorporated into formal doctrine, and certainly not into the actual planning process. Hence, concept developers need to go back to the drawing table, and make a concerted effort to separate the proverbial wheat from the chaff. Change is good, but so is tradition. The definitions advanced by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz have stood the test of time for good reasons. If we decide to change them, we should have equally good reasons for doing so."
    • Published On: 3/1/2006
  •  Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy

    Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy

    Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy Dr Harry R Yarger Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The word “strategy” pervades American conversation and our news media. We tend to use strategy as a general term for a plan, a concept, a course of action, or a “vision” of the direction in which to proceed at the personal, organizational, and governmental—local, state, or federal—levels. Such casual use of the term to describe nothing more than “what we would like to do next” is inappropriate and belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking. It reduces strategy to just a good idea without the necessary underlying thought or development. It also leads to confusion between strategy and planning, confining strategic possibilities to near-time planning assumptions and details, while limiting the flexibility of strategic thought and setting inappropriately specific expectations of outcomes. "
    • Published On: 2/1/2006
Page 21 of 28