Monographs

 
  •  Closer Than You Think: The Implications of the Third Offset Strategy for the U.S. Army

    Closer Than You Think: The Implications of the Third Offset Strategy for the U.S. Army

    Closer Than You Think: The Implications of the Third Offset Strategy for the U.S. Army Mr Samuel R White Jr Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is moving forward with a broad set of innovation initiatives designed to effectively posture the U.S. military for the coming decades. One sub-set of initiatives, the Third Offset, is focused on leap-ahead technologies and capabilities that may offset competitor parity in critical domains."
    • Published On: 10/26/2017
  •  Closer Than you Think - The Implications of the Third Offset Strategy for the US Army

    Closer Than you Think - The Implications of the Third Offset Strategy for the US Army

    Closer Than you Think - The Implications of the Third Offset Strategy for the US Army Samuel R. White, Jr. Report by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "In support of the Army’s examination of the Third Offset, the U.S. Army War College conducted a 6-month project employing faculty and student researchers to study the potential impact of the DoD’s Third Offset Strategy on the Army. The study team examined the Third Offset Strategy from a strategic perspective. Ultimately, the study is designed to help the Army understand the influence of the Third Offset capabilities on the character of warfare and the implications of these capabilities for the Army and Landpower. This understanding may then help inform decisions in research and development, as well as leader development, training, and organizations."
    • Published On: 10/1/2017
  •  Toward a NATO of the Gulf? The Challenges of Collective Defense Within the GCC

    Toward a NATO of the Gulf? The Challenges of Collective Defense Within the GCC

    Toward a NATO of the Gulf? The Challenges of Collective Defense Within the GCC Dr Jean-Loup Samaan Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The stability of the Gulf remains a priority of U.S. national security interests. Because of its importance both politically and economically, the region is and should likely remain a critical area for U.S. Armed Forces in the near future. But if for a long time, the Gulf Arab kingdoms seemed to be passive actors of their own region―leaving either Iran, Iraq, or Western powers to shape the power plays―they now reached an unprecedented level of strategic ambition. As evidenced by their active diplomatic agendas in the Middle East and their increased military involvement in regional crises, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are now players that matter."
    • Published On: 9/28/2017
  •  Strategic Landscape, 2050: Preparing the U.S. Military for New Era Dynamics

    Strategic Landscape, 2050: Preparing the U.S. Military for New Era Dynamics

    Strategic Landscape, 2050: Preparing the U.S. Military for New Era Dynamics Mr Roman Muzalevsky Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Assessing longer term trends may seem like a manageable task. But in the world of rapid technological innovations and growing complexity, it turns into a more difficult enterprise. Yet this is what Mr. Roman Muzalevsky, a strategic affairs analyst, achieves in his visionary assessment of a strategic landscape and operational threat environment likely to emerge by 2050."
    • Published On: 9/14/2017
  •  The Clash of the Trinities: A New Theoretical Analysis of the General Nature of War

    The Clash of the Trinities: A New Theoretical Analysis of the General Nature of War

    The Clash of the Trinities: A New Theoretical Analysis of the General Nature of War MAJ Daniel D. Maurer Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Major Daniel Maurer begins assembling his framework by respectfully questioning the received wisdom that Clausewitz was the last and most comprehensive word on the subject of war’s underlying nature. First, despite some common ground regarding the relevance of war’s political basis, he finds no consensus (no “unified field theory”) among practitioners, presidents, political scientists, sociologists, or historians—from Clausewitz to Wylie to Keegan—that satisfactorily accounts for all of war’s varying shades, and which legitimately recognizes its basic elemental components, its evolving character, and the “Why?” that animates or inspires parties to engage in conflict."
    • Published On: 9/11/2017
  •  Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing: How Can the Army Achieve Assurance and Deterrence Efficiently and Effectively?

    Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing: How Can the Army Achieve Assurance and Deterrence Efficiently and Effectively?

    Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing: How Can the Army Achieve Assurance and Deterrence Efficiently and Effectively? Dr John R Deni Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "For the purposes of efficiently and effectively assuring allies and deterring adversaries in Europe and on the Korean Peninsula, the Army’s force posture is out of balance today, with insufficient units and Soldiers stationed overseas. Since the end of the Cold War—during which hundreds of thousands of Soldiers were stationed overseas—the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of a U.S.-stationed Army, yielding an over-reliance on rotational deployments for continuous heel-to-toe presence to achieve deterrence and assurance effectively and at reasonable, sustainable cost."
    • Published On: 8/25/2017
  •  What Should the U.S. Army Learn From History? Recovery From a Strategy Deficit

    What Should the U.S. Army Learn From History? Recovery From a Strategy Deficit

    What Should the U.S. Army Learn From History? Recovery From a Strategy Deficit Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "This monograph examines the potential utility of history as a source of education and possible guidance for the U.S. Army. The author considers the worth in the claim that since history (more accurately termed the past) is all done and gone, it can have no value for today as we try to look forward. This point of view did not find much favor here. The monograph argues that although history does not repeat itself in detail, it certainly does so roughly in parallel circumstances. Of course, much detail differs from one historical case to another, but nonetheless, there are commonly broad and possibly instructive parallels that can be drawn from virtually every period of history, concerning most circumstances."
    • Published On: 7/26/2017
  •  U.S. Landpower in the South China Sea

    U.S. Landpower in the South China Sea

    U.S. Landpower in the South China Sea LTC Clarence J Bouchat (USAF, Ret) Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "U.S. landpower in the South China Sea is an essential component to stabilizing this contested region. Together, the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) offer distinctive capabilities whose defensive nature in this semi-enclosed maritime environment tend to be less prone to escalation while still sending an unequivocal message of committed support and steady resolve to partners and competitors alike. To establish U.S. landpower as a critical part of security and stability in the region, this monograph presents how its wide-ranging capabilities are important in directly supporting U.S. interests. "
    • Published On: 7/7/2017
  •  At Our Own Peril: DoD Risk Assessment in a Post-Primacy World

    At Our Own Peril: DoD Risk Assessment in a Post-Primacy World

    At Our Own Peril: DoD Risk Assessment in a Post-Primacy World Mr Nathan P Freier Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The report endeavors to inform the defense strategy discussion by evaluating the components, high-level assessment, and articulation of risk by the Department of Defense (DoD) at the strategic and military levels of analysis, as well as across the operational and future challenges time horizon. Moreover, in doing so, it answers a single simple question: How should DoD adapt its current risk identification and assessment conventions to accommodate an environment defined by persistent, disruptive change?"
    • Published On: 6/29/2017
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