Recent Articles

Guide to Rebuilding Public Sector Services in Stability Operations: A Role for the Military? Professor Susan Merrill Guides and Handbooks by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Strategic Studies Institute "This paper provides guidance helpful to U.S. peacekeeping personnel in planning and executing stability operations tasks related to restoration of public sector services and infrastructure. It is designed to supplement existing and emerging guidance, and is specifically relevant to addressing the needs of public sector rebuilding in a post-conflict situation by peacekeeping forces. The material presented here draws both from theory and analytic frameworks and from on-the-ground experience of practitioners."

Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction Beth Cole, Professor William J Flavin Guides and Handbooks by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, United States Institute of Peace, United States Institute of Peace Press "Terrorists, transnational organized crime syndicates, local warring factions, warlords, and petty thieves have all found common cause in states and regions in conflict. This nexus of interests has grown in sophistication over the past decade, aided by money and technology and fueled by greed and fanaticism. Civilians have increasingly become the victims of violence fostered by this nexus. The required response is a comprehensive one that brings together specialized organizations to stabilize extremely dangerous and hostile environments while laying the foundations for a sustainable peace."

War's Second Grammar Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "With the publication of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, the U.S. military officially embraced a second grammar of war. As an official statement of counterinsurgency doctrine, these manuals have received their share of criticism and praise, neither of which will be repeated here. Instead, the purpose of this opinion piece is to suggest that, no matter how different war’s second grammar is from its first, it is still a grammar. To be sure, holding true to good grammar contributes immensely to favorable outcomes in war. However, even an exquisite grammar cannot save a dubious logic; nor can it encompass all factors that contribute to military success."

The Army's Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict Major Paul Oh, Dr Don M Snider, Major Kevin Toner Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In the series forward, General Casey challenges us to deeply study the richness of the Army professional Ethic formed over our 234 year history, the last 35 years of which comprised as an all-volunteer professional force. Dr. Snider and his fellow authors take on General Casey’s challenge and engage in vibrant and thoughtful dialog about our profession and our PME. They call us toward a deeper understanding of what it means to be a professional, to be part of a professional body, and our responsibilities to that body and to the nation it serves in continuing to advance our Ethic."

Food Security Mr Brent C Bankus, Jason Delosua Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "For a majority of Americans and western Europeans, sufficient food is readily accessible and its cost is a relatively small percentage of their annual income. This, however, is not the case for almost a billion people around the world, including large numbers in the strategically important states of Egypt, India, China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Pakistan and Ethiopia. In these countries, and in others, food insecurity has been or is a contributor to regional or domestic instability, "

Congressional Gridlock, Town Hall Vitriol...and the Information Dennis M Murphy Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Speed, access to news, connectivity…. The information age, as Thomas Friedman likes to remind us, has made the world flat. From many perspectives, that’s good news. You can access news from anywhere, at any time with a click of a mouse. You have the capability to watch literally hundreds of television channels, in multiple languages from the comfort of your couch. You can listen to rock, jazz, metal or classical music without interruption driving from coast to coast…or you can listen to talk radio a mind-numbing 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. And the future will only bring more capability, more options, and more information."

National Security Strategy Reform: Rebalancing the President's Agenda Dr Robert H Dorff Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The common wisdom about presidential success in achieving major goals is simple: Focus on only one or at most two major initiatives. Presidents who try to accomplish too much risk accomplishing nothing, and multiple agenda items distract the team from “staying on message” providing ample opportunity for opponents to undermine the efforts."

Mind-Sets and Missiles: a First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis Mr Kenneth Michael Absher Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This Letort Paper provides a detailed chronology and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The author, Mr. Kenneth Absher, contends that, when our national security is at stake, the United States should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations, including espionage, to penetrate our adversary’s deceptions. At the same time, the United States must also understand that our adversary may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or may not allow its own agenda to be influenced by U.S. diplomatic pressure."

Iraq: Strategic Reconciliation, Targeting, and Key Leader Engagement Capt Jeanne F Hull Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Military commanders and diplomats in Iraq and Afghanistan have been meeting with important local officials since the inception of those conflicts. These Key Leader Engagements (or KLE as they are now termed) have aided commanders and diplomats alike in furthering their objectives by establishing productive relationships with those who know and understand Iraq’s complex human terrain best—the Iraqis. However, these engagements frequently take place on ad-hoc bases and are rarely incorporated into other counterinsurgency operations and strategies. In some cases, unit commanders fail to see the utility of using KLE at all—an oversight that contributes to deteriorating security situations and loss of popular support. "