Strategy & Policy

 
  •  NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind?

    NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind?

    NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind? Dr William T Johnsen Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In November 1991, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization released "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" (hereafter Strategic Concept), the first significant revision of NATO strategy since the Alliance adopted the strategy of Flexible Response in 1967. In this new document, NATO acknowledged the dramatic improvements in the European security environment, and positioned the Alliance for the post-Cold War era. Since 1991, the Strategic Concept has guided NATO as it absorbed a unified Germany, massively reduced allied forces, partially overhauled its command and control structures, undertook peace operations in the former Yugoslavia under the aegis of the U.N., conducted combat operations for the first time in its history, and started to tackle the difficult question of enlarging the Alliance."
    • Published On: 5/25/1995
  •  Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability

    Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability

    Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability Dr Steven Metz Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this study, Steven Metz argues that the way the Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the military is better prepared for the reconstitution of capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult."
    • Published On: 2/1/1995
  •  Haiti Strategy: Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Rule of Law, Handoffs, and Exit

    Haiti Strategy: Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Rule of Law, Handoffs, and Exit

    Haiti Strategy: Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Rule of Law, Handoffs, and Exit Dr Gabriel Marcella Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Now that the armed forces of the United States have entered Haiti, what is the exit strategy? As the United States, the government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the United Nations coalition establish order, it is best to be mindful of the tasks ahead: building a new authority system based on the rule of law, instilling respect for human rights, and developing those values common to democratic communities around the world. The two keys to the success of this strategy will be how Haiti handles the amnesty question and what kind of judicial and police system is developed."
    • Published On: 10/20/1994
  •  The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning

    The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning

    The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning Dr Michael J Mazarr Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The author of this monograph, Dr. Michael J. Mazarr, argues that the current revolution in military affairs is part of a larger sociopolitical transformation. The new technologies both propelling and resulting from this transformation are having a profound impact on warfare. Dr. Mazarr urges military and civilian strategists, planners, and decisionmakers to think about armed conflict in ways so novel that those used to dealing with "the unchanging truths about war" may feel threatened. To help deal with the ambiguities and complexities presented by the RMA, Dr. Mazarr offers a framework of four principles for defense planning."
    • Published On: 6/10/1994
  •  National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy

    National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy

    National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy Dr Michael G Roskin Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The "national interest" is a composite declaration derived from those values that a nation prizes most–liberty, freedom, security. Interests are usually expressed in terms of physical survival, economic prosperity, and political sovereignty. The list invariably expands, and is ultimately shaped by subjective preferences and political debate. As an object of political debate, the concept of national interest serves to propose, justify, or denounce policies."
    • Published On: 5/1/1994
  •  Environmental Security: A DoD Partnership for Peace

    Environmental Security: A DoD Partnership for Peace

    Environmental Security: A DoD Partnership for Peace Dr Kent Hughes Butts Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "International environmental issues can lead to instability and conflict that threaten U.S. security interests and may result in the commitment of U.S. forces. Chronic, unresolved environmental issues threaten stability in such critical regions as the former Soviet Union, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Recognizing this, the Department of Defense (DOD) has committed itself to using DOD assets to mitigate environmental issues that could lead to instability. However, a strategy to implement this proactive policy has not been developed."
    • Published On: 4/1/1994
  •  The Nature of the Post-Cold War World

    The Nature of the Post-Cold War World

    The Nature of the Post-Cold War World Mr William G Hyland, Mr Charles William Maynes Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Are we in a new era in world affairs? It has become commonplace to assert this. But the best way to peer into the future--perhaps the only way--is to examine the past and to look for trends that appear to be shaping the present. If we understand clearly the contours of the international system after 1945, it will probably be easier for us to determine the extent to which we are now truly in a revolutionary era, one which will give us, whether we wish it or not, a New World Order."
    • Published On: 3/1/1993
  •  Strategy, Forces and Budgets: Dominant Influences in Executive Decision Making, Post-Cold War, 1989-91

    Strategy, Forces and Budgets: Dominant Influences in Executive Decision Making, Post-Cold War, 1989-91

    Strategy, Forces and Budgets: Dominant Influences in Executive Decision Making, Post-Cold War, 1989-91 Dr Don M Snider Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This study will present, using the process-tracking methodology of George and McKeown, the executive decision making of the Bush administration during the 1989-90 period. During this period the administration decided "that by 1995 our security needs can be met by an active force 25 percent smaller than today's." This early public statement was an indication of a set of major decisions made by the administration to effect a defense draw-down for the post-cold war era, decisions on both military strategy and the forces needed to execute it."
    • Published On: 2/1/1993
  •  Campaign Planning Handbook AY23

    Campaign Planning Handbook AY23

    Campaign Planning Handbook AY23 Col. Keith Burkepile Publication from the US Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, the US Army War College Press, and the School of Strategic Landpower "The purpose of this document is to assist United States Army War College students during the Military Strategy and Campaigning (MSC) course. It also serves to assist commanders, planners, and other staff officers in combatant commands (CCMD), joint task forces (JTF), and service component commands. It supplements joint doctrine and contains elements of emerging doctrine as practiced globally by joint force commanders (JFCs). It portrays a way to apply draft doctrine awaiting signature, published doctrine, and emerging concepts, all at the higher levels of joint command, with a primary emphasis at the combatant-command level."
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