Strategy & Policy

Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, A Report Sponsored by the Army Capabilities Integration Center in Coordination with Joint Staff J-39/Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Branch LTC Charles R Burnett, COL William J Cain Jr, LTC Christopher D Compton, Mr Nathan P Freier, LTC Sean M Hankard, Prof Robert S Hume, LTC Gary R Kramlich II, COL J Matthew Lissner, LTC Tobin A Magsig, COL Daniel E Mouton, Mr Michael S Muztafago, COL James M Schultze, Prof John F Troxell, LTC Dennis G Wille Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "U.S. competitors pursuing meaningful revision or rejection of the current U.S.-led status quo are employing a host of hybrid methods to advance and secure interests that are in many cases contrary to those of the United States. These challengers employ unique combinations of influence, intimidation, coercion, and aggression to incrementally crowd out effective resistance, establish local or regional advantages, and manipulate risk perceptions in their favor."

The USAWC Strategy Model in Moldova: Developing the Master's Course (Level II PME) for Military and Civilian Professionals COL Florian Circiumaru, Colonel Mark V Montesclaros Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Beginning in 2009, a multinational team of NATO professional military education (PME) experts began providing assistance to the Republic of Moldova’s Armed Forces at the Moldovan Military Institute (later Academy [MMA]) in Chisinau. The team’s broad purpose was to help the Moldovan military adjust from a Soviet-style military educational system to one that more closely mirrored NATO and Western standards. While constitutionally a neutral country, Moldova is a Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consortium member and participant in the Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP). As part of the DEEP process, the NATO team, co-led by Colonel (Ret.) John F. Troxell of the USAWC’s Strategic Research Department, was initially charged with two major efforts."

Futures Seminar 2015 - The United States Army in 2025 and Beyond, Vol. 2 Mr Samuel R White Jr Compilation of Student Papers by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College Press "This compendium represents 23 students’ peek into the Army of 2025+. Some ideas and recommendations are specific and affect narrow slices of the Army; others are broad and span multiple services or components. Some are tactical; others strategic. Some very aspirational; others very practical. Regardless, they are the thoughts of strategic thinkers who have embraced their responsibility to help posture the enterprise for the future by thinking and writing about tough issues. The enterprise is better for their effort."

Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners Need to Know Dr Tami Davis Biddle Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "In this monograph, Dr. Tami Davis Biddle examines why it is so difficult to devise, implement, and sustain sound strategies and grand strategies. Her analysis begins with an examination of the meaning of the term “strategy” and a history of the ways that political actors have sought to employ strategies and grand strategies to achieve their desired political aims. She examines the reasons why the logic undergirding strategy is often lacking and why challenges of implementation (including bureaucratic politics, unforeseen events, civil-military tensions, and domestic pressures) complicate and undermine desired outcomes. This clear-headed critique, built on a broad base of literature (historical and modern; academic and policy-oriented), will serve as a valuable guide to students and policymakers alike as they seek to navigate their way through the unavoidable challenges—and inevitable twists and turns—inherent in the development and implementation of strategy."

Strategic Insights: Economic Power: Time to Double Down John F. Troxell Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "A recent editorial in The New York Times asked the question, “Who threatens America most?” It proceeded to compare recent pronouncements by incoming senior military leaders, the President, the FBI director, and finally the Director of National Intelligence. The major candidates included the usual nation states (Russia, North Korea, and China), a few nonstate terrorist organizations (ISIS and al-Qaeda), and a couple of unattributed capabilities (weapons of mass destruction and cyberattacks). The editorial concluded with the lament: 'If officials cannot agree on what the most pressing threats are, how can they develop the right strategies and properly allocate resources?' "

The Limits of Offshore Balancing Dr Hal Brands Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Should the United States undertake a fundamental strategic retrenchment? Should it roll back, and perhaps do away with, the system of overseas security commitments and military deployments that have anchored its international posture since World War II? Many academic and strategic studies observers have answered “yes” to these questions in recent years. They assert that America’s long-standing, postwar grand strategy has become both dispensable and self-defeating—dispensable because that grand strategy is no longer needed to sustain an advantageous global environment, and self-defeating because it wastes finite means while eliciting adverse behavior from allies and adversaries alike. The proper response to this situation, they believe, is to adopt a minimalist approach referred to as “offshore balancing.” Briefly stated, offshore balancing envisions a dramatic reduction in America’s overseas military deployments and alliance commitments, and a shift toward greater restraint and modesty in U.S. policy writ large. It is premised on the idea that this type of retrenchment will actually produce better security outcomes at a better price— that when it comes to grand strategy, less will actually be more."

Using Target Audience Analysis to Aid Strategic Level Decisionmaking Dr Steve Tatham Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Albert Einstein famously stated that: “Any fool can know; the point is to understand.” Over the past 20 years, the United States has known that there exist people with a profound hatred of all that it and the West are, and all that it stands for. During that time the American people and our allies abroad have known war in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and we know that today in Syria, Iraq, in Nigeria and North Africa those enemies plan and plot more violence and more hatred against us. Yet, do we really understand? If there is one observation that has been repeated by military commanders and policymakers alike from almost every nation in our various coalitions, it is the idea that we have not understood our adversary properly."

2015-16 Key Strategic Issues List Professor John F. Troxell Document by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The global security environment remains volatile, uncertain and complex and the velocity of instability around the world has increased dramatically. The recently published National Military Strategy highlights the growing global disorder and increasing unpredictability. The complexity of this dynamic security environment is captured in the Army’s new operating concept, “Win in a Complex World.” The challenge that we face is clearly articulated in the Army Vision..."

The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the ANSF Will Not Hold, and the Implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan Dr M Chris Mason Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Military personnel who have experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Vietnam, as well as senior leaders and military historians alike, will find this book by Dr. Chris Mason thought-provoking and useful. Dr. Mason examines indigenous personnel issues at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war and uses empirical data and exhaustive research to argue that all three wars were lost before the first shots were fired—not on the battlefield, but at the strategic level of war."