Recent Articles

United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Engineers Manual United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Manual by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, United Nations "This Manual describes the United Nations (UN) Military Engineer Unit, focusing on Military Engineer support to a UN Mission and Force Headquarters. Always scalable in size, modular in function and Mission-tailored, the UN Military Engineer Unit’s size and composition depend on the size, composition and requirements of the UN Mission it supports and the physical characteristics of the Mission area."

Terrorist and Insurgent Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Use, Potentials, and Military Implications Dr Robert J Bunker Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Derived from the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) use threat scenarios, three levels of military significance are foreseen with terrorist and insurgent activities associated with these devices. Because of the technologies that will eventually be associated with UAVs—robotics and expert (and artificial intelligence) systems networked together—their significance is projected as increasing over time from the tactical to the operational and then to the strategic levels of concern..."

Duffer’s Shoal: A Strategic Dream of the Pacific Command Area of Responsibility COL Russell N Bailey, LTC Bob Dixon, Ms Laura McAleer, LTC Derek J O'Malley, COL (NZ) Christopher J Parsons, COL Elizabeth R Smith Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The following strategic assessment seeks to go beyond a traditional comparative analysis of the military, technological, political, cultural, and economic factors governing the relationships and capabilities of the Asia Pacific environment. To truly make sense of the intrinsic complexities unique to this region, the authors endeavor to broaden our view and rely on a tool often overlooked in government studies: imagination. Moreover, they aim to offer a strategic document that is readable, instructive, and provocative. Pulling from a well-referenced piece of military teaching, this assessment borrows a learning concept first employed in 1904 by Major General Sir Ernest Dunlop Swinton in The Defence of Duffer’s Drift."

The Army War College Review Vol. 1 No. 3 Dr Larry D Miller Tim L. Rieger, Edward R. Sullivan, Brandon Newton, Andrew M. Zacherl, Derrick Lee Army War College Review by the US Army War College Press

Using Target Audience Analysis to Aid Strategic Level Decisionmaking Dr Steve Tatham Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Albert Einstein famously stated that: “Any fool can know; the point is to understand.” Over the past 20 years, the United States has known that there exist people with a profound hatred of all that it and the West are, and all that it stands for. During that time the American people and our allies abroad have known war in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and we know that today in Syria, Iraq, in Nigeria and North Africa those enemies plan and plot more violence and more hatred against us. Yet, do we really understand? If there is one observation that has been repeated by military commanders and policymakers alike from almost every nation in our various coalitions, it is the idea that we have not understood our adversary properly."

2015-16 Key Strategic Issues List Professor John F. Troxell Document by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The global security environment remains volatile, uncertain and complex and the velocity of instability around the world has increased dramatically. The recently published National Military Strategy highlights the growing global disorder and increasing unpredictability. The complexity of this dynamic security environment is captured in the Army’s new operating concept, “Win in a Complex World.” The challenge that we face is clearly articulated in the Army Vision..."

Strategic Insights: Fragile States Cannot Be Fixed With State-Building Robert D. Lamb Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The problem with the way the international community thinks about and responds to fragile states is not that we do not understand “fragility,” its causes, and its cures, but that we think of them as “states,” as coherent units of analysis. As a result of this strategic level mistake, efforts to build state capacity to contain violence and reduce poverty are at least as likely to destabilize the country as they are to help. The U.S. military should consider the destabilizing potential of its efforts to build capacity, train and equip security forces, and provide support to diplomacy and development when its partners and beneficiaries are officials of fragile states."

Peace & Stability Journal, Volume 5, Issue 4 Mister Robert C Browne Peace and Stability Journal by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute During the 2015 PSOTEW, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) facilitated a discussion aimed at developing a new course on civilian and military relations. The new course will focus on developing the knowledge and skills necessary for mid-level practitioners in the U.S. Government (USG), the Non-Governmental Organization/International Organization (NGO/IO), and multi-national communities to work more effectively with each other and with host country actors."

SOLLIMS Sampler – Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations (July 2015) Mister David A Mosinski PKSOI SOLLIMS Sampler by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "The seven cross-cutting principles for stability operations are applicable at the individual, organizational, and systemic levels and are pertinent throughout planning, conduct, assessment, and transitions. These principles have proven their worth across the range of peace and stability operations and across diverse operational environments, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Southeast Asia, or Central America – as evidenced in countless lessons learned in the SOLLIMS database. What follows is a representative sample of lessons learned – highlighting key elements of each of the seven cross-cutting principles: Host Nation Ownership and Capacity, Political Primacy, Legitimacy, Unity of Effort, Security, Conflict Transformation, and Regional Engagement."