Archive

War's Second Grammar Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "With the publication of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, the U.S. military officially embraced a second grammar of war. As an official statement of counterinsurgency doctrine, these manuals have received their share of criticism and praise, neither of which will be repeated here. Instead, the purpose of this opinion piece is to suggest that, no matter how different war’s second grammar is from its first, it is still a grammar. To be sure, holding true to good grammar contributes immensely to favorable outcomes in war. However, even an exquisite grammar cannot save a dubious logic; nor can it encompass all factors that contribute to military success."

Congressional Gridlock, Town Hall Vitriol...and the Information Dennis M Murphy Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Speed, access to news, connectivity…. The information age, as Thomas Friedman likes to remind us, has made the world flat. From many perspectives, that’s good news. You can access news from anywhere, at any time with a click of a mouse. You have the capability to watch literally hundreds of television channels, in multiple languages from the comfort of your couch. You can listen to rock, jazz, metal or classical music without interruption driving from coast to coast…or you can listen to talk radio a mind-numbing 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. And the future will only bring more capability, more options, and more information."

Mind-Sets and Missiles: a First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis Mr Kenneth Michael Absher Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This Letort Paper provides a detailed chronology and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The author, Mr. Kenneth Absher, contends that, when our national security is at stake, the United States should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations, including espionage, to penetrate our adversary’s deceptions. At the same time, the United States must also understand that our adversary may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or may not allow its own agenda to be influenced by U.S. diplomatic pressure."

A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance Efforts LTC Theresa Baginski, COL Brian J Clark, LTC Francis Donovan, Ms Karma Job, LTC John S Kolasheski, COL Richard A Lacquement Jr, COL Michael J McMahon, Brigadier Simon "Don" Roach, COL Sean P Swindell, COL Curt A Van De Walle Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Current operations, demands of persistent conflict, and enduring U.S. national security interests underscore the immediate and continuing need to improve U.S. Security Force Assistance (SFA) efforts. The frequency and importance of such activities throughout U.S. history demonstrate that the current requirements are not anomalies. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been challenged to accomplish key national security goals due to a lack of capability and capacity to effectively advise, utilize, and partner with foreign security forces."

National Security Strategy Reform: Rebalancing the President's Agenda Dr Robert H Dorff Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The common wisdom about presidential success in achieving major goals is simple: Focus on only one or at most two major initiatives. Presidents who try to accomplish too much risk accomplishing nothing, and multiple agenda items distract the team from “staying on message” providing ample opportunity for opponents to undermine the efforts."

Iraq: Strategic Reconciliation, Targeting, and Key Leader Engagement Capt Jeanne F Hull Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Military commanders and diplomats in Iraq and Afghanistan have been meeting with important local officials since the inception of those conflicts. These Key Leader Engagements (or KLE as they are now termed) have aided commanders and diplomats alike in furthering their objectives by establishing productive relationships with those who know and understand Iraq’s complex human terrain best—the Iraqis. However, these engagements frequently take place on ad-hoc bases and are rarely incorporated into other counterinsurgency operations and strategies. In some cases, unit commanders fail to see the utility of using KLE at all—an oversight that contributes to deteriorating security situations and loss of popular support. "

The Role of Cuban Paramilitary Organizations (People's Militias) in the Post-Castro Era Dr Max G Manwaring Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Armed nonstate groups all over the world are directly challenging targeted governments’ physical and moral right and ability to govern. This almost chronic chaos is exacerbated by traditional nationstate actors using nonstate popular militias, youth leagues, gangs, or their equivalents to help the take control, maintain control, or regain control of a given political-economic-social entity. It is in this context that popular militias have been organized, trained, and nurtured in Cuba."

Pakistan - The Most Dangerous Place in the World Dr Larry P Goodson Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Pakistan is the most dangerous foreign policy problem facing the United States for five major reasons. First, Pakistan is a nuclear country, with at least 60 nuclear warheads (according to both journalistic and unclassified U.S. Government sources), a regular supply of fissile material with which to make more, multiple delivery systems, and a history as a known proliferator. Pakistan developed nuclear weapons because of its long and bloody history with its bigger next-door neighbor, India, to which it has lost four major military conflicts since 1947. They have not squared off again since the Kargil Conflict of 1999, and the world holds its breath over their next spat."

Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The USAWC’s Strategic Studies Institute held its 20th Annual Strategy Conference on April 14-16, 2009, at Carlisle Barracks. This year’s focus, “Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies,” was intended to look beyond the noted importance of advances in the field of cyber and information technologies to raise awareness of other technology areas which thus far have received less visibility. The conference explored biogenetics, biometrics, nanotechnologies, robotics, artificial intelligence, alternative energies, electromagnetic weaponry, nuclear power, and global warming. Approximately 135 attendees along with 19 panelists and speakers participated. As anticipated, the conference brought together a diverse group of scholars and individuals from the defense community and academia."