Collections

State Collapse, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Somalia Dr J Peter Pham Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "...In this monograph, however, Dr. J. Peter Pham adopts a different approach. Beginning with a keen appreciation for the intricacies of Somali culture and history, he argues that the key is to understand political legitimacy among the Somali and then examines how both al-Shabaab and the different local polities that have emerged in Somalia have, to varying degrees, acquired it—as well as how successive Somali regimes have not. He also explores how weakness of, and divisions among, the insurgents can be better exploited by engaging and empowering alternative centers of legitimacy. What emerges from his analysis is a rather nuanced picture of the counterinsurgency strategy that, following several frustrating years, finally achieved its objectives, as well as several provocative suggestions."

Building Better Armies: An Insider’s Account of Liberia Dr Sean McFate Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "We have long known that helping allies build better armies and police forces is a key to regional stability and the exit strategy for costly missions like Afghanistan in an “as they stand up, we stand down” approach. Yet the U.S. track record on this is unacceptably weak. The 2012 coup in Mali was staged by U.S. trained Malian soldiers. In Afghanistan, after years of training, the Pentagon assessed that only one of the Afghan National Army’s 23 brigades is able to operate independently. This does not augur well for U.S. troop withdrawal in 2014 or for the future of Afghanistan."

What Is Next for Mali? The Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability Dr Dona J Stewart Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "In March 2012, the government of Mali, one of the most touted symbols of Africa’s democratic potential fell in a military-executed coup. At the same time, a 4-decade-old rebellion among Tuaregs seeking autonomy or independence reached new heights, fueled by weapons from Muammar Gadaffi’s fallen government and perhaps the belief that the Arab Spring could extend to northern Mali. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and their allies were quick to capitalize on the increasing chaos in a territory characterized by lack of government control and poverty and seized the major cities in the north. The imposition of a severe form of Islamic law and a growing food crisis sent the population fleeing south across Mali’s international borders. The French-led military intervention, Operation SERVAL, ousted the militants from the main cities in the north, but did not address the crisis’ underlying issues including the grievances that feed the Tuareg nationalist movement, the establishment of a civilian-led government in Mali, and the near- and long-term threats to food security. The eruption of this crisis also demands a critical look at the Sahel’s regional security framework, and the U.S. role in it. "

Conflict Management and Peacebuilding: Pillars of a New American Grand Strategy Dr Robert H Dorff, Dr Volker C Franke Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press The symposium discussions ranged from the conceptual to the practical, with a focus on the challenges and desirability of interagency cooperation in international interventions. Invited panelists shared their experiences and expertise on the need for and future of an American grand strategy in an era characterized by increasingly complex security challenges and shrinking budgets. Panelists agreed that taking the status quo for granted was a major obstacle to developing a successful grand strategy and that government, the military, international and nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector are all called on to contribute their best talents and efforts to joint global peace and security efforts. The panelists engaged the audience in a discussion that included viewpoints from academia, the military, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and industry. Despite the broad range of viewpoints, a number of overarching themes and tentative agreements emerged. The reader will find them in the chapters of this edited volume.

Forging an American Grand Strategy: Securing a Path Through a Complex Future. Selected Presentations from a Symposium at the National Defense University Dr Sheila R Ronis Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press On November 8-9, 2011, the National Defense University held a symposium entitled “Forging an American Grand Strategy: Securing a Path Through a Complex Future,” at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, DC. This book represents a compilation of several papers delivered at that conference. The topics discussed are relevant to the audiences of the Strategic Studies Institute, and the U.S. Army in general, students, faculty, developers of strategy, and policymakers. Joint professional military education requires the teaching of grand strategy and the assistance such a strategy makes to the development and articulation of the National Security Strategy. This is the focus of much of the curriculum at all the war colleges within the Pentagon. The conference began a conversation that needs to continue because the Nation is struggling with where we are going and how we need to get there. What is the country’s grand strategy? Do we need one? If one does not exist, then in a world of complexity and globalization, what is the context that we will use to make decisions in the absence of a grand strategy that guides? How can the Nation plan in a proactive sense to be ready for the future, let alone shape one, without such a framework? The papers presented at this conference represent a sampling of the diversity of opinions on this topic. We hope that it will give the reader some issues to consider.

NATO Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach: The Implications of Burden-Sharing and the Underappreciated Role of the U.S. Army Dr John R Deni, Mr Steven J Whitmore Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The 2010 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decision to expand its ballistic missile defense program was somewhat surprising for several reasons, including lukewarm European public support for ballistic missile defense and tightening defense budgets on both sides of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, the Alliance has moved forward, with a significant expansion of its ballistic missile defense program, stating its intent to defend all European member state territory and populations, and declaring at the Chicago summit in 2012 that the Alliance had achieved an interim capability."

Changing Minds In The Army: Why It Is So Difficult and What To Do About It Dr Stephen J Gerras, Dr Leonard Wong Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "While changing one’s mind is not something we normally associate with strategic leadership, Stephen Gerras and Leonard Wong point out that it is not only a valuable skill at the strategic level, but also a necessary capability in the current security environment of complexity and change. Unfortunately, as the authors describe, changing one’s mind does not come easy for Army senior leaders. Individual and organizational factors emerge that make the ability to change one’s mind difficult and elusive. Nevertheless, this monograph introduces a concept that all Army senior leaders should evaluate both in themselves and the Army profession."

An Assessment of the DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace Dr Thomas M Chen Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "In some ways, the cyber domain is quite different from the traditional operational domains of air, land, sea, and space. Cyber threats are stealthy and difficult to attribute; critical infrastructures are difficult to defend against unseen and unpredictable adversaries. The 2011 Department of Defense (DoD) Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace was a significant policy statement for publicly embracing cyberspace as an operational domain and declaring a number of strategic initiatives to maintain U.S. security in the face of emerging cyber threats. In this monograph, Dr. Thomas Chen explains the strategies as they have evolved from previous national strategies and examines each strategy critically for clarity, comprehensiveness, and novelty. "

The Real "Long War": The Illicit Drug Trade and the Role of the Military Prof Geoffrey Till Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Since the end of the Cold War, for the United States and everyone else, the concept of security has widened enormously. It has moved far beyond the confines of national defense against military threats from other nation states, incorporating threats ranging from transnational criminality, through cyber attack, international terrorism, and aggression from rogue and other hostile states. This poses increasing challenges to the world’s militaries, especially those also grappling with the consequences of reduced financial support. It raises the question of choice and priority. How should the United States allocate its priorities and resources, for example, between the worst kind of threat the nation faces and the most likely?"