Recent Articles

 
  •  Known Unknowns: Unconventional "Strategic Shocks" in Defense Strategy Development

    Known Unknowns: Unconventional "Strategic Shocks" in Defense Strategy Development

    Known Unknowns: Unconventional "Strategic Shocks" in Defense Strategy Development Mister Nathan P Freier PKSOI Paper by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Strategic Studies Institute "The current defense team confronted a game-changing “strategic shock” in its first 8 months in office. The next team would be well-advised to expect the same. Defense-relevant strategic shocks jolt convention to such an extent that they force sudden, unanticipated change in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) perceptions about threat, vulnerability, and strategic response. Their unanticipated onset forces the entire defense enterprise to reorient and restructure institutions, employ capabilities in unexpected ways, and confront challenges that are fundamentally different than those routinely considered in defense calculations."
    • Published On: 11/1/2008
  •  PLA Missions Beyond Taiwan

    PLA Missions Beyond Taiwan

    PLA Missions Beyond Taiwan Mr Marc Miller Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, The National Bureau of Asian Research, and The Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M University "The PLA is being assigned and training for an increasing variety of missions, including nontraditional battlefields such as outer space and cyber space, as well as nontraditional functions, such as United Nations peacekeeping operations."
    • Published On: 11/1/2008
  •  Known Unknowns: Unconventional "Strategic Shocks" in Defense Strategy Development

    Known Unknowns: Unconventional "Strategic Shocks" in Defense Strategy Development

    Known Unknowns: Unconventional "Strategic Shocks" in Defense Strategy Development Mr Nathan P Freier Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The current defense team confronted a gamechanging “strategic shock” in its first 8 months in office. The next team would be well-advised to expect the same. Defense-relevant strategic shocks jolt convention to such an extent that they force sudden, unanticipated change in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) perceptions about threat, vulnerability, and strategic response. Their unanticipated onset forces the entire defense enterprise to reorient and restructure institutions, employ capabilities in unexpected ways, and confront challenges that are fundamentally different than those routinely considered in defense calculations."
    • Published On: 11/1/2008
  •  Leadership in the Era of the Human Singularity: New Demands, New Skills, New Response, The Proteus Monograph Series, Volume 2, Issue 4

    Leadership in the Era of the Human Singularity: New Demands, New Skills, New Response, The Proteus Monograph Series, Volume 2, Issue 4

    Leadership in the Era of the Human Singularity: New Demands, New Skills, New Response, The Proteus Monograph Series, Volume 2, Issue 4 Barton Kunstler Study by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, Proteus Monograph Series Fellows Program "The “human singularity” refers to the integration of technology into the human body so that levels of mental acuity and physical ability eclipse all previous known levels. Because of the unique character of these enhanced human specimens, they will represent a singularity in human history, something unique and to which a new set of laws may well apply. A broad front of converging core technologies, such as nanotechnology, bioengineering, supercomputing, materials development, and robotics, may make such individuals commonplace by 2030; indeed, significant steps have already been taken to achieve this goal, and the singularity could arrive earlier."
    • Published On: 10/17/2008
  •  Counterfactual Reasoning: A Basic Guide for Analysts, Strategists, and Decision Makers, The Proteus Monograph Series, Volume 2, Issue 5

    Counterfactual Reasoning: A Basic Guide for Analysts, Strategists, and Decision Makers, The Proteus Monograph Series, Volume 2, Issue 5

    Counterfactual Reasoning: A Basic Guide for Analysts, Strategists, and Decision Makers, The Proteus Monograph Series, Volume 2, Issue 5 Noel Hendrickson Study by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership Proteus Monograph Series Fellows Program "Counterfactual reasoning is the process of evaluating conditional claims about alternate possibilities and their consequences (i.e., “What If” statements). These alternatives can be either past possibilities (e.g., “If the United States had not abolished the Iraqi army in 2003, then the Iraqi insurgency would have been significantly smaller in 2005”) or future possibilities (e.g., “If Iran had nuclear weapons, then it would provide this technology to Hezbollah”). Counterfactuals are essential to intelligence analysis because they are implicit in all strategic assessments. For, any proposal about the appropriate response to a particular situation (past or future) assumes that certain things would or might occur if that response were made."
    • Published On: 10/17/2008
  •  Military Transformation Challenges: Moldova and Montenegro

    Military Transformation Challenges: Moldova and Montenegro

    Military Transformation Challenges: Moldova and Montenegro Prof Bernard F Griffard Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The dissolution of the Soviet Bloc and the disintegration of Yugoslavia produced 22 new independent governments across Europe and Central Asia. Prior to 1991 these countries were part of integrated economic and military structures where they contributed what was required and shared in the benefits of their closed loop systems. For those smaller entities at the lower end of the viability spectrum, independence, with the resulting disappearance of the economic and defense security blankets, has been more of a cold shower than a warm bath. "
    • Published On: 10/16/2008
  •  Experimentation in Support of DoD's Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept

    Experimentation in Support of DoD's Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept

    Experimentation in Support of DoD's Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept Prof Bert B Tussing Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "On 23 and 24 September 2008, the Center for Strategic Leadership hosted a “Limited Objective Experiment” (LOE) in support of the validation and refinement of the Department of Defense’s (DoD)Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept (HD-CS JOC). The event was the fourth in a series that envisions a total of 12 such experiments, all designed to help describe how Joint Force Commanders will conduct and support operations in this regime eight to twenty years in the future. Previous LOE’s were hosted and facilitated by the National Defense University and the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security. The last two experiments have been hosted and conducted by CSL at Collins Hall."
    • Published On: 10/16/2008
  •  Transformation of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces

    Transformation of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces

    Transformation of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces Mr Ritchie L Dion, Prof Bernard F Griffard, Prof James W Shufelt Jr Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The South Caucasus region is bounded by the Black Sea in the west and the Caspian Sea in the east, by Russia in the north, Turkey in the west and Iran in the south. This region, in combination with the Russian North Caucasus, is often regarded as the land bridge where the East and the West meet. Within this geographically confined space three small, yet completely dissimilar nations have emerged – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The history of the region and the present character of its peoples are inextricably tied to the legacy of the several empires that have ruled over this region. Each left a legacy, for better or worse, within the three nations. Despite this legacy, or in some cases even because of it, each country has managed to develop their own distinct character, culture and history. "
    • Published On: 10/16/2008
  •  Collins Center Update, Volume 10, Issue 4 (Fall 2008)

    Collins Center Update, Volume 10, Issue 4 (Fall 2008)

    Collins Center Update, Volume 10, Issue 4 (Fall 2008) COL Eric Ashworth & LTC Eric McEldowney, Mr. William O. Waddell, COL (Ret.) B.F. Griffard, COL (Ret.) Arthur L. Bradshaw Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership
    • Published On: 10/15/2008
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