Recent Articles

Russia and Arms Control: Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration? Dr Stephen J Blank Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "As the Obama administration took office, Russo-American relations were generally acknowledged to be at an impasse. Arms control issues feature prominently in that conflicted agenda. Indeed, as of September 2008, the Bush administration was contemplating not just a break in arms talks but actual sanctions, and allowed the bilateral civil nuclear treaty with Russia to die in the Senate rather than go forward for confirmation. Russian spokesmen make clear their belief that American concessions on key elements of arms control issues like missile defenses in Europe are a touchstone for the relationship and a condition of any further progress towards genuine dialogue."

Collins Center Update, Volume 11, Issue 1 (Winter 2009) Mr. Ritchie Dion, Mr. Harry Phillips, LTC Jim Harvey, Professor Bernard F. Griffard, Professor Dennis M. Murphy Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership

Strategic Planning in the Albanian Armed Forces COL Daniel G Grey, Prof Bernard F Griffard, Dr R Craig Nation Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "On July 9 2008 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies signed Accession Protocols with Albania and Croatia. This action opened the way for the full NATO membership of these two countries, and marked a major milestone in the continuing post-Cold War realignment of Europe. The event was especially significant for Albania, a country essentially isolated from its neighbors and the rest of Europe from 1948 to 1991. While there is still work to be done, most indications are that Albania will formally join the 26 nation pact in April 2009, coinciding with the 60th anniversary of the founding of NATO."

Kazakhstan's Defense Policy: An Assessment of the Trends Mr Roger N McDermott Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Roger N. McDermott argues that Kazakhstan’s armed forces, though subject to many structural changes, have not yet experienced systemic military reform. He assesses the achievements and setbacks of U.S. and NATO defense assistance to the country, while also showing that Kazakhstan remains deeply linked in close defense and security partnership with Russia. McDermott suggests greater sophistication and follow-up is needed from Western assistance programs to ensure that Kazakhstan successfully gains genuine military capabilities and the type of armed forces it needs within the region."

Kiss the Embargo Goodbye Dr Alex Crowther Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The embargo on Cuba has been in place for almost 50 years. Although it may have been an appropriate policy response to the Cuban Revolution in the milieu of the Cold War, the reality of the 21st century calls for its abolishment. It is time to kiss the embargo goodbye, while maintaining an unyielding stance that democracy is the only acceptable form of government in the Western Hemisphere."

Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm COL Scott G Wuestner Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This paper examines the current Building Partner Capacity and Security Force Assistance capabilities and capacities within the U.S. Army as well as the Department of Defense. The current operational environment calls for us to look at history, policy, doctrine, and other academic proposals to identify capability and capacity gaps. As the General Purpose Force looks forward to expanding roles in Irregular Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, and Security Assistance, does the U.S. Army have the proper force structure and minimal capability to fight and win the counterinsurgency of the future?"

Japan's Decision for War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons Dr Jeffrey Record Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace?"

Russia, China, and the United States in Central Asia: Prospects for Great Power Competition and Cooperation in the Shadow of the Georgian Crisis Dr Elizabeth Wishnick Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "An overview of changing U.S. Central Asia policy over the past 5 years reveals an effort to respond to changing developments on the ground, most recently the Georgian crisis, but also the “color” revolutions, the Andijan events in Uzbekistan and its subsequent decision to end U.S. basing rights at Karshi Khanabad, Kazakhstan’s economic rise, and leadership change in Turkmenistan. At the same time, the worsening security situation in Afghanistan and growing insecurity about energy supplies has heightened U.S. interest in security and economic cooperation in Central Asia. "

Operational Security in an Age of Radical Transparency Dennis M Murphy Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "We often hearken back to the Cold War as a simpler time…not because of the danger it portended, but because of the nature of the threat. That bipolar world defined a clear enemy with an order of battle that could be templated and processes and methodologies that could be studied. It was a two dimensional world of good and bad. Operations security (OPSEC), defined as “select(ing) and execut(ing) measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation,” was equally cut and dry. U.S. commanders in Europe were principally concerned with the Soviet-bloc spy taking pictures of the caserne motor pool. Troops were briefed prior to training exercises and deployments not to discuss dates, times or specifics of the operation under threat of military justice penalties. And that was that. Risk reduced…OPSEC considered and maintained. But, oh how the world has changed..."