Archive

 

  •  In Defense of Rational Risk Assessment

    In Defense of Rational Risk Assessment

    In Defense of Rational Risk Assessment Mr Nathan P Freier Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Risk in Webster’s is “the possibility of suffering harm or loss.”1 Risk accompanies both action and inaction. To strategists, it is accounted for and mitigated, but not always or even commonly avoided. To the national security strategist, risk—to paraphrase the current defense strategy—is the likelihood of failure or prohibitive cost in pursuit of key objectives. In this view, some goals are beyond reach. Others are within reach, but the cost of achieving them puts more important ambitions in some jeopardy. Unfortunately, those familiar with contemporary strategic-level military decisionmaking know that rational consideration of even the prospect of failure is absent. In high-level policy discussions, success is assumed."
    • Published On: 2/1/2007
  •  Colombia and the United States--The Partnership: But What Is the Endgame?

    Colombia and the United States--The Partnership: But What Is the Endgame?

    Colombia and the United States--The Partnership: But What Is the Endgame? AMB Myles R R Frechette Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The American-Colombian strategic partnership has made significant progress since the inception of Plan Colombia. The United States has provided a considerable amount of economic, police, judicial, and military assistance. But much work looms ahead to eliminate the threats to state authority—the terrorism and the drug trafficking that nurture so much violence and corruption. Drug production and trafficking continue as the producers have learned how to outwit government counternarcotics efforts."
    • Published On: 2/1/2007
  •  Exploring the "Right Size" for China's Military: PLA Missions, Functions, and Organizations

    Exploring the "Right Size" for China's Military: PLA Missions, Functions, and Organizations

    Exploring the "Right Size" for China's Military: PLA Missions, Functions, and Organizations Mr Justin B Liang, Dr Sarah K Snyder Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, with the National Bureau of Asian Research "On October 6, 2006, more than 60 leading experts on China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) convened at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, for a two-day discussion of the drivers of PLA force modernization. The 2006 PLA Conference was co-sponsored by National Bureau of Asian Research and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Entitled “Exploring the ‘Right Size’ for China’s Military: PLA Missions, Functions, and Organization,” the conference explored continuities and discontinuities in the forces driving PLA force modernization, assessed how current modernization efforts are linked to national requirements, and examined what such development reveals about China’s national defense strategies."
    • Published On: 2/1/2007
  •  Negotiating with Iran and Syria over Iraq

    Negotiating with Iran and Syria over Iraq

    Negotiating with Iran and Syria over Iraq Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The United States has been struggling for decades to establish effective ways to deal with Iran and Syria, with no easy answer coming to the fore. In recent years, the question sometimes was framed as to whether we should seek regime change for these nations or accept the existence of the current regimes and attempt to change their behavior through political pressure and negotiations. Recently, the possibility of coercive regime change seems to have been ruled out under all but the most exceptional circumstances by a key administration official."
    • Published On: 1/1/2007
  •  Iraqi Security Forces and Lessons from Korea

    Iraqi Security Forces and Lessons from Korea

    Iraqi Security Forces and Lessons from Korea Dr Sheila Miyoshi Jager Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The creation of a viable Iraqi security force has been the sine qua non of our success in Iraq (and the withdrawal of our military). The key question is, is this still feasible? This is not the first time we have undertaken such a task. Some succeeded (the Balkans and El Salvador), some failed (Vietnam), and some are ongoing (Afghanistan). But it was in South Korea, after its liberation at the end of World War II, where we first attempted to build a national security force from the ground up..."
    • Published On: 12/1/2006
  •  Naval Transformation, Ground Forces, and the Expeditionary Impulse: The Sea-Basing Debate

    Naval Transformation, Ground Forces, and the Expeditionary Impulse: The Sea-Basing Debate

    Naval Transformation, Ground Forces, and the Expeditionary Impulse: The Sea-Basing Debate Prof Geoffrey Till Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The end of the Cold War has ushered in a period in which Western military forces have engaged primarily in expeditionary operations. These have turned out to be much more complex politically than first thought and have required naval planners to focus on delivering effects from the sea rather than at sea. Accordingly, navies around the world are going through a time of transition and transformation in which questions are being asked about their priorities, the relative importance of their contributions to joint and combined campaigns, and how these best might be provided."
    • Published On: 12/1/2006
  •  Transformation's Uncontested Truths

    Transformation's Uncontested Truths

    Transformation's Uncontested Truths Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Much of the literature concerning military transformation in the United States employs a number of popular, but hitherto unchallenged clichés. Unfortunately, when phrases are repeated frequently enough, they begin to sound true. In policy circles, where haste is often by necessity the order of the day, that poor basis can suffice to justify any number of decisions. Clichés and catchwords are merely handy ways of capturing and conveying truths; they may reveal a lack of imagination on the part of the user, but they are hardly dangerous. Unsubstantiated clichés, however, are another matter."
    • Published On: 11/1/2006
  •  Fashion Tips for the Field Grade

    Fashion Tips for the Field Grade

    Fashion Tips for the Field Grade Dr Leonard Wong Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "From my perch here in the ivory fortress of the U.S. Army War College, I am tasked to look across the Army, take notice of strategic trends in the human dimension of war, and then ponder their implications for the military. Recently, I have felt compelled to address a strategic trend noticed by most everyone in the Army, yet seldom discussed in open company. Although I have yet to get my hands on the actual statistics to prove it, I believe that right about the time an officer attains the rank of major, his choice of clothing begins to narrow down to two or three items. As a result, he begins to stand out in a crowd because his civilian wardrobe is about 7 or 8 years out of date. (I focus on males because they (we) have greater need for correction.)"
    • Published On: 10/1/2006
  •  Confronting the Unconventional: Innovation and Transformation in Military Affairs

    Confronting the Unconventional: Innovation and Transformation in Military Affairs

    Confronting the Unconventional: Innovation and Transformation in Military Affairs Dr David Tucker Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "As the Quadrennial Defense Review Report for 2006 makes clear, the Department of Defense (DoD) is committed to transforming itself. In the years to come, it will continue to transform its regular or conventional warfare capabilities, that is, its capabilities to operate against the military forces of other states. But the Report also makes clear that DoD must give “greater emphasis to the war on terror and irregular warfare activities, including long-duration unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and military support for stabilization and reconstruction efforts.”
    • Published On: 10/1/2006
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