Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing: How Can the Army Achieve Assurance and Deterrence Efficiently and Effectively? Dr John R Deni Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "For the purposes of efficiently and effectively assuring allies and deterring adversaries in Europe and on the Korean Peninsula, the Army’s force posture is out of balance today, with insufficient units and Soldiers stationed overseas. Since the end of the Cold War—during which hundreds of thousands of Soldiers were stationed overseas—the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of a U.S.-stationed Army, yielding an over-reliance on rotational deployments for continuous heel-to-toe presence to achieve deterrence and assurance effectively and at reasonable, sustainable cost."

Strategic Insights: Lost in Translation Dr M Chris Mason Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press The type of wars being fought since the end of World War II has changed dramatically from those fought in the first half of the 20th century and before. Wars fought between countries have dropped in number to nearly zero, while the number of wars fought inside individual countries has risen dramatically.

What Should the U.S. Army Learn From History? Recovery From a Strategy Deficit Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "This monograph examines the potential utility of history as a source of education and possible guidance for the U.S. Army. The author considers the worth in the claim that since history (more accurately termed the past) is all done and gone, it can have no value for today as we try to look forward. This point of view did not find much favor here. The monograph argues that although history does not repeat itself in detail, it certainly does so roughly in parallel circumstances. Of course, much detail differs from one historical case to another, but nonetheless, there are commonly broad and possibly instructive parallels that can be drawn from virtually every period of history, concerning most circumstances."

The Army War College Review Vol. 3 No. 2 Larry D Miller Colonel James M. Efaw, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin R. Jonsson, Lieutenant Colonel Asariel Loria, Commander Mark O’Connell, Colonel Stephen E. Schemenauer Army War College Review by the US Army War College Press

Strategic Insights: U.S.-China Relations: Avoiding the Traps Prof John F Troxell Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press

The Army War College Review Vol. 3 No. 1 Larry D Miller Colonel Darren Huxley, COL David C. Menser, Lieutenant Colonel Carter L. Price, Lieutenant Colonel Jaren K. Price, LTC Geoffrey W. Wright Army War College Review by the US Army War College Press

Ends, Means, Ideology, and Pride: Why the Axis Lost and What We Can Learn from Its Defeat Dr Jeffrey Record Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Why did the Axis Powers lose World War II, and what can we learn from its defeat? The Axis seemed on top of the world until 1941, when it added to its list of enemies the United States and the Soviet Union. The entry of Russia and America into the war decisively tipped the balance against Germany, Italy, and Japan. Resource-rich Russia and the United States were prepared for protracted conflict, whereas the Axis was not. From Pearl Harbor onward, it is difficult to imagine how the Axis could have avoided the fate that befell it, short of Stalin’s defection from the Allied side."

U.S. Landpower in the South China Sea LTC Clarence J Bouchat (USAF, Ret) Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "U.S. landpower in the South China Sea is an essential component to stabilizing this contested region. Together, the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) offer distinctive capabilities whose defensive nature in this semi-enclosed maritime environment tend to be less prone to escalation while still sending an unequivocal message of committed support and steady resolve to partners and competitors alike. To establish U.S. landpower as a critical part of security and stability in the region, this monograph presents how its wide-ranging capabilities are important in directly supporting U.S. interests. "

At Our Own Peril: DoD Risk Assessment in a Post-Primacy World Mr Nathan P Freier Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The report endeavors to inform the defense strategy discussion by evaluating the components, high-level assessment, and articulation of risk by the Department of Defense (DoD) at the strategic and military levels of analysis, as well as across the operational and future challenges time horizon. Moreover, in doing so, it answers a single simple question: How should DoD adapt its current risk identification and assessment conventions to accommodate an environment defined by persistent, disruptive change?"