Middle East & North Africa

 
  •  Professionalizing the Iraqi Army: US Engagement after the Islamic State

    Professionalizing the Iraqi Army: US Engagement after the Islamic State

    Professionalizing the Iraqi Army: US Engagement after the Islamic State Dr C. A. Pfaff Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "While the US intelligence community worries about the emergence of “Da’esh 2.0,” the US security cooperation community has to worry about the development of the “Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 4.0” that will have to fight Da’esh and meet a broad range of other security and defense requirements. Here, the “4.0” refers to the facts that this is not the United States’ first attempt to assist the Iraqis in building their defense capacity and the United States is not the first security partner to try. Britain and the Soviet Union also took their turns developing Iraqi military capabilities, both with similar results."
    • Published On: 1/28/2020
  •  Turkey and the United States on the Brink: Implications for NATO and the US-Turkish Strategic and Military Partnership

    Turkey and the United States on the Brink: Implications for NATO and the US-Turkish Strategic and Military Partnership

    Turkey and the United States on the Brink: Implications for NATO and the US-Turkish Strategic and Military Partnership Dr. Kamal A. Beyoghlow Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The US-Turkish strategic partnership established at the end of World War II reached its climax in the late eighties, and is at a dangerous crossroad. Such an outcome has had a devastating effect on Turkey’s relationship with other Western partners, especially NATO, which has been the backbone of America’s defense alliance since the start of the Cold War. This situation, if it continues, is likely to force the unraveling of NATO as a cohesive organization at a time when it is facing a myriad of collective global security challenges, particularly in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan—far beyond its traditional defensive posture on the European continent. All is not lost, however, and with more diligent diplomatic and military-to-military dialogue and compromises, US-Turkish relations can be salvaged."
    • Published On: 1/8/2020
  •  Recommendations for Success in Afghanistan

    Recommendations for Success in Afghanistan

    Recommendations for Success in Afghanistan Dr M Chris Mason Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The group identified the four most important and challenging issues which the Resolute Support mission grapples with on a daily basis: (1) maintaining the equilibrium of power and control between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban at its current level; (2) bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table to begin peace talks with the Afghan Government; (3) getting Pakistan to curb its 17-year support to the Taliban; and, (4) start to roll back the pernicious dominance of opium production in the Afghan economy and its corrosive influence on national governance and state-building. "
    • Published On: 7/23/2019
  •  Riding the Hydra: How the Army Enterprise Went to War 2001-2007

    Riding the Hydra: How the Army Enterprise Went to War 2001-2007

    Riding the Hydra: How the Army Enterprise Went to War 2001-2007 Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly Historical Research Review by US Army War College, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center "The history of the U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom is replete with tactical and operational studies, and the shifts in strategy are well documented. The Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA) official study, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, provides an excellent analysis of the operational level of war. “Riding the Hydra,” however, examines the institutional Army, specifically the Army staff, and its efforts to prepare the Army for war."
    • Published On: 2/22/2019
  •  Contemporary Chemical Weapons Use in Syria and Iraq by the Assad Regime and the Islamic State

    Contemporary Chemical Weapons Use in Syria and Iraq by the Assad Regime and the Islamic State

    Contemporary Chemical Weapons Use in Syria and Iraq by the Assad Regime and the Islamic State Dr Robert J Bunker Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Chemical weapons remain a component of the 21st-century battlefield even though the international community has attempted to ban them from the arsenals of both state and nonstate actors. They have been referred to as the poor man’s atomic bomb, as have biological weapons, another form of nonnuclear weapons of mass destruction. While chemical weapons do not have the destructive power of strategic—or even tactical—nuclear warheads, they are far easier to acquire or produce and are able to generate a terror factor even when their use is merely threatened."
    • Published On: 2/7/2019
  •  Executive Summary: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Vol. 1

    Executive Summary: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Vol. 1

    Executive Summary: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Vol. 1 Colonel Joel D. Rayburn, Colonel Frank K. Sobchak with Lieutenant Colonel Jeanne F. Godfroy, Colonel Matthew D. Morton, Colonel James S. Powell, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew M. Zai Document by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The U.S. Army in the Iraq War was commissioned by Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno in 2013 to serve as the initial Army’s operational level history of the conflict. While he instructed that the review should be held to the same academic and evidentiary requirements of previous historical studies, other aspects would be fundamentally different. Believing that a classified review of the war would not be circulated sufficiently to engender organizational learning and change, General Odierno directed that the final product should be a readable, unclassified narrative."
    • Published On: 1/17/2019
  •  Executive Summary: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Vol. 2

    Executive Summary: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Vol. 2

    Executive Summary: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Vol. 2 Colonel Joel D. Rayburn, Colonel Frank K. Sobchak, with Lieutenant Colonel Jeanne F. Godfroy, Colonel Matthew D. Morton, Colonel James S. Powell, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew M. Zais Document by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The U.S. Army in the Iraq War was commissioned by Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno in 2013 to serve as the initial Army’s operational level history of the conflict. While he instructed that the review should be held to the same academic and evidentiary requirements of previous historical studies, other aspects would be fundamentally different. Believing that a classified review of the war would not be circulated sufficiently to engender organizational learning and change, General Odierno directed that the final product should be a readable, unclassified narrative."
    • Published On: 1/17/2019
  •  The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 1: Invasion – Insurgency – Civil War, 2003-2006

    The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 1: Invasion – Insurgency – Civil War, 2003-2006

    The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 1: Invasion – Insurgency – Civil War, 2003-2006 COL Joel D. Rayburn, COL Frank K. Sobchak Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "In September 2013, Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond T. Odierno directed the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Study Group to research and write an operational history of the U.S. Army’s experience in the Iraq War from 2003 to 2011. This volume, The United States Army in the Iraq War, 2003-2006, is the first of two fulfilling that task. It tells the story of the U.S.-led campaigns to remove Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi Ba’athist regime from power in 2003 and to stabilize the country following those operations. It details the course of the campaigns up to a point in late 2006 when President George W. Bush and other U.S. leaders changed the strategy in Iraq to one that resulted in the “surge” counteroffensive by American troops in 2007–2008. That counteroffensive and the subsequent withdrawal of the coalition forces from Iraq are the subjects of the second volume of this series."
    • Published On: 1/17/2019
  •  The U.S. Army in the Iraq War — Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal, 2007-2011

    The U.S. Army in the Iraq War — Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal, 2007-2011

    The U.S. Army in the Iraq War — Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal, 2007-2011 COL Joel D. Rayburn, COL Frank K. Sobchak Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "In September 2013, then Army Chief of Staff General Raymond T. Odierno directed the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Study Group to research and write an operational history of the U.S. Army’s experience in the Iraq War from 2003 to 2011. This volume of The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the second of two fulfilling that task. It tells how the surge counteroffensive in 2007-2008 neutralized both the Sunni insurgency and Shi’a militias, bringing Iraq to its most peaceful and stable state since the invasion. It then describes how, with political support for the war waning, consecutive Presidential administrations began to reduce the number of troops in Iraq while Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and later United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) worked hurriedly to prepare the Iraqi military to take responsibility for their nation’s security. The speed of the drawdown accelerated significantly after the election of President Barack Obama, culminating in an unexpected complete withdrawal in 2011..."
    • Published On: 1/17/2019
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