Strategic Issues

An American Way of War or a Way of Battle? Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Serious study of the American approach to waging war began in the early 1970s with the publication of Russell Weigley’s The American Way of War: A History of U.S. Military Strategy and Policy. Examining how war was thought about and practiced by key U.S. military and political figures from George Washington to Robert McNamara, Weigley concluded that, except in the early days of the nation’s existence, the American way of war centered on the desire to achieve a “crushing” military victory—either through a strategy of attrition or one of annihilation—over an adversary."

The Collins Center Update Vol 6, Issue 1: October - December 2003 Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership

Rebalancing the Force: Weighing the Roles of the Components Prof James O Kievit, LTC Robert W Lindemann, LTC John C Traylor, Prof Bert B Tussing Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Conduct of the Global War on Terrorism has raised the involuntary mobilization of Army Reserve and National Guard forces to their highest levels since World War II. This increased reliance on the Reserve Components (RC) prompted the Secretary of Defense to direct the Services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretaries of Defense to examine whether and how to “rebalance forces” in order to reduce the need to involuntarily mobilize the Guard and Reserve. The Army’s mission analysis is well underway, and the resulting AC/RC force structure will impact how the components provide appropriate and ready forces in support of the entire spectrum of missions overseas and for Homeland Security."

The Trajectory of Security Transformation Dr Steven Metz Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "For a decade now, a historic revolution in military affairs has unfolded, driven largely by technological developments. Within the U. S. military, immense effort has been expended to understand this revolution and harness it into security transformation. A network of organizations, institutions, and individual experts emerged to shape and energize this process. The result has been the most rigorous and sustained security transformation in human history."

Strengthening Regional Cooperation in Central Asia / Central Asian States Disaster Response Conference 2003 Prof Bernard F Griffard, LTC Curtis W Turner, Prof Bert B Tussing Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The world continues to get smaller, and the neighborhoods that it is composed of are becoming more dependent upon one another. Today’s threats to stability are trans-national in nature and rarely contained within the borders of one country. In most cases the consequences of a major terrorist action or environmental disaster will quickly overwhelm the management capability and response assets of the affected nation. When that occurs the maintenance of stability relies on effective regional, and if required, international assistance. A government that attempts to “go it alone” in today’s environment runs the risk of losing the confidence of its citizens and, as a result, its viability. As part of the United States’ active efforts to forge new, productive international relationships to meet the challenges of the 21st century, encouraging stronger regional ties where few currently exist is a key policy initiative."

Crack in the Foundation: Defense Transformation and the Underlying Assumption of Dominant Knowledge in Future War COL Herbert R Mcmaster Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "A failure to examine critically the fundamental assumption that underpins much of the defense transformation initiative threatens to undermine the best efforts of senior military and civilian officials and create vulnerabilities in future American forces. While this failure may not affect initiatives connected with homeland security, the ballistic missile defense program, or business practice reforms, it has permitted the development of an unrealistic vision of future conventional war. The intellectual foundation for building tomorrow’s military force rests on the unfounded assumption that technologies emerging from the “information revolution” will lift the fog of war and permit U.S. forces to achieve a very high degree of certainty in future military operations."

Reporters on the Ground: The Military and the Media's Experience During Operation Iraqi Freedom Prof Michael J Pasquarett Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "During the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Department of Defense (DoD) developed an embedded media program that planned for large numbers of embedded reporters throughout military units. Unlike Vietnam in the 1970s, this program resulted in television reporting from within Iraq, especially from those reporters embedded with front-line units, almost instantaneously. The speed that these reports made it on the air often outpaced the military’s communication channels. Although it gave the American citizens an immediate close up report of what their armed forces were doing, it handicapped media analysts and stateside reporters in their ability to put the raw reporting from the field into a larger context. Conversely, those TV journalists supplying these spectacular reports and engrossing pictures from the front line were also handicapped in that they were reporting in a vacuum, unable themselves to obtain any kind of perspective or context."

Citizen-Soldiers in a 21st Century Army at War Prof James O Kievit, LTC Thomas P Murray Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In the first decade of the 19th Century, Prussian General Karl Von Clausewitz set out to determine why nations with the most professional armies of his day lost war after war to the seemingly less-professional armies of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. In his now famous manuscript, On War, Clausewitz identified as essential to the nature of war the interplay of three key elements: the Government, the General and the army, and the people. From the government derived the fundamental rationale, from the general and the army the necessary skill and courage, and from the people the passions that enabled the creation and sustained exertion of tremendous national power. Successful conduct of war therefore requires both the preparation and the thoughtful orchestration of all three elements to draw forth and appropriately direct the maximum power of the nation."

Assisting Professional Militaries in Latin America, National Security Strategy Development Workshop, La Paz, Bolivia Prof Bernard F Griffard, Mr Todd M Wheeler Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Professionalization of their nation’s military establishment is a challenge for some Latin American democracies because of the historical baggage carried by their armed forces. The populations of the countries concerned are often suspicious of providing these former repressive organizations with modern “equipment and techniques”. However, the reality is, that the region’s military organizations existing with less than adequate training and professional standards as well as operating in an under resourced environment are susceptible to corruption and politicization, and in that way pose a threat to further democratic development. "