Strategy & Policy

by LTC Aaron “Blair” Wilcox and Colonel (RET) Rick O’Donnell; Issue paper from the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership; The paper discusses the US Army's efforts to implement a new talent management strategy based on newly available data from over four years of assessments. It emphasizes the need to leverage data from assessment programs like the Battalion Commander Assessment Program (BCAP) and Colonels Command Assessment Program (CCAP) to select the best leaders for specific roles. The authors argue that current selection processes rely too heavily on subjective assessments and personal knowledge, while neglecting valuable, objective data newly available from BCAP and CCAP.

Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-first Century Dr C. A. Pfaff Monograph by the US Army War College, US Army War College Press, Strategic Studies Institute "To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that examine the strategic decision-making process in interactions with adversaries and partners. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game-theory and similar approaches to understand how coercion works better. This analysis considers competitive interactions between actors that have discrete and qualifiable, if not quantifiable, preferences and who behave rationally, though this analysis acknowledges the behavior that is considered rational is frequently informed by nonrational social, cultural, and psychological factors. Considering these competitive interactions allows one to identify “rules of thumb” that can orient and guide actors as they compete."

James M. Mitchell, James A. Kievit, Kirk J. Junker, Patrick J. Malone, Leslie L. Semrau; Publication by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership; The U.S. Army War College student team “Indovino Nefario” analyzes the future force design approaches of China and Russia, emphasizing that both nations are likely to adopt policy-driven and competition-centric strategies rather than traditional doctrinal frameworks. The report highlights that while China focuses on integrating military and economic strategies through its Military Civil Fusion policy, Russia is expected to prioritize asymmetric capabilities and modernization of its conventional forces to maintain deterrence amid economic constraints, with both nations aiming to mitigate risks associated with armed conflict in 2035.

Carlisle Compendia Allied Space Training Edition Dr Larry D Miller, Colonel Bryan Shrank, Colonel Scott Emmel, Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Miller Document by US Army War College "U.S. national strategy documents highlight the increasing significance of the space domain for today’s warfighters and the importance of working with our international allies and partners in that realm. In this issue, we outline and propose an Army course focused on integrating space operations into land warfare. The proposed Combined Space Officer Course (CSOC) will strengthen alliances and partnerships, increase lethality, and build greater deterrence. "

Grand Strategy is Attrition: The Logic of Integrating Various Forms of Power in Conflict Dr Lukas Milevski Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "In this monograph, Dr. Lukas Milevski explores the fact that grand strategy is accepted by academics as a concept, without any firm agreement on what that concept is or the logic that supports it. Indeed, it is vital to understand this logic, regardless of whether one pins it to the label “grand strategy” or to any other label that may be available."

Scenario Planning and Strategy in the Pentagon Dr Michael Fitzsimmons Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Students and practitioners of national security policy have long understood that uncertainty about the future is a central challenge of strategy. Scenario planning should be one of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) most important tools for developing strategy under uncertainty. Since 2002, the DoD has employed a formalized, joint scenario planning process to support strategy and force development, but that process has proven less influential than intended for strategic decision-making."

Strategic Insights: Challenges in Using Scenario Planning for Defense Strategy Dr Michael Fitzsimmons Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press

What Should the U.S. Army Learn From History? Recovery From a Strategy Deficit Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "This monograph examines the potential utility of history as a source of education and possible guidance for the U.S. Army. The author considers the worth in the claim that since history (more accurately termed the past) is all done and gone, it can have no value for today as we try to look forward. This point of view did not find much favor here. The monograph argues that although history does not repeat itself in detail, it certainly does so roughly in parallel circumstances. Of course, much detail differs from one historical case to another, but nonetheless, there are commonly broad and possibly instructive parallels that can be drawn from virtually every period of history, concerning most circumstances."

Ends, Means, Ideology, and Pride: Why the Axis Lost and What We Can Learn from Its Defeat Dr Jeffrey Record Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Why did the Axis Powers lose World War II, and what can we learn from its defeat? The Axis seemed on top of the world until 1941, when it added to its list of enemies the United States and the Soviet Union. The entry of Russia and America into the war decisively tipped the balance against Germany, Italy, and Japan. Resource-rich Russia and the United States were prepared for protracted conflict, whereas the Axis was not. From Pearl Harbor onward, it is difficult to imagine how the Axis could have avoided the fate that befell it, short of Stalin’s defection from the Allied side."