Recent Articles

American Grand Strategy after War Dr Dallas D Owens, Mr Ionut C Popescu Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and Duke University " • Since World War II, each American war has been followed by a period of grand strategy reassessment. • The degree to which the Nation’s leaders have felt the need to revise grand strategy has depended in part upon the degree to which the preceding conflict led to adverse consequences and in part upon the level of perceived danger in the new strategic environment."

State and Nonstate Associated Gangs: Credible "Midwives of New Social Orders" Dr Max G Manwaring Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph introduces a misunderstood aspect of “wars among the people.” The author addresses the interesting subject of the multifaceted nature and predominant role of gangs operating as state and nonstate proxies in the modern unbalanced global security environment. In every phase of the process of compelling radical political change, agitator-gangs and popular militias play significant roles in helping their political patrons prepare to take control of a targeted political-social entity. As a result, gangs (bandas criminales or whatever they may be called) are important components of a highly complex political-psychological-military act—contemporary irregular asymmetrical political war. In these terms, this monograph is relevant to modern political discussions regarding “new” socialism, populism and neopopulism, and hegemonic state and nonstate challenges to stronger opponents. "

Mexico's Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy Dr Hal Brands Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "On June 30, 2008, President George W. Bush signed into law the Merida Initiative, a 3-year, $1.4 billion counterdrug assistance program for Mexico and Central America. The bulk of this money is destined for Mexico, where it will help fund counternarcotics operations against the powerful cartels that have recently turned much of that country into a war zone. Since 2006, Mexico has suffered thousands of drug-related killings, a dramatic deterioration of public security, and severe psychological and social trauma; the Merida Initiative aims to rectify this situation by giving the Mexican government the tools to take the offensive in its fight against the drug traffickers. The program is likely to be extended in some form when its original mandate expires, and thus presages a long-term U.S. commitment to counternarcotics in Mexico."

Collins Center Update, Volume 11, Issue 2 (Spring '09) Ritchie Dion, Professor Bert B. Tussing, Professor Dennis Murphy, LTC Janice E. King Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership

The New Balance: Limited Armed Stabilization and the Future of U.S. Landpower Mister Nathan P Freier PKSOI Paper US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "The Department of Defense (DoD) cannot long ignore the inadequacy of much of the current force for nontraditional challenges lurking on the strategic horizon. In the face of the next large-scale unconventional challenge when the President turns to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) for options, the SecDef must have the right force available to respond effectively."

Drug Trafficking, Violence, and the State in Mexico Dr Phil Williams Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Headlines and television commentaries about Mexico becoming a failed state as a result of drug-related violence have become a dime a dozen. Terms such as “criminal insurgency,” “narco-terrorism,” and narco-insurgency are all used to describe the widespread killings. The Joint Operating Environment Report of 2008 even suggested that Mexico, along with Pakistan, could suffer from a dramatic collapse of the state, with serious implications for U.S. national security."

Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: A Proposed Human Capital Model Focused upon Talent LTC Michael J Colarusso, COL David S Lyle, COL Casey Wardynski Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Creating and maintaining a highly competent U.S. Army Officer Corps has always been the cornerstone of the nation’s defense. Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle, and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso consider America’s continuing commitment to an all-volunteer military, its global engagement in an era of persistent conflict, and evolving changes in its domestic labor market. They argue that the intersection of these factors demands a comprehensive Officer Corps strategy recognizing the interdependency of accessing, developing, retaining and employing talent. In their view, building a talent-focused strategy around this four-activity human capital model will best posture the Army to match individual officer competencies to specific competency requirements."

New NATO Members: Security Consumers or Producers? Dr Joel R Hillison Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In reading the headlines recently, one would assume that all of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies are shirking their commitments to the alliance and relying on the United States to do the heavy lifting in places like Afghanistan. But the reality is more nuanced. The contributions of NATO members vary greatly from country to country, and not all NATO allies can be characterized as free riders. While burden-sharing debates have been an enduring feature of NATO since its founding in 1949, they have become more heated in recent years as the U.S. military finds itself over-stretched in Afghanistan and Iraq and facing tough budgetary decisions due to the recent economic crisis."

Training for the “Political” War COL Louis H Jordan Jr Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "During a coffee break discussion that one esteemed colleague refers to as the “kaffe klatsch,” we addressed a scenario depicted in a recent work on our efforts in Iraq. The scene is familiar. An officer arrives in theater to discover the unpredictable environment surrounding him. In this case, he comments that he has found himself in a “political” war and not a “military” war."