Collections

  •  What Should the U.S. Army Learn From History? Recovery From a Strategy Deficit

    What Should the U.S. Army Learn From History? Recovery From a Strategy Deficit

    What Should the U.S. Army Learn From History? Recovery From a Strategy Deficit Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "This monograph examines the potential utility of history as a source of education and possible guidance for the U.S. Army. The author considers the worth in the claim that since history (more accurately termed the past) is all done and gone, it can have no value for today as we try to look forward. This point of view did not find much favor here. The monograph argues that although history does not repeat itself in detail, it certainly does so roughly in parallel circumstances. Of course, much detail differs from one historical case to another, but nonetheless, there are commonly broad and possibly instructive parallels that can be drawn from virtually every period of history, concerning most circumstances."
    • Published On: 7/26/2017
  •  The Army War College Review Vol. 3 No. 2

    The Army War College Review Vol. 3 No. 2

    The Army War College Review Vol. 3 No. 2 Larry D Miller Colonel James M. Efaw, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin R. Jonsson, Lieutenant Colonel Asariel Loria, Commander Mark O’Connell, Colonel Stephen E. Schemenauer Army War College Review by the US Army War College Press
    • Published On: 7/24/2017
  •  Strategic Insights: U.S.-China Relations: Avoiding the Traps

    Strategic Insights: U.S.-China Relations: Avoiding the Traps

    Strategic Insights: U.S.-China Relations: Avoiding the Traps Prof John F Troxell Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press
    • Published On: 7/19/2017
  •  The Army War College Review Vol. 3 No. 1

    The Army War College Review Vol. 3 No. 1

    The Army War College Review Vol. 3 No. 1 Larry D Miller Colonel Darren Huxley, COL David C. Menser, Lieutenant Colonel Carter L. Price, Lieutenant Colonel Jaren K. Price, LTC Geoffrey W. Wright Army War College Review by the US Army War College Press
    • Published On: 7/18/2017
  •  Ends, Means, Ideology, and Pride: Why the Axis Lost and What We Can Learn from Its Defeat

    Ends, Means, Ideology, and Pride: Why the Axis Lost and What We Can Learn from Its Defeat

    Ends, Means, Ideology, and Pride: Why the Axis Lost and What We Can Learn from Its Defeat Dr Jeffrey Record Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Why did the Axis Powers lose World War II, and what can we learn from its defeat? The Axis seemed on top of the world until 1941, when it added to its list of enemies the United States and the Soviet Union. The entry of Russia and America into the war decisively tipped the balance against Germany, Italy, and Japan. Resource-rich Russia and the United States were prepared for protracted conflict, whereas the Axis was not. From Pearl Harbor onward, it is difficult to imagine how the Axis could have avoided the fate that befell it, short of Stalin’s defection from the Allied side."
    • Published On: 7/13/2017
  •  U.S. Landpower in the South China Sea

    U.S. Landpower in the South China Sea

    U.S. Landpower in the South China Sea LTC Clarence J Bouchat (USAF, Ret) Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "U.S. landpower in the South China Sea is an essential component to stabilizing this contested region. Together, the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) offer distinctive capabilities whose defensive nature in this semi-enclosed maritime environment tend to be less prone to escalation while still sending an unequivocal message of committed support and steady resolve to partners and competitors alike. To establish U.S. landpower as a critical part of security and stability in the region, this monograph presents how its wide-ranging capabilities are important in directly supporting U.S. interests. "
    • Published On: 7/7/2017
  •  At Our Own Peril: DoD Risk Assessment in a Post-Primacy World

    At Our Own Peril: DoD Risk Assessment in a Post-Primacy World

    At Our Own Peril: DoD Risk Assessment in a Post-Primacy World Mr Nathan P Freier Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The report endeavors to inform the defense strategy discussion by evaluating the components, high-level assessment, and articulation of risk by the Department of Defense (DoD) at the strategic and military levels of analysis, as well as across the operational and future challenges time horizon. Moreover, in doing so, it answers a single simple question: How should DoD adapt its current risk identification and assessment conventions to accommodate an environment defined by persistent, disruptive change?"
    • Published On: 6/29/2017
  •  Transforming the Force: The 11th Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963 to 1965

    Transforming the Force: The 11th Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963 to 1965

    Transforming the Force: The 11th Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963 to 1965 Brigadier General Thomas C. Graves Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Today’s Army has gone through some incredible transformations since the end of the Cold War. Since then, the Army has struggled with Force XXI concepts and, more recently, the concept of the “Prototype Brigade.” This monograph examines other periods of transformation to determine whether any of the lessons learned can be applied to current force structure changes. Specifically, the monograph conducts an in-depth study of the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963 to 1965, when the Army conducted extensive experimentation with air mobility and helicopter operations."
    • Published On: 6/27/2017
  •  Cyber Infrastructure Protection: Vol. III

    Cyber Infrastructure Protection: Vol. III

    Cyber Infrastructure Protection: Vol. III LTC John D Colwell, Jr, Dr Tarek N Saadawi Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "A key contribution of this book is that it provides an integrated framework and a comprehensive view of the various cyber infrastructure protection (CIP) approaches. The book is divided into three main parts: Part I addresses policy and strategy for cybersecurity and cybercrime; Part II focuses on the cybersecurity of smart cities; and, Part III discusses cyber infrastructure security and technical issues. We strongly recommend this book for policymakers and researchers."
    • Published On: 6/15/2017
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