Past Publications

The Paradox of Civil War Dr Stephen D Biddle Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The danger of civil war in Iraq has gotten much recent attention. Civil war would certainly be a disaster. Paradoxically, though, threatening overt civil war may be the only way out of our current predicament."

Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post-Conflict in the 21st Century COL Lloyd J Matthews Colloquium Report by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "During each of the last 15 years, the U.S. Army War College has sponsored a broad-based strategy conference that addresses a major security issue of current relevance to the United States, its allies, and, indeed, the entire world. Bringing together some 150 200 scholars, defense specialists, news media representatives, active and retired members of the military community, and uniformed and civilian faculty members of senior U.S. service colleges, the annual conferences are conceived to generate open, unfettered dialogue on the issue under discussion. Particular attention is paid to controversial or unresolved questions, always with the aim of surfacing practical answers based upon multiple perspectives and a dispassionate regard for reason and the attendant facts."

Chinese Crisis Management Mr Andy Gudgel Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, The Heritage Foundation, and American Enterprise Institute "Over 50 experts on China and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gathered at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, from October 1-3, to attend the 2004 Chinese Crisis Management Conference. Cosponsored by the Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute, and the U.S. Army War College, the conference participants discussed a framework for analyzing Chinese decisionmaking during crises, and examined historical examples of domestic, regional, and international crises and how the Chinese government dealt with them."

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response Dr Steven Metz, LTC Raymond A Millen Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Insurgency has existed throughout history but ebbed and flowed in strategic significance. Today the world has entered another period when insurgency is common and strategically significant. This is likely to continue for at least a decade, perhaps longer. As the United States confronts this threat, extrapolating old ideas, strategies, doctrine, and operational concepts is a recipe for ineffectiveness. Reconceptualization is needed."

Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice Mr Henry D Sokolski Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center "Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration’s desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike."

Unlearning Counterinsurgency Dr Steven Metz Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Once again insurgency and counterinsurgency have become issues of great importance to the U.S. military, particularly the Army. This is not a new phenomenon, but the latest manifestation of an old cycle. Several times in the past the Army has mastered counterinsurgency, only to see attention wane when the strategic significance of insurgency subsided, thus forcing it to re-learn the skill when a new threat emerged. Now we must do this again."

Shadows of Things Past and Images of the Future: Lessons for the Insurgencies in Our Midst Dr Max G Manwaring Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph begins with a short discussion of contemporary insurgency. It argues that in studying terror war, guerrilla war, or any other common term for insurgency war, we find these expressions mischaracterize the activities of armed groups that are attempting to gain political control of a state. These organizations are engaged in a highly complex political act--political war. Given that this type of conflict is likely to challenge U.S. and other global leadership over the next several years, it is important to understand that the final results of insurgency or counterinsurgency are never determined by arms alone. Rather, the results depend on winning the political support of the people."

Current and Future Challenges for Asian Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Regional Response Dr Scott A Jones Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph examines the current state of export control system development in the greater Asia region, with particular emphasis on the economic and security environment in which these systems operate. Identification then is made of the gains and remaining deficiencies in export control development. The monograph concludes by examining the applicability of the European Union’s effort to coordinate export controls to the regional forces shaping the regional trade and security dynamics in Asia and what the United States can do to facilitate greater export control development and cooperation."

Confronting an Irregular and Catastrophic Future Mr Nathan P Freier Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Next year's Quadrennial Defense Review (or QDR) will be the most important since the end of the Cold War. A frank appraisal of the nation’s strategic future in light of September 11, 2001 (9/11), experience in the war on terrorism, and on-going conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan indicates a need for substantial adjustment to the strategy reflected in QDR ‘01. Such adjustments in defense strategy and policy, however, require that the future trajectory of the nation’s primary challenges be thoroughly reassessed."