Collections

Future War/Future Battlespace: The Strategic Role of American Landpower Dr Steven Metz, LTC Raymond A Millen Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The great difficulty in forecasting the future strategic environment and the force structure needed in response is the plethora of variables that change the calculus. Only hindsight reveals the failure of a Maginot Line or the brilliant success of a mechanized Blitzkrieg doctrine. In the final analysis, the reader must judge the line of reasoning. In this monograph, Dr. Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen examine the trends in the strategic environment in their development of the Future War/Future Battlespace. One fact is clear. Traditional warfighting has changed in the post 9-11 era. The U.S. military must adapt or fail. There is no other recourse."

Globalization and the Nature of War Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Perhaps the single most important phenomenon of the 21st century is globalization. It is clearly redefining the international security environment, as well as many other aspects of human affairs. Yet, while analysts and scholars continue to study (and debate) its economic, social, and political effects, they have done comparatively little work concerning its impact on war, in particular the nature of war. In an effort to fill this gap, Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II has written a monograph exploring the nature of war, and how it has changed as a result of globalization."

Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq: The Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey Dr W Andrew Terrill Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "War with Iraq will signal the beginning of a new era in American national security policy and alter strategic balances and relationships around the world. The specific effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. In some, America’s position will be strengthened. In others, it may degrade without serious and sustained efforts."

Waging Ancient War: Limits on Preemptive Force Dr D Robert Worley Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this study, conducted under the U.S. Army War College’s External Research Associates Program, Dr. D. Robert Worley addresses the ways that the age of terrorism is affecting American grand strategy. He contends that terrorism has made many of the basic concepts of international relations and national security obsolete. Declaring war on a tactic—terrorism—erodes the clarity necessary for coherent strategy. Dr. Worley then develops what he calls a “guerra strategy” more appropriate for dealing with terrorism and other nonstate threats."

Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr W Andrew Terrill Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "During the latter half of the 20th century, U.S. military leaders and planners focused heavily on winning wars, and not so much on the peacekeeping or nation-building that comes afterwards. But national objectives can often be accomplished only after the fighting has ceased. With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to begin planning for the post-conflict reconstruction of that state. This monograph presents some historical insights from past occupations and peace operations, provides some additional analysis of the unique requirements involved in remaking Iraq, and, most importantly, develops a detailed list of potential tasks to help contemporary military commanders plan for post-conflict operations there."

Why Saddam will not Choose Exile Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "During his rise to power, Saddam Hussein is reported to have taken his two young sons to Iraqi torture chambers to view acts of torment committed against the luckless individuals imprisoned there. One of these sons, Uday, grew up to be a psychopath, while the other, Qusay, became a cold disciplined killer like his father. Both learned from Saddam’s torturers to avoid the most horrible of all fates—helplessness before your enemies. It is a fate that Saddam himself will never accept."

Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict Major Robert M Cassidy Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Major Robert Cassidy uses a detailed assessment of the Russian experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya to draw important conclusions about asymmetric warfare. He then uses this to provide recommendations for the U.S. military, particularly the Army. Major Cassidy points out that small wars are difficult for every great power, yet are the most common kind. Even in this era of asymmetry, the U.S. Army exhibits a cultural preference for the “big war” paradigm. He suggests that the U.S. military in general, including the Army, needs a cultural transformation to master the challenge of asymmetry fully. From this will grow doctrine and organizational change."

Defeating Saddam Hussein's Strategy LTC Raymond A Millen Colloquium Report by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Should war break out between Iraq and the United States, Saddam Hussein will likely adopt a strategy designed to undermine the prestige of the United States and turn the Arab World against the West. A war culminating in a titanic battle for Baghdad would provide Saddam Hussein with the prestige and respect he seeks from the Arab World. His military advisers have likely informed him that urban combat will deprive U.S.-led coalition forces of their technological advantage and result in considerable attrition."

Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr W Andrew Terrill Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to plan for its post-conflict reconstruction. To assist such planning, this study proposes a construct for identifying the postwar missions to be accomplished following a victory over the Hussein regime and suggests the time phasing for the accomplishment of specific tasks."