Strategy & Policy

Transformation and Strategic Surprise Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Colin Gray takes a broad view of strategic surprise, and relates it to the current military transformation. He argues that the kind of strategic surprise to which the United States is most at risk and which is most damaging to our national security is the deep and pervasive connection between war and politics. Although America is usually superior at making war, it is far less superior in making peace out of war. Dr. Gray concludes that the current military transformation shows no plausible promise of helping to correct the long-standing U.S. weakness in the proper use of forces as an instrument of policy."

American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment Dr Stephen D Biddle Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Grand strategic choices are among the most important decisions senior leaders must make. Getting grand strategy right is fundamental to success in the Global War on Terrorism. This monograph assesses the grand strategic choices presented to the United States since 2001, by evaluating their ability to serve our basic national security interests in a post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), world, and by identifying implications for American policy in the coming years."

Strategic Implications of Intercommunal Warfare in Iraq Dr W Andrew Terrill Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The future of Iraq is uncertain. The country is in a dangerous phase. The removal of a brutal dictatorship by coalition forces in April 2003 has given the Iraqi people hope for a new and better political system, where individuals do not have to live in continuing fear and uncertainty. Nevertheless, the Iraqi people must also address the difficult challenges of self-government for a diverse population, with major ethnic and sectarian groups that often maintain widely divergent agendas. If they fail to do this and an ethnic/sectarian war ensues, the consequences will be dire, not only for Iraq, but for the entire Middle Eastern region."

Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post-Conflict in the 21st Century COL Lloyd J Matthews Colloquium Report by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "During each of the last 15 years, the U.S. Army War College has sponsored a broad-based strategy conference that addresses a major security issue of current relevance to the United States, its allies, and, indeed, the entire world. Bringing together some 150 200 scholars, defense specialists, news media representatives, active and retired members of the military community, and uniformed and civilian faculty members of senior U.S. service colleges, the annual conferences are conceived to generate open, unfettered dialogue on the issue under discussion. Particular attention is paid to controversial or unresolved questions, always with the aim of surfacing practical answers based upon multiple perspectives and a dispassionate regard for reason and the attendant facts."

Unlearning Counterinsurgency Dr Steven Metz Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Once again insurgency and counterinsurgency have become issues of great importance to the U.S. military, particularly the Army. This is not a new phenomenon, but the latest manifestation of an old cycle. Several times in the past the Army has mastered counterinsurgency, only to see attention wane when the strategic significance of insurgency subsided, thus forcing it to re-learn the skill when a new threat emerged. Now we must do this again."

Confronting an Irregular and Catastrophic Future Mr Nathan P Freier Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Next year's Quadrennial Defense Review (or QDR) will be the most important since the end of the Cold War. A frank appraisal of the nation’s strategic future in light of September 11, 2001 (9/11), experience in the war on terrorism, and on-going conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan indicates a need for substantial adjustment to the strategy reflected in QDR ‘01. Such adjustments in defense strategy and policy, however, require that the future trajectory of the nation’s primary challenges be thoroughly reassessed."

Trilateral Strategic Defense Capability Planning Symposium Dr Kent H Butts, LTC Curtis W Turner Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The Republic of the Philippines (RP) has undertaken a bold initiative to reform its national security architecture in order to more effectively address regional terrorist and other transnational threats. This strategic planning initiative has developed the Emerging Security Environment to 2022 document, a National Military Strategy, a National Internal Security Plan, and a Multi-Year Defense Capability Planning System (MYDCaPS). The initiative has its roots in a two-year long series of trilateral, Republic of the Philippines, Australia and United States (U.S.) Senior Leader Strategic Planning Symposia. The Australian Embassy-Manila hosted the latest event, the Trilateral Strategic Defense Capability Planning Symposium, on 13-15 July 2004."

A Nation at War in an Era of Strategic Change Dr Williamson Murray Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The President, Secretary of Defense, and the Army’s Chief of Staff have all stated that the United States is a “Nation at War.” This fundamental fact is key to what we do at the U.S. Army War College. Because of our continued emphasis on the Global War on Terrorism, we face significant strategic challenges as we continue to transform the force, improve interagency integration into joint operations, and, all the while, engage in active combat operations."

Observing al Qaeda Through the Lens of Complexity Theory: Recommendations for the National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism LTC Michael F Beech Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The defeat of al Qaeda and the global network of Islamic terrorist organizations often appear no more certain today than it did two years ago. Since 9/11 the world has witnessed terrorist attacks against US interests and its allies in seven different countries. Al Qaeda may have lost Afghanistan as a safe haven, but it has gained a new front by conducting operations against US and coalition forces in Iraq. Despite US military successes, al Qaeda retains a demonstrated ability to recruit and conduct operations globally as Osama bin Laden and many of his most experienced inner circle and associates are still at large. Although there has yet to be another devastating attack on the US homeland, it is important to remember that the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon took over three years of planning and preparation. The lack of a subsequent catastrophic attack in the US since 9/11 is not in itself proof of a successful strategy against terrorism. Despite the efforts of two years of military operations against al Qaeda, the CIA pronounced that al Qaeda still represents the single greatest risk to US national security. This paradox calls into question the very frameworks, models and tools that US strategic leaders use to develop counter terrorism policy and strategy."